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Abstract 
 
This thesis critically explores a social reality (i.e. a resettlement process) from the 
perspective of a local community through the collection and analysis of empirical 
data, focusing on the nature of the power relations between affected communities 
and their traditional leadership, and uncovers some of the deeper dynamics at play 
between the traditional authority and its constituencies. The nature and evolution of 
these power dynamics was influenced by 150 years of Bafokeng social and political 
history, shaped by the discovery of minerals, by repeated challenges of 
constituencies to the leadership and their respective constant repositioning in the 
balance of powers, and by the advent of representative democracy. 
 
This thesis argues that the wealth engendered by mining revenues, and the 
agreements that the Bafokeng traditional authority and mining companies entered 
into on the one hand; and the fragility of such wealth and contractual arrangements 
due to growing dissatisfaction within communities as well as competing land claims 
by individuals within the Royal Bafokeng Nation on the other (threatening the very 
basis on which this wealth is built), have contributed to shift the leadership style in the 
Royal Bafokeng Nation from one emphasising participatory democracy and checks 
and balances, thereby tending to a relatively stable balance of powers; to a more 
authoritarian and centralised one, stripping institutions such as traditional councils 
and lekgotla of their (counter) powers, and co-opting representatives of communities 
on the ground such as the kgosanas (headmen).  
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Terminology 
 
The argument of this research is built around key terms such as mining, community 
and participatory democracy and this section describes how these terms are used in 
the thesis. 
 
Mining: the term mining is used here in a broad sense, encompassing a range of 
meanings. It can designate mining activities such as exploration, underground and 
open cast mining, blasting, or disposal of mining waste; as well as mining companies 
themselves. Although a few mining companies have operations in the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation, Anglo Platinum will be specifically mentioned in this research, as it 
is blasting from the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine (a Joint Venture between the 
Bafokeng and Anglo Platinum) that led to the displacement and relocation of the 
community of Lekgoropane. 
 
There are a number of terms used to refer to people affected by mining or having an 
interest in mining projects or the mining industry in general: communities, 
stakeholders, civil society, Interested and Affected Parties… All are valid and were 
used in this thesis. More specifically, people who participated directly in the research 
are generally referred to as informants, interviewees or participants. 
 
‗Community‘ is a complex and multidimensional concept in social sciences. While it is 
used to mean anything and everything in the common discourse, it has a range of 
meanings in social science, defined by a variety of researchers in an array of 
disciplines. Community ―often refers to groups of people who share values and 
interests, whether or not they are situated in one specific locality‖ (Cheney et al. p.6). 
Used as an adjective, the term can also describe common interests and values held 
by particular groups of people. It is a flexible definition however, as there can of 
course be a diversity of interests and values held by people in one group, even 
though this group identifies itself as a ‗community‘. ―Thus the concept of community 
is complex, dynamic and sometimes contradictory so needs to be interpreted with 
this in mind.‖ (Cheney et al., p.6) In this thesis, the term community has been used to 
refer in particular to the inhabitants of Lekgoropane who were relocated to Mafenya, 
based on the fact that as far as the relocation process was concerned, they had the 
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same interests (although values were not always shared), and simply because 
people on the ground referred to themselves as a community. 
 
Participatory democracy: democracy in essence signifies government or power of the 
people by the people and for the people. ‗The people‘s‘ rule can be enacted in 
different ways: ―In participatory democracy, „the people‟ participate directly in 
decision-making‖. This is unlike representative democracy which entails the selection 
of representatives (usually through elections) among ‗the people‘ to take decisions on 
their behalf. (Ife, p.75) This thesis is primarily concerned with the concept of 
participatory democracy in the framework of traditional leadership, and how people 
participate in this context. 
 
Land title, in the most legally binding form, is an individual property right that bestows 
the right to use and dispose of land, usually limited only by contemporary planning 
and other laws that prevent certain types of use. (MMSD, 2002, p.146) 
 
Royalties are a tax paid by corporations for the right to exploit a sovereign asset – the 
payment is usually based on an amount per tonne or a percentage of total production 
or profits. (MMSD, 2002, p.148) 
 
The IFC defines Physical displacement as the actual physical relocation of people 
resulting in a loss of shelter, productive assets or access to productive assets (such 
as land, water and forests).  
 
Economic displacement: results from an action that interrupts or eliminates people‘s 
access to productive assets without physically relocating the people themselves. 
 
Finally, involuntary relocation: relocation is considered involuntary when affected 
individuals or communities do not have the rights to refuse land acquisition that 
results in displacement. This can occur in cases of: lawful expropriation or restrictions 
on land use based on eminent domain; and negotiated settlements in which the 
buyer can resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if 
negotiations with the seller fail. (cf. IFC PS 5) 
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Both the terms chief and kgosi have been used in this research as both are in use in 
the Royal Bafokeng Nation. The term chief tends to be used particularly for leaders 
until the mid-1990s (cf. Bozzoli) while kgosi is a newly introduced term used to 
designate the current leader of the Royal Bafokeng Nation as well as his 
predecessor. 
 4 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After 1994 the position of traditional authorities was uncertain: criticised for being 
pawns during apartheid, many thought that they no longer had the legitimacy and 
support to persist in the New South Africa, or that there was simply no place for 
traditional authorities in a modern democracy. Nevertheless, traditional authorities 
were recognised by the Constitution, and after a few years in the dark, their role in 
the new democratic dispensation was clarified: traditional means of power were 
entrenched by giving traditional leadership structures land administration 
prerogatives. 
 
The Bafokeng context is of particular interest with respect to the above mentioned 
issues, as they exist within a unique set of power relations between the traditional 
authority, its constituencies, and the mining companies; which is why I decided to 
venture into the Royal Bafokeng Nation. I have endeavoured to investigate how the 
traditional authority was assuming its functions (notably with regards to land 
management and administration) and how power relations played out in these unique 
circumstances.  
 
These issues were investigated through the study of the relocation of approximately 
eighty households from the village of Lekgoropane (an extension of the village of 
Rasimone) to Mafenya, in order to make way for mining operations. Indeed, the 
relocation process constituted an example of how land management and 
administration matters are dealt within the Bafokeng‘s communal land areas, and it 
involved interactions between the traditional authority and a section of its 
constituency, interactions through which power relations were revealed. 
 
The fact that the relocation was induced by mining activities not only illustrates the 
impact of mining on life in the Royal Bafokeng Nation, but also emphasises the 
inextricable link between the Bafokeng and the mining industry, and its impact on 
social and political life. As a matter of fact, the Bafokeng traditional leadership was 
involved in the resettlement process in its capacity as traditional authority and 
administrator of the land, but also as a party engaged in co-mining with Anglo 
Platinum, in a 50:50 Joint Venture. This puts the traditional authority in an ambiguous 
position and significantly affects power relations, not only in the relocation process, 
but in the Royal Bafokeng Nation at large.  
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Although the study of the relocation process focuses on one community, at the level 
of a mining project; the power dynamics between mining companies and the 
traditional authority on one hand, and affected communities on the other, are a 
reflection of deeper power dynamics within the Royal Bafokeng Nation, which in turn 
are partly a resultant of the relationship that has been developed with mining 
companies. 
 
How did the relocation process unfold and what key socio-political issues were 
uncovered by the process? More specifically, what did the relocation process reveal 
about the management and administration of communal land in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation?, and about the relationship between the traditional authority, Bafokeng 
constituencies and mining companies? Within this sub-question, a strong emphasis is 
placed on the power dynamics at play, their characteristics, and what they are based 
on.  
 
This research is anchored in South African debates around land management and 
access to land in rural areas, and the role and legitimacy of traditional leadership in a 
modern representative democracy; both very sensitive and controversial questions, 
and extensively researched themes. The rather atypical characteristics of the 
Bafokeng ‗tribe‘, including private ownership of communal land, access to massive 
revenues from mining, as well as the resulting presence of an unusually powerful 
traditional authority, make this research a valuable addition to the existing literature. 
Indeed, the traditional leadership in the Royal Bafokeng Nation has rather remarkably 
adjusted to the dramatic changes in its own history, as well as those of South Africa 
as a whole. The current ruler, Kgosi Leruo, is a young, modern, educated chief, 
managing the 300 000 strong Nation like a big company: juggling with hundreds of 
civil servants, a few corporate entities, a multi-billion Rand investment portfolio, and 
major infrastructural projects such as the Royal Bafokeng Stadium. “The Bafokeng 
are, in the words of one of [kgosi‟s] advisers, part tribe, part development agency and 
part global commodity corporation” (Financial Times, 28 June 2008) 
 
The research also adds to previous research on the Bafokeng, which is relatively 
scarce and mostly historical and/or focused on the mode of government. There is 
very little (published) to no research into the Bafokeng and how their relationship with 
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companies mining on their land is managed. This research provides insights on the 
matter. 
 
The research is also embedded within the literature dealing with the social impacts of 
mining. Indeed, social scientists are contributing more and more to the developing 
field of research on the social, socio-economic and socio-political dimensions of 
mining. With respect to resettlement processes, most research papers which deal 
with the topic are very theoretical and do not explore the intricacies involved with the 
relocation process. They mostly identify key land use issues and concepts, such as 
competing land tenure regimes, conflicts around compensation, and violation of 
indigenous peoples‘ rights, and provide broad guidelines as to how to deal with them. 
In other words, by searching for the largest common denominator, this type of 
research provides little insight into how those issues arise and tend to neglect the 
importance of history and context in the way those issues should be resolved. The 
main reason for this is that most of the research on the social dimensions of mining is 
produced by government or industry funded organisations and is meant to be used 
for policy making in governments and internally in mining companies, which have 
progressively acknowledged the social aspects of mining as an integral part of 
business success. 
 
This thesis on the other hand concentrates on the root causes of conflict and unequal 
power relations, in order to provide a better understanding of how they can be dealt 
with. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study the resettlement process in detail, holistically and in 
context, and use it as a basis to illustrate the role of the Bafokeng traditional authority 
in land administration and more generally in the management of community 
resources (including mining revenues), and provide a critical analysis of power 
relations in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. 
 
This thesis deals not only with the relocation process per se and the way it unfolded 
in Lekgoropane (Rasimone); it also examines the role that the Bafokeng traditional 
authority played in it, and unveils the power dynamics at place between traditional 
leadership structures and people on the ground.  
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The literature review reflects this, and provides firstly a conceptual and theoretical 
framework to examine the linkages between traditional authorities, democratic 
principles in South Africa and the land question. This Chapter (chapter 2.) aims at 
shedding some light on traditional authorities and their role and relevance in a 
modern representative democracy, with a focus on the land issue; land tenure 
regimes in the rural areas of South Africa; and more specifically, how decisions 
pertaining to the allocation and administration of communal land are taken, since 
traditional authorities in South Africa essentially derive their power and legitimacy 
from their land administration prerogatives, and because Mining Induced 
Displacement and Relocation (MIDR) is effectively a land use and administration 
issue. The second part of the literature review (chapter 3.) deals with the literature 
concerning the theory and practice of mining induced displacement and relocation, 
which has been the subject of dedicated research recently, and will include the 
regulatory framework and finally, the social impacts of MIDR. 
 
Chapter 4. describes the methods used in the research, as well as the limitations 
encountered. 
 
Following a deductive analysis, this thesis investigates the history of land acquisition, 
and the subsequent fight for a share of the mineral wealth. This, in addition to the 
traditional authority‘s land administration prerogatives, will allow the reader to 
understand the ambivalent role that the Bafokeng traditional authority played during 
the relocation process (chapter 5.).  
 
It goes on to explore the manner in which the relocation process was managed, and 
the nature of the relationships that were developed between the traditional authority 
and the affected community (chapter 6). From there, these relationships are 
analysed in the light of the literature and in the context of Bafokeng history, marked 
by constant readjustments in the balance of power, to highlight the shift that has 
occurred in powers relations (chapter 7.). Explaining this shift involves going back to 
the fundamental source of power for traditional authorities and the crux of the 
problem: the control of land, and the increasing importance that such control has 
taken over the years as the Bafokeng become more and more entangled with the 
mining industry. 
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Finally, some views on the ‗story behind the story‘ are proposed in the closing 
remarks (chapter 8.). 
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2. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE LAND QUESTION: 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 THE INSTITUTION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONSTITUTION  
Traditional leaders are one of the country‘s longest surviving structures. Over 
16,5 million rural people live under the jurisdiction of approximately 800 traditional 
leaders (Houston & Somadoda, 1996). Chapter 12 of the South African Constitution 
describes the role of traditional leadership as ―an institution at local level on matters 
affecting local communities‖, but their powers and role within the newly created 
municipalities remained unclear. Indeed, no provision was made for traditional 
leaders at the local tier of government, where the executive and legislative authority 
is vested in the elected municipal council. 
 
The White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance (RSA), adopted in 2003, 
summarises the role and functions of traditional leaders as follows: 
 To promote socio-economic development; 
 To promote service delivery; 
 To contribute to nation building; 
 To promote stability among community members; 
 To promote social cohesiveness of communities; 
 To promote the preservation of the moral fibre and regeneration of society; 
 To promote and preserve the culture and tradition of communities; and 
 To promote the social well-being and welfare of communities. 
 
2.1.1 Legitimacy of traditional leaders 
The legitimacy of traditional/tribal leaders is based on tradition; encompassing an 
inherited culture and way of life, a people‘s history, moral and social values, and 
traditional institutions serving those values (Keulder, 1998, p.21). 
 
The claim of Traditional Authorities to legitimacy, according to Ntsebeza, is based on 
their ―control of land administration and allocation process at the local administrative 
and Tribal Authorities level.‖ (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.257)  
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2.1.2 Rules of succession 
The system of traditional leadership is based on primogeniture. In other words, the 
eldest son of the senior or principal wife typically inherits chieftaincy or kingship after 
the death of his father who was chief or king of the tribe or nation. In other instances 
the chief can be succeeded due to ill-health or old age, and relatives other than the 
eldest son may succeed the chief if the need arises and provided this decision has 
the support of the people.  
 
2.1.3 Governance and Democratic principles 
Traditionally, in the pre-colonial period, whenever decisions affecting the general 
well-being of a community had to be made, a consultation process was followed with 
the objective of gaining consensus. Typically, these decisions were taken at the 
Lekgotla or Pitso (Tswana for tribal assembly), attended by heads of households, the 
traditional leader and his council; and people were free to express their views without 
fear of being censored or punished through fines or exile.  
 
This style of leadership geared towards achieving consensus through consultation 
progressively eroded during the colonial period and apartheid, as traditional leaders 
became pawns in the hands of the government who used them to implement colonial 
policies throughout the country. Those who would not cooperate were deposed and 
replaced by compliant relatives or power hungry headmen appointed by government 
(Ntsebeza, 2004 and 2005). In this respect, Mamdani (1996) distinguishes between 
customary chiefs and administrative chiefs: the former attained leadership positions 
through legitimate lines of succession and with the blessings of their community, 
while the latter encompass those who assumed power through the legitimate route 
but serve the needs of the colonial government, as well as those who attained 
leadership positions with the aid of the colonial government. 
 
2.1.4 Traditional leaders under Apartheid  
Traditional authorities were recognised by the Constitution and given a role to play in 
the New South Africa even though ―a large number of traditional authorities became 
“stooges” of colonial and apartheid regimes.‖ (Ntsebeza, 1999, p.83) As a matter of 
fact, the catalogue of collaboration by traditional authorities, their autocratic abuse of 
power and corruption, especially during the apartheid period after the introduction of 
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the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, self-government and ―independence‖ of some 
Bantustans, is well documented. (Ntsebeza, 1999, p.83) 
 
An essential feature of rural local government during the apartheid period, and to 
some extent the colonial period, was the concentration or fusion of administrative, 
judicial and executive power in a single functionary, the tribal authority. This fusion is 
well captured by Mamdani in his delineation of what he calls ―decentralised 
despotism‖ or the ―bifurcated state,‖ namely, the Native Authority: 
 
“Not only did the chief have the right to pass rules (by-laws) 
governing persons under his domain, he also executed all laws and 
was the administrator in “his” area, in which he settled all disputes. 
The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all moments of 
power, judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative. This 
authority was like a clenched fist, necessary because the chief stood 
at the intersection of the market economy and the non-market one. 
The administrative justice and the administrative coercion that were 
the sum and substance of his authority lay behind a regime of extra-
economic coercion, a regime that breathed life into a whole range of 
compulsions: forced labour, forced crops, forced sales, forced 
contributions, and forced removals.” (Mamdani, 1996, p.23) 
 
The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act indeed granted traditional leaders far-reaching 
administrative and judicial powers such as the allocation of land held in trust, the 
preservation of law and order, the provision and administration of services at local 
government level, social welfare administration and the erection and maintenance of 
schools. The implementation of Bantu Authorities firmly enlisted chiefs in the local 
arm of the central state, it strengthened the position of chiefs, but it eroded their 
legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects: ―as the apartheid state became vicious, so did 
traditional authorities. From revered and legitimate leaders, most traditional 
authorities became feared leaders by the majority of rural people.‖ (Ntsebeza, 1999, 
p.83) 
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2.2 TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEMOCRACY  
Post-1994 South Africa moved from an authoritarian apartheid regime to a 
democracy strongly influenced by liberal democratic values that include 
representative government. 
 
Yet, the South African Constitution as well as legislation flowing from it send 
conflicting messages: on the one hand, it enshrines a bill of rights including 
democratic principles based on elected representative government; and on the other, 
it recognises the role of unelected traditional authorities without any clarity regarding 
their functions and powers. This is, as Ntsebeza argues, a fundamental contradiction: 
“the two cannot exist at the same time for the simple reason that traditional 
authorities‟ claim to power is by birthright and their subjects are not afforded the 
opportunity urban-based South Africans enjoy of choosing or electing their leaders.” 
(2005, p.256) 
 
2.2.1 Roles and functions post-94  
While the Constitution failed to define the role of traditional leadership post 1994, 
some had their idea of what it should be. On the one hand, traditional leaders 
themselves, represented by the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa 
(Contralesa), thought they should be the primary form of government in rural areas, 
instead of local municipalities. On the other hand, authors such as Ntsebeza have 
been critical of the institution of traditional leadership itself, and of the value it could 
add in the effective operation of rural areas. 
 
Traditional leaders are typically responsible for the allocation of land for small-scale 
farming, grazing, and residential purposes; the preservation of law and order 
(including adjudication over minor disputes of a civil nature); the provision and 
administration of services at local government level; social welfare administration in 
their communities (including processing applications for social security benefits and 
business premises); and the promotion of education, including the erection and 
maintenance of schools and administration of access to education finance (i.e. 
scholarships and study loans for learners) (Nthau, 2002). 
 
As Ntsebeza (2005, p.256) points out, for nearly a decade the ANC-led government 
did not commit to a strong position with respect to the roles and powers of traditional 
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authorities in the South African democracy, but in 2003, two pieces of legislation 
were passed by parliament, which would eventually clarify to an extent the position of 
traditional authorities in the new South Africa: the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act and the Communal Land Rights Act. The former makes 
provision for the establishment of ‗Tribal Councils‘ by traditional authorities; and the 
latter gives these Councils the authority to administer and allocate land in the rural 
areas. According to Ntsebeza, these laws ―effectively [resuscitate] the powers 
[traditional authorities] enjoyed under the notorious Bantu Authorities Act of 1951.‖ 
(2005, p.257) In other words, after all these years of tergiversation as to the role of 
traditional authorities in the not so new democratic dispensation, the ANC-led 
government has ended up giving traditional authorities the same powers the 
apartheid state granted them. 
 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (RSA, 2003) makes 
provision for traditional leadership to play a role in all three spheres of government. 
Section 3 (1) of the Act makes provision for the establishment of traditional councils 
in an area which has been recognised by the Premier as a traditional community. 
This would take place, in terms of the preamble, within the context of transforming 
―the institution of traditional leadership […] in line with constitutional imperatives […] 
so that democratic governance and the values of an open and democratic society 
may be promoted‖. 
 
Nonetheless, as Ntsebeza (2005) argues, these councils are still undemocratic in 
nature, as the majority of the members are not popularly elected. Indeed, only 40 per 
cent of members should be elected, which leaves traditional authorities and their 
appointees with a majority. Ntsebeza suggests that the establishment of traditional 
councils dominated by traditional authorities and their appointees could have been a 
trade-off to dissuade traditional authorities to push for a constitutional amendment 
(Ntsebeza, 2005, p.286).  
 
The Communal Land Rights Act (RSA, 2003) specifies the role of traditional 
authorities in land administration. Traditional councils (established in terms of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance framework Act) were given land allocation 
and administration powers and functions in communal areas by an amendment to the 
draft Communal Land Rights Bill (2002). Since the claim of Traditional Authorities to 
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legitimacy, according to Ntsebeza, is based on their ―control of land administration 
and allocation process at the local administrative and Tribal Authorities level‖ 
(Ntsebeza, 2005, p.257), the Communal Land Rights Act perpetuates this. The 
traditional councils do not require magistrates and district commissioners to make the 
final decision with respect to the land allocation process; even though, as Ntsebeza 
observes, that had been the practice during the colonial and apartheid periods (2005, 
p.296).  
 
In terms of Section 21 (2) of the Communal Land Rights Act: ―If a community has a 
recognised traditional council, the powers and duties of the land administration 
committee may be exercised and performed by such council.‖ These are enormous 
powers for an essentially unaccountable structure. This means that traditional 
authorities ―will be decentralised and indeed despotic in so far as they will be 
unaccountable.‖ (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.287)  
 
It is interesting to note that the original draft Communal Land Rights Bill (gazetted in 
2002) divested traditional authorities of their land administration functions in favour of 
democratically elected administrative structures and proposed the transfer of 
registrable land rights to individuals, families and communities (Ntsebeza, 2005, 
p.287). ‗Legitimate‘ traditional authorities were accorded ex officio representation not 
exceeding 25 per cent (without however clarifying the meaning of ‗legitimate 
traditional authority‘). ―The draft Bill clearly attempted to strike a balance between the 
constitutional obligation to extend democracy to all parts of the country, including 
rural areas, and accommodating the institution of traditional leadership, which is 
recognised in the constitution.‖ (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.287) Traditional authorities 
represented by Contralesa and the House of Traditional Leaders, rejected the 2002 
draft Bill. Cabinet amended the Act in October 2003 and gave traditional councils the 
prerogative of land administration. Despite protests by civil society organisations, 
gender and land rights activists, the Act was passed unanimously by parliament in 
January 2004. 
 
This highlights the lack of effective organisation in rural communities to influence 
decision-making: ―civil society has not been as organised as traditional authorities. 
Without a strong and organised voice, rural inhabitants are going to find it hard to 
influence government.” (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.291) 
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While the struggle against the racial state was for democracy and the recognition of 
full citizenship rights to all South Africans; these two pieces of legislation together 
give unelected and unaccountable traditional authorities a dominant role in land 
administration in rural areas, suggesting the entrenchment of rural South Africans as 
‗subjects‘ (cf. section 2.3). However, despite their image of archaic governments, 
their unpopularity, their role in the implementation of apartheid policies, and their lack 
of defined role in local, provincial and national government, traditional authorities 
have survived and even seen their powers reinforced through recent legislation.  
 
2.2.2 The persistence of traditional authorities in the democratic dispensation 
The title of traditional leaders inherently absolves them from the fundamentals of 
rigorous accountability and performance management, as described in the Municipal 
Systems Act of 2000. While elected local government officials can be voted out in an 
election, or jailed if they misappropriate funds or display nepotism, there is no 
tangible sanction should a chief do the same. Some of the key factors contributing to 
the persistence of traditional authorities in the South African democracy will be 
outlined in the following paragraphs.  
 
As we have seen, traditional leaders are well organised (through organisations such 
as Contralesa and the National and Provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders), 
whereas on the other hand, rural inhabitants are typically less organised and are 
organised on a smaller scale, which makes it difficult to influence decision-making, 
especially at a national level in debates around legislation. 
 
Secondly, traditional leaders and their representative organisations are well 
connected in the ANC government and seem to be able to pull some strings in order 
to influence decisions to their advantage. According to reporter Christelle 
Terreblance (Cape Time, 28 January 2004), the amendment by cabinet to the above 
mentioned draft Communal Land Rights Bill (giving traditional councils land 
administration powers) was made shortly after a meeting involving then Deputy 
President Zuma, King Zwelithini and IFP‘s Chief Buthelezi, suggesting that the 
amendment was a deal. 
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Thirdly, electoral promises and the introduction of ‗developmental local government‘ 
raised expectations, but the poor performance of local government structures and 
elected councillors with respect to infrastructure development and service delivery 
has cost them the support of rural people who had hoped for a transformation in their 
lives, and conversely appears to have strengthened the position of traditional 
authorities and headmen (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.291).  
 
Finally, traditional authorities have simply benefited from the ANC‘s ambivalent 
position, coupled with the political and economic conditions of the early 1990s 
(including the need to garner support for the 1994 elections), when the political 
negotiation process was underway (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.294). ―The recognition of the 
institution of traditional leadership was by and large influenced by political and 
reconciliation considerations, rather than influenced by popular support.‖ (Ntsebeza, 
2005, p.295) 
 
2.2.3 Eliminating the divisions between citizens and subjects: a new framework? 
As far as the election of municipal councillors is concerned, urban and rural South 
Africans enjoy the same citizenship rights (i.e. the right to elect local government 
representatives). However, when it comes to the vital and sensitive issue of land 
allocation and access to land, rural people become ‗subjects‘, as those decisions are 
by law in the hands of traditional councils, dominated by unelected traditional 
authorities and their appointees; in other words, structures that are unrepresentative 
and unaccountable. 
 
The recognition of traditional authorities under the new political order has far-
reaching implications on concepts of citizenship and democracy. It effectively creates 
two classes of citizens, or, in Mamdani‘s words: citizens and subjects. 
  
By establishing democratically elected local government with development functions, 
and democracy in decision making regarding land, the intention of post-1994 South 
Africa is to introduce separation of powers and democracy in the form of elected 
representation in local government and land, even in rural areas. This is a major 
departure from tribal authorities, where power is concentrated in a single functionary, 
and almost no official is democratically elected; and where patriarchal principles 
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prevailing in the institution mean that major decisions on land allocation and local 
government, are almost invariably taken by men only*.  
 
Traditional authorities see rural elected councillors and the extension of democracy to 
land issues as deeply threatening attempts to undermine their political and economic 
powers (Ntsebeza, 1999, p.83). Indeed, the widespread view among traditional 
leaders (including the IFP and Contralesa) with regard to local government in rural 
areas is that tribal authorities should be the primary structures, a far cry from the 
ceremonial role that the ANC had hoped they would accept in the democratic 
dispensation (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.295). It is this fusion of power which Mamdani 
argues lies at the heart of decentralised despotism. Separation of powers, he 
suggests, is a necessary condition for democratization in rural areas. Ntsebeza adds 
that it should be coupled with the principle of elected representation. ―The need for 
both separation of powers and elected representatives, is confirmed by the 
resistance of traditional authorities to anything that even remotely challenges the 
power of Tribal Authorities.‖ (Ntsebeza, 1999, p.92) 
 
Ntsebeza argues that a new form of democracy, that would combine the participatory 
elements of pre-colonial indigenous institutions and the representative aspect of 
liberal democracy, is necessary to eliminate the divisions between urban and rural 
South Africans, and allow rural people to enjoy full citizenship rights (Ntsebeza, 2005, 
p.299). 
 
Traditional authorities derive their power and legitimacy for a significant part from 
their land allocation and administration prerogatives. The conditions thereof are 
detailed in the following section. 
 
2.3 TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND LAND ADMINISTRATION IN RURAL AREAS 
2.3.1 Land administration  
The homelands might have officially been reintegrated in the new South Africa but 
traditional authorities are still in charge of ‗communal lands‘ that cover almost 
                                               
 
*
 The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act however specifies that women 
should represent a minimum of 30 percent of members in the ‗Traditional Councils‘. 
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13 per cent of the country; and they ―continue to play a role in land allocation, local 
government and dispute settlement‖ (Nthau, 2002, p.2). 
 
―Democratising land administration after 1994 was an integral part of the process of 
tenure reform […] in rural areas.‖ (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.279) The 1997 White Paper on 
South African Land Policy concentrated inter alia on people living in rural areas and 
their rights in land. It made a distinction between ‗ownership‘ and ‗governance‘ and 
specified that ―the Tenure Reform Programme will separate these functions, so that 
ownership can be transferred from the state to the communities and individuals on 
the land‖ (RSA, p.93).  
 
In line with their aspiration to be the only primary structure in rural areas and play a 
central role in rural development, traditional authorities insist on preserving their 
function in land administration. Therefore, with respect to land tenure reform, ―they 
reject the notion that where land is held on a group basis, the administration thereof 
should be transferred to democratically constituted and accountable structures.‖ 
(Ntsebeza, 2005, p.281) If that view prevails, and should traditional authorities be 
transferred land that is property of the state and administer it, ordinary rural residents 
would be legally excluded from decision-making processes, including land allocation.  
 
2.3.2 Land allocation procedure 
Although legally most communal land is nominally owned by the state, it is ―generally 
held in trust for specific tribal communities and allocated by chiefs to people living 
under their jurisdiction on a usufructuary basis.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.47) 
 
Usually only male ‗household heads‘ (i.e. married with their own homesteads) have a 
right to land under customary law, but in practice, women, including unmarried 
women, are considered to be entitled to apply for land. However, a minimum age at 
which women become eligible can apply (Lahiff, 2000, p.57). In former Transkei, 
―anyone who was married and was a permanent resident of any of the areas under 
[the chief‟s] jurisdiction was qualified to apply for land. In addition, all unmarried 
females who had children could also apply for land if they were permanently resident‖ 
(Solinjani, quoted in Lahiff, 2000, p.49). ―This combination of requirements (i.e. 
membership of the community and head of a household, together with some 
discrimination between men and women) recurs throughout the homeland areas, with 
minor local variations.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.49)  
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People who qualify for land would then approach their village headman who may 
refer the application to the tribal authority (i.e. the tribal council). According to Lahiff‘s 
research, ―the ultimate power to allocate land rests with the chief‖, even though chiefs 
are expected to consult the community on important matters and to protect the 
interests of all community members (Lahiff, 2000, p.56). 
 
―Land for arable and residential purposes is usually obtained through the tribal chief 
or, more commonly, the village headman acting on behalf of the chief, who may 
allocate plots from whatever land is currently available.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.49) Plot 
holders who have obtained land in this manner are given a right to the use and 
benefits of that land; the land can be transferred to another family member with 
permission of the tribal leaders, but cannot be sold (Lahiff, 2000, p.50). In principle, 
chiefs and Tribal Authorities have the ―power to repossess land if it is abandoned, if it 
is needed for another purpose such as a road or a public building, if it is deemed 
surplus to the needs of the holders, or in order to punish a landholder for some 
offence‖; nevertheless, ―outright dispossession is rare, and the communal system is 
generally seen as a reasonably secure form of tenure” (Lahiff, 2000, p.50).  
 
―Once allocated, residential and arable plots are generally reserved for the exclusive 
use of the occupying household.” (Lahiff, 2000, p.49) Unallocated land is usually 
available to community members as a common pool resource, and is used for cattle 
grazing as well as for natural resources such as fruits, plants and timber (Lahiff, 
2000, p.49).  
 
Research shows that there is generally ―a high degree of satisfaction among plot-
holders, traditional leaders and elected local councillors with the manner in which 
people acquire land [and] the conditions under which people hold land […].‖ (Lahiff, 
2000, p.63) Lahiff‘s research found that elements within the community studied were 
unhappy with the power of tribal leaders and the way it is exercised in the area of 
land allocation (Lahiff, 2000, p.64) and Lahiff concluded that this could indicate ―a 
need for a more democratic or inclusive process whereby different elements within 
the community, not only those on good terms with the chiefs, could be involved in 
decisions regarding communal land.‖ (2000, p.65) 
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The linkage between chieftaincy and the control of the land allocation process is key 
to understanding how traditional leaders derive their authority. During the apartheid 
era, traditional authorities played a central role in the administration of land, in 
addition to their executive and judicial powers, thus substantiating Mamdani‘s thesis 
of a ―clenched fist.‖ Policies established in post-1994 South Africa entrench 
democratic principles and distinguish between ownership and governance of land (cf. 
White Paper on Land Policy). This is incompatible with recognising traditional 
authorities, as they are both landowners and administrators of the land, in spite of the 
non-democratic origin of their position. As Ntsebeza (2004, p.87) argues: “Democratic 
decentralisation, with its insistence on elected representatives, is incompatible with 
the recognition of a hereditary institution of traditional leadership.” Government‘s 
reluctance to resolve this contradiction meant that while South Africans in urban 
areas enjoyed full rights as citizens, in rural areas, in the former Bantustans, 
residents continued to be subjects.  
 
2.4 LAND TENURE IN RURAL SOUTH AFRICA 
2.4.1 Tenure debate and access to land in South Africa 
The debate over access to land by black people in South Africa under colonialism, 
apartheid and democracy centres on individual versus collective ownership of land 
(Lahiff, 2000, p.45). While the trend is towards the extension of individual property 
and the principle of ‗one man one lot‘, some stress the benefits of communal land 
ownership, as a way of fostering social equity. Indeed, as the Department of Land 
Affairs‘ White Paper on South African Land Policy states that: 
 
―communal systems provide free or very cheap access to land for the 
poor. The social structure which goes with communal ownership also 
provides an important survival safety net function to the poor, as does 
the fact that the land cannot be sold to raise cash in emergencies or 
foreclosed debt.‖ (RSA, 1997, p.73) 
 
Historical context 
State policy on land during apartheid was based on the communal form of tenure, the 
tribal administration, and forms of rural planning and development known as 
‗betterment‘. As Lahiff (2000) argues, the ―forms of land-holding and land use in the 
former homelands have been directly influenced by the policies and actions of the 
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South African state (in its various forms) in pursuit of racial segregation and the 
promotion of an oppressive migrant labour system.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.46) Indeed, with 
the discovery of minerals, of gold in particular, in the 1880s, the white colonialists 
revised their policy towards Africans from one that promoted African farmers, to one 
aiming to convert them into wageworkers (Ntsebeza, 2005, p.297). A new form of 
local government and land tenure system supported that policy change. As a matter 
of fact, communal land tenure facilitated the concentration of Africans in the 
homelands, while preventing the emergence of a class of rich peasants and farmers, 
and ensuring a high degree of social control through compliant tribal leaders who 
controlled access to land (Lahiff, 2000, p.47).  
 
As early as 1855, the settler government of the Transvaal prohibited anybody who 
was not a ‗burger‘ from owning land in the Transvaal, and at  the same time 
precluded Natives from burger rights (Lahiff, 2000, p.47). For nine years, between 
1905 and 1913, Africans in the Transvaal were allowed to buy land in their own 
names. However, after 1913 and until the advent of democracy, Africans in South 
Africa were denied full rights of land ownership. To this day, most black people in 
rural areas continue to live under some form of communal land tenure. 
 
2.4.2 Forms of communal land tenure  
Communal land tenure in South Africa combines elements of individual and collective 
property rights. There are three categories of land administered under the communal 
system. The first is ‗tribal land‘, i.e. land occupied by tribes prior to the 1936 Native 
Trust and Land Act, and in many cases, from pre-colonial times. Nominal ownership 
of this land passed to the South African Native Trust in 1936, but with little or no 
change to the inhabitants (Lahiff, 2000, p.48).  
 
The second category is constituted by land purchased by the Native Trust (later the 
South African Development Trust) from 1936 onwards, for addition to the reserves. 
This land was allocated to specific ‗tribal communities‘ and was held in trust by the 
State President. ―In addition, the Trust acquired nominal ownership to state land 
earmarked for inclusion in the homelands (released areas) and all tribal farms 
(scheduled areas) not in private ownership.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.48) 
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Finally, the third category is constituted by privately owned land, bought in the 
scheduled areas prior to 1913, outside the scheduled areas until 1936, and from the 
Trust after 1936 (Lahiff, 2000, p.48). This land was bought in undivided shares by 
groups of named black farmers. Some purchasers were successful in having title 
deeds issued in their own names, while ―others were obliged by the racial laws of the 
day to register the land in the name of a tribe or state official, to be held in trust for 
the named purchasers. Over time, the sense of private ownership would appear to 
have faded (if indeed it ever existed), and today most such land is used and 
administered in such a way that it is indistinguishable from other communal land.‖ 
(Lahiff, 2000, p.48) 
 
Other forms of land tenure in former homeland rural areas include freehold land held 
by individuals and groups like church missions, and state land.  
 
The sense of community ownership on tribal farms tends to be the strongest, ―based 
on uninterrupted occupation […] and relative lack of state interference over the 
years.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.48) On Trust farms, the state is the nominal owner but many 
believe that permission given to the community to occupy is equivalent to a transfer 
of ownership (Lahiff, 2000, p.49). The small category of land bought outright by tribal 
groups or others constitute a separate category of full (individual or collective) private 
ownership, with no state involvement. However, ―in practice, popular perceptions do 
not differ greatly between these three categories.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.49) 
 
Findings from Lahiff‘s research show that the legal status of land ownership and 
perceptions of land ownership often diverge: ―In popular perception, virtually all 
categories of land in the [former] homelands are believed to belong to the community 
or the chief (whether in a moral or a legal sense), despite the fact that formal title (in 
the form of deeds) is, in most cases, held by the state.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.47)  
 
2.4.3 The communal tenure system  
―The communal tenure system found in South Africa is „communal‟ in the sense that 
an individual‟s entitlement to land flows from membership of a socio-political 
community (a village or tribe), rather than from private ownership‖ (Lahiff, 2000, 
p.49). It does not entail collective agriculture, and it does not imply that the whole 
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community is involved in decision-making regarding the allocation of land (Lahiff, 
2000, p.49). 
 
For Lahiff (2000), the merits of communal land tenure are two-fold: firstly, land 
administered by traditional leaders is cheap/free for housing and farming, and 
secondly it cannot be sold or confiscated. However, it appears that ―people fail to 
secure bank loans to build houses due to the conditions of insecure […] land tenure”, 
which do not allow them to use their land as collateral (Nthau, 2002, p.66). Other 
disadvantages include the fact that businesses are reluctant to invest on the land as 
they would not have any option to get a return on investment by selling the developed 
land (the value of land is largely determined by the development that is put on it). And 
finally, land allocation is biased against women, as they cannot be given land if they 
are under 35 years old and not married (and even then, only household heads have 
the right to a plot for residence and farming). Furthermore, a woman cannot dispose 
of her property when her husband dies as the in-laws remain in control of/custodians 
of the household (Nthau, 2002, p.71). This of course is contrary to the principle of 
non-discrimination (in this case on the basis of gender) that is enshrined in the 
Constitution (Chapter 2). 
 
 
This chapter has presented traditional authorities and their roles and powers in the 
South African democracy; highlighting their powerful remit in relation to land use, 
allocation and administration. The next chapter focuses on a particular land use and 
administration issue: that of the displacement of local communities (from communal 
land) to make way for mining. This will provide the basis to understand the relocation 
process explored in chapter 6 and the role that the Bafokeng traditional authority 
played in it. 
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3. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MINING INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND 
RESETTLEMENT (MIDR) 
Mining is a defining feature of the South African economy, and in many places across 
the country, it is a defining feature of the physical landscape too. Besides the 
swathes of land scarred by the industry, mining activities contribute to the pollution of 
surface and groundwater resources; long term soil contamination; the generation of 
huge amounts of waste*; the consumption of large amounts of energy produced from 
fossil fuels; the depletion of non renewable mineral resources; and are the source of 
health and safety hazards.  
 
But while the environmental impacts of mining are well known and documented, less 
is known of the social dimensions of mining and notably about the relationships that 
form and develop between mining companies and neighbouring communities. Those 
relationships are established wherever an existing or proposed mining project 
impacts directly or indirectly on surrounding communities. This naturally includes the 
relocation case examined in this research (see chapters 6 and 7) Research into 
these relationships exposes the complexity of ‗the social‘ and is specifically relevant 
for this research, as conflict over the development of resources, and the distribution 
of impacts and benefits, can be significant. The study of such relationships is key in 
identifying power imbalances and providing a framework for addressing much of the 
grievances expressed in relation to resettlement processes. The following sections 
examine Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement (MIDR) and its effects on 
social sustainability, concentrating on what displacement specialists call the 
‗resettlement effect‘. Finally, the regulatory framework regarding MIDR is discussed. 
 
3.1 COMMUNITY - MINING RELATIONSHIPS 
“Knowledge of society and relationships between humans depends 
on subjective judgements and experiences. Thus any given social 
reality can be seen from a range of individual and shared 
perspectives.” (Cheney et al., 2002, p.4)  
 
                                               
 
*
 Over 80 per cent of waste disposed on land in South Africa is mining waste. 
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There are two sides in a mining – community relationship and hence, (at least) two 
perspectives on the subject. From a mining company perspective, poor community -
mine relations can lead to tension and violence and hinder progress towards long-
term sustainability. In view of that, over the last decade or so, the minerals industry 
internationally has become progressively concerned with the expectations and 
implementation of sustainable development ideas, and the ‗triple bottom line‘ of 
economy, environment and society (see Cheney et al., 2002, for a more detailed take 
on company views on relationships between mining and communities).  
 
This research focuses for a great part on the point of view of local communities on 
mining induced relocation; the process that bound them temporarily to the mine; and 
the extent to which they have felt enabled to influence the outcomes in negotiation 
and decision making processes. As such, the community perspective on mine -
community relationships is the main focus of this section.  
 
This section is mainly based on Cheney et al.‘s research (2002), which explores 
relationships and participatory processes in the mining context by examining three 
case studies in the Australian province of Victoria, and which has a strong resonance 
with the relocation case studied (see chapters 6 and 7). The ‗Victorian studies‘ seek 
to shed some light on key social issues such as power and social conflict from the 
perspective of people affected by mining at a local level. Cheney et al.‘s research 
examines people‘s participation in mining – community relationships, their reasons to 
participate, the values they defend and how they experience these relationships.  
 
3.1.1 Public participation processes: involving people in mining projects 
Mining issues can be discussed in a variety of forums, formal or informal: residents‘ 
associations, focus group meetings held during the environment assessment 
process, or even consultative committees formed by industry. To a large extent 
though, mining - community relationships take place through formal, legislated public 
participation processes. As a matter of fact, over the past twenty years or so, public 
participation in environmental authorisation processes has increasingly become ―a 
feature of many jurisdictions internationally‖ (Cheney et al., 2002, p.2). This is the 
case in South Africa, where a public participation process is required to obtain an 
environmental authorisation in terms of the National Environmental Management Act 
of 1998. During this process, directly affected people, but also any interested parties 
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such as Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), businesses and relevant 
governmental authorities, have an opportunity to ask questions, provide input, raise 
concerns and object the proposed development. There is indeed a broad consensus 
that all affected stakeholders must be involved in planning and decision-making to 
enhance the sustainability of mining and other projects, as well as the community 
within which it occurs (MMSDSA, 2002, p.53).  
 
Motivations to participate 
People can be involved in relationships with mining companies for a number of 
reasons, directly and indirectly. Mineworkers, but also their families and friends may 
be bound to the mining industry by ties of dependency or loyalty. Thus, their views on 
the industry are likely to be affected accordingly, if for instance they are cautious not 
to put income generating opportunities at risk (Cheney et al., 2002, p.12). On the 
other hand, people may be drawn into relationships with mining companies, at times 
unwillingly, because they are affected by mining activities. The displacement and 
relocation of a community to make way for mining is an extreme case of such 
impacts, but they are many other ways mining projects can impact directly or 
indirectly on local communities. People then become actively involved in relationships 
with mining companies (mostly through public participation processes) in order to 
influence decision making and promote better outcomes for themselves.  
 
The nature of people‘s relationships with the mining industry thus depends on how 
they are linked to the industry, but also on the values they seek to uphold. In the 
Victorian studies for instance, informants spoke about the precautionary principle; a 
sense of responsibility towards future generations; sustainable mining practices, and 
the consideration of social, economic and environmental factors in decision making 
(Cheney et al., 2002, p.13). In the same way, there is a diversity of values held, the 
objectives people seek to attain through participation are varied, and are based on 
individual, but also broader social concerns: people felt they had to participate in 
order to address a power imbalance, defend their interests, or redress what they 
perceived as wrongs. For people opposed to the mining projects in Victoria for 
instance, involvement in public participation processes was motivated by the fact that 
they felt that ―they had some capacity, and hence responsibility, to restrict or prevent 
proposals going ahead‖ (Cheney et al., 2002, p.17): 
 
  
27 
“[…] I do think it has to be done. I think there is a role, for a voice of 
the residents even if it appears you are just being negative all the 
time, and anti progress. It's our right to do that. You cannot rely on 
government […] to look after your interests.” (Community participant, 
quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.17) 
 
Power relations in public participation processes 
However, even though people participating in relationships with mining companies 
have their own agendas; they experience difficulties having their voice heard. Indeed, 
relationships between communities and institutions in general, whether public or 
private, almost always involve unequal power relations; with substantial differences in 
the resources, authority, status, and legitimacy of each party (Labonte, 1997). 
Mining – community relationships are no exception to the rule and are marked by a 
significant power imbalance in favour of mining companies, which can result in a lack 
of confidence, discomfort, intimidation, and concern about consequences from the 
side of community members. 
 
This is reflected in the way people in Victoria, Australia experienced communication 
with mining companies. Informants in Cheney et al.‘s research described mining 
companies as secretive or lying, as well as furthering its own commercial interests at 
the expense of the broader community; this was seen by members of the community 
as deceitful or a betrayal: 
 
―They came under the pretence that it was their right to drill and that 
they seldom find anything. After the first round, we were told there 
was nothing there. Geologically interesting… but nothing of interest. 
Two years later they were back for more drilling. At the conclusion of 
that, the geologist said lots more drilling needs to be done, and his 
boss confirmed this statement that afternoon. Two days later the 
midday news carried a story of the gold strike and it was on the front 
pages of the paper the next morning. We never got over not being 
told. It was an absolute disgrace. They are liars. The relationship 
went down hill from there.‖ (Community participant, quoted in Cheney 
et al., 2002, p.16) 
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The use of jargonistic or technical language is another manifestation of unequal 
power relations. People often feel disempowered without the necessary technical 
knowledge and/or support to understand the language used, and express 
dissatisfaction with how communication is conducted: 
 
“The language they use - if they were to spend time talking in 
layman's terms so people could participate, this would assist the 
community come to some resolution. … Locals don't understand the 
terminology used in the reports, like heapleaching, noxometer. […] 
Previous reports omitted a lot of important content and yet were given 
the green light, without consideration for the surrounding areas.” 
(Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.16) 
 
The antagonistic and unequal nature of relationships did not always manifest itself so 
obviously; the manner in which public consultation was taking place also contributed 
to the feeling of power and intimidation: 
 
“A lot of people were completely flustered by […] their manner, and 
the way the room was set up: a table with a row of men on one side 
and a little spot with the person with the microphone and you're under 
the spotlight. It wasn't conducive to reaching a co-operative 
conclusion. It was set it up as an antagonistic, someone has to win, 
fighting situation. I don't see that as a useful process.” (Community 
participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.20) 
 
Being confronted to this type of power imbalance can be frustrating for communities, 
who have their own ideas of their role and ability to influence decisions, and their 
expectations of outcomes. The reality however, is that people facing mining 
companies have to substantially revise their expectations. Without the support of 
clear legislation regarding participation processes, and considering the unequal 
power relations characterising them, people can find themselves feeling powerless. 
As a matter of fact, the law in South Africa does not give any clear guidelines 
regarding the extent to which mining companies are compelled to consider the 
concerns of stakeholders, in particular of affected communities, in the planning, 
design and implementation of a mining project. Furthermore, the concept of 
‗participation‘ can be interpreted in a number of ways: from mere information, to 
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consultation and decision making (see section 3.2.2 for a more detailed breakdown 
and a normative view of participation). The mining industry has thus taken advantage 
of this gap to impose its own conception of ‗participation‘, which is generally a 
minimal one, just sufficient to comply with legal requirements, with little or no 
opportunity for affected parties to have a meaningful input. 
 
Barriers to participation  
In these conditions, it is not surprising that some community members are overcome 
by a sense of inevitability and powerlessness, and believe such projects are too big 
to fight against, that it is not worth the effort.  
 
Besides issues of unequal power relations and regulatory weaknesses, more 
practical barriers to participation include a lack of resources (e.g. childcare), and 
financial disincentives such as costs associated with absence from work, as well as 
administrative costs associated with transport and communication (Cheney et al., 
2002, p.18). 
 
Although most community participants in Victoria experienced unsatisfactory 
consultative processes, they did appreciate the fact that these processes existed and 
allowed affected communities to be informed of the proposed projects. They also 
valued being able to ask questions, express their views, voice their concerns and 
attempt to influence decision making on the project, as for many it was the only forum 
they had to do so.  
 
Most people in the Victorian studies described participation processes as exhausting, 
time consuming, tokenistic, and with little reward in the end. But even though people 
realised that they might be fighting something that was too big and beyond their 
control, and had corresponding reservations as to the utility of public participation 
forums, they took advantage of the procedures in place and attempted to obtain the 
best project possible:  
 
“It is inevitable that the mining will go ahead if the minerals are there, 
economics will make that happen. It is up to communities to ensure 
that it is done as responsibly as possible. There must be 
compromises in any situation - we or they won't get all they want, but 
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we want to get the best outcomes.‖ (Community participant, quoted in 
Cheney et al., 2002, p.18) 
 
3.1.2 Power and trust in mining – community relationships 
For people in the Victorian studies, the power imbalance and lack of trust were major 
factors impacting on relationships in general and participation in decision making in 
particular. In instances where power had been misused and trust had been lost as a 
result, ―people described themselves as feeling powerless and vulnerable‖ (Cheney 
et al., 2002, p.21). 
 
The definition of ‗power‘ adopted by Cheney et al., and relevant to the study of 
community – mine relationships, is the ability at an organisational or individual level, 
to bring about decisions that shape and determine outcomes (Cheney et al., 2002, 
p.22).  At the level of the system, power can manifest itself in the way the structure of 
the political and economic systems favours certain interests over others. Both 
conceptions are pertinent and valid in the relocation case examined and will be 
further developed in chapter 6.  
 
On the other hand, powerlessness is envisaged as a ―lack of control over destiny‖ 
(Syme, 1997, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.22). In the context of a mining project 
affecting a community, and a fortiori in the context of mining induced relocation, this 
can be interpreted as control over the immediate environment; people‘s ability to 
express themselves and negotiate with those who have conflicting interests, and 
ultimately, control over where and how people choose to live their life.  
 
In Victoria, powerlessness was exacerbated by the fact that government agencies 
were perceived as being not responsive to the local community‘s interests.  
Feeling powerless acted as a catalyst for some people and stimulated them to take 
action, sometimes in spite of their own self image as politically conservative: 
 
“Yes, but I haven't been involved in anything political, really. I've 
fought for things, but never did anything like writing to people about 
this open pit. This to me, is the destruction of [this town], that is the 
triumph of greed over the happiness of ordinary everyday citizens. It's 
like sacrificing that on the altar. It really, I'm really upset about it. […] 
  
31 
It's all my memories, but basically it comes down to greed of the 
mining company, over people's happy lives.” (Community participant, 
quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.24) 
 
Labonte notes that powerless individuals in conflict with or opposition to 
organisations and people that are more powerful than they are tend to create an 
identity as an organised group, in order to address the power imbalance. This 
process of community organisation occurred in all of the Victorian studies, where 
people had organised themselves into issue-based or resident action groups. 
(Cheney et al., 2002) and in the relocation process as well (chapter 6.).  
 
Individuals involved in these groups described them as a strong source of advocacy 
and identity for their members. In all three of the Victorian studies, the groups formed 
by individuals in reaction to a perceived power imbalance had a substantial impact on 
the proposed mining projects. As a matter of fact, in two out of the three cases, the 
projects did not proceed. 
 
People in Victoria responded to unequal power relations in other ways as well, 
including legal representation and petitioning the government t-o provide legislative 
reforms and resources.  
 
While feelings of powerlessness can prompt people to organise themselves and act, 
they can also affect people‘s motivation and capacity to take action in the opposite 
way, as an informant in Victoria puts it: 
 
“People feel powerless. We feel that we do not have the capacity to 
deal with it. I can't get up and speak. I feel inadequate. We rely on 
people who can articulate things. Most of us feel we can't 
communicate. I feel powerless. I can't do it but I have to. It is a big 
strain.” (Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.23) 
 
When people who participate feel their input is disregarded and promises are broken, 
there is a break down of trust in the relationship. There were examples in Victoria 
where people felt they were being listened to at the time, but subsequently felt 
ignored: 
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“[…] I was surprised when I read the report though; it seemed a lot of 
things which appeared to have been taken on board at the time had 
somehow disappeared. […] A lot of things seemed glossed over or 
not put in which had been raised by the community. At the time I felt 
like we were being listened to and it was a fair process, but when we 
saw the report it was as though there had been a hidden agenda.” 
(Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.25) 
 
Claus Offe defines trust as ―the belief […] that others will do certain things or refrain 
from doing certain things, which in either case affects the well-being of the holder of 
the belief […]. Trust is the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will 
contribute to my / our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me / us.‖ 
(Claus Offe, quoted in Warren, 1999, p.47). Consequently, the building of trust over 
time is based on the perceived consistency, predictability and robustness of the 
behaviour of others. Cheney et al. identified four factors that influenced trust in the 
Victorian studies: firstly specific actions perceived as breaking rules or unfair; 
secondly the morals or ethics of companies and individuals; thirdly the lack of access 
to, manipulation, or dissimulation of information; and finally the impact of financial 
interests (Cheney et al., 2002, p.25). Community participants in Victoria notably found 
that directors and employees were bound by their wages, while consultants depended 
on income from the mines, and government structures relied on taxes and royalties 
generated by the mines. 
 
“I don't know how you get around it, where the proponent employs 
the consultants. So in other words, you don't pay somebody for 
something you don't want to hear. That's a fair perception through the 
community. So no matter what the blasting experts came up with, or 
no matter what the dust experts came up with, or the historical 
experts, or the heritage or the environmental experts, it would have to 
be that it can go ahead with these conditions or with these sort of 
things. It would be a very brave consultant to come out and tell the 
gold mine that they couldn't do it. Because of this reason, you can't 
tell them. Because their place in consultancy within the mining 
industry would be very limited from that day on! […] Probably, okay, 
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the proponent stands to win financially, so they can pay the 
consultancy costs. But I think the consultants really should be, look I 
don't know, […] even if the consultants were employed 
independently, they would still generally be working within the 
industry.” (Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, 
p.25) 
 
Issues associated with power and perceptions of trustworthiness were recurring 
themes in all the Victorian case studies. Not only did informants question the 
independence of research and studies, but they also blamed companies for hiding 
information and obscuring facts, and saying one thing and doing another. Lying to 
and/or deliberately misleading local communities does not seem to be anything 
extraordinary for mining companies, as relocated people in Mafenya experienced (cf. 
chapter 6) and some informants in the Victorian studies deplored:  
 
“They have done that much work I don't believe anything, they can 
offer me the world and I wouldn't believe it. I'm afraid they are just a 
pack of liars. They have lied to us too many times. […] It seems to be 
standard practice. […] You hear things, and it seems to be the 
standard lines. It doesn't matter where they are or who they are 
talking to.” (Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, 
p.12) 
 
This type of attitude is emblematic of the general disregard communities are treated 
with. Informants in Victoria complained about making efforts to contribute in forums 
and decision making processes, but not being listened to. Some experienced 
disrespect, and perceived mining officials as rude or uncooperative. In a few cases, 
some informants even felt threatened and intimidated (Cheney et al., 2002, p.16). 
 
“I know we've got to live with mining, but how far do you go? Do I 
want to go flying down their big pits? No I don't. I think in an 
established community, you've got to have some respect for people.” 
(Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.26) 
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In those conditions, negotiating a fair and mutually beneficial relocation can be tricky 
to say the least, not to say impossible. In addition to inadequate communication and 
dysfunctional relationships, there are a number of factors that can put people‘s lives 
and well-being at risk, and those have to be carefully considered and managed in the 
relocation process. There are a number of laws and guidelines to help prevent 
deterioration in affected communities‘ quality of life. 
 
3.2 SOCIAL IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH RESETTLEMENT PROCESSES 
Mining Induced Displacement and Relocation (MIDR) processes are subject to the 
laws of the South African state, notably the Constitution, and as such entail extensive 
consultation of affected communities (including the possibility of these communities 
to veto/refuse the relocation), as well as the principle of fair compensation. 
Nonetheless, they are all too often the cause of much distress, impoverishment, 
violation of human rights and other adverse effects of the traumatic uprooting of 
communities. Indeed, mining-induced displacement and resettlement  poses major 
risks to societal sustainability. The World Bank Group‘s policy on involuntary 
resettlement encapsulates the severity of these risks in its opening lines: 
 
“Bank experience indicates that involuntary resettlement under 
development projects, if unmitigated, often gives rise to severe 
economic, social and environmental risks: productive systems are 
dismantled; people face impoverishment when their productive 
assets or income sources are lost; people are relocated to 
environments where their productive skills may be less applicable 
and the competition for resources greater; community institutions and 
social networks are weakened; kin groups are dispersed; and cultural 
identity, traditional authority, and the potential for mutual help are 
diminished or lost.” (World Bank, 2001) 
 
The International Finance Corporation‘s Performance Standard 5 on Land Acquisition 
and Involuntary Settlement (2006) expresses similar concerns and warns against 
―long-term hardship and impoverishment for affected communities, as well as 
environmental damage and social stress in areas to which they have been 
displaced.‖ (IFC, 2006) 
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It is not possible to provide an accurate estimate of the number of people who have 
been resettled as a result of mining in southern Africa. The figure of 35,000 
(Sonnenberg & Münster, 2001) given for the last decade only reflects those 
resettlements for which formal resettlement plans have been compiled. It is 
reasonable to assume that many unrecorded resettlements, which have not followed 
best practice guidelines, and which involve many thousands more people, have 
occurred (Sonnenberg & Münster, 2001).  
 
A significant feature of resettlement is that it often affects people who have little 
access to resources and who benefit least from the new mining development. 
(MMSDSA, 2002, p.24) As a matter of fact, resettlement programmes inevitably have 
the greatest impacts on rural communities, which are already poor; therefore, they 
risk adding new forms of impoverishment in these vulnerable communities.  
 
3.2.1 The resettlement effect 
Mining Induced Displacement and Resettlement  is accompanied by what 
displacement specialists call the ‗resettlement effect‘, defined as the loss of physical 
and non-physical assets, including homes, communities, productive land, income-
earning assets and sources, subsistence, resources, cultural sites, social structures, 
networks and ties, cultural identity, and mutual help mechanisms (MMSD, 2002, 
p.159). 
 
Displacement and resettlement processes involve a number of risks for the 
displaced, over and above the loss of land, which may address only 10 – 20 % of the 
impoverishment risks known to be associated with involuntary displacement. 
(Cernea, 2000, pp.11-55) Displacement may have the following implications 
(Downing, 2002): 
 Landlessness: Land that is lost has to be reconstructed or replaced with income-
generating employment to avoid impoverishment and loss of capital. Failure to 
do so can result in landlessness and impoverishment (MMSDSA, 2002, p.53). 
 
 Joblessness: Relocation may result in loss of economic power, redundancy of 
skills, loss of markets, and breakdown of economic networks. As a result, the risk 
of losing employment is high. Unemployment or under-employment will result 
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from resettlement if not addressed immediately after relocation, and new and 
sustainable job opportunities are created  
 
 Homelessness: Loss or decline in the quality of shelter is exacerbated if 
compensation is paid at market value rather than replacement value. For some, 
a worsening in housing standards or loss thereof is a reality.  
 
 Marginalisation: Relocation may result in loss of social and political status if the 
host community regards new arrivals as strangers or inferior. The resettled 
person, viewed as a stranger, is denied opportunities in the host community and 
experiences a drop in social status, lack of confidence, feelings of injustice and 
heightened vulnerability, and psychological depression. 
 
 Loss of agricultural land and food insecurity: The loss of productive land may 
lead to a decline in available nourishment, nutrition problems, and increased 
mortality. Malnourishment results from deficient calorie-protein intake, and the 
incidence of morbidity and mortality depend on the effectiveness with which 
landlessness and joblessness are dealt. This issue should be recognised within 
the context of subsistence farming and food security ,as well as being part of the 
culture of the affected communities (SAHRC, 2008, p.ix). 
 
 Increased morbidity and mortality: Malnourishment, stress and anxiety cause 
health levels to decline. Unsanitary conditions favour parasitic and vector-borne 
diseases such as malaria and bilharzia. The young, old and frail are particularly 
susceptible. 
 
 Loss of access to common property resources: People may lose access to 
grazing land, fisheries, forests, and burial grounds, which may contribute to loss 
of income, a decline in living standards, employment, and recreation 
opportunities. Resettled communities tend to encroach on protected areas and 
on the host community's resources, which is a source of potential conflict. 
 
 Loss of access to public services: Access to health care, education, public 
transport, and other public services may be lost. 
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 Social breakdown: Displacement breaks patterns of social organisation, 
interpersonal ties, informal ties, and other forms of social capital. The net loss of 
social capital and information compounds the loss of natural, human and 
physical capital. Social capital is furthermore usually unperceived and 
uncompensated. 
 
 Risks to host populations: If the resettlement site is already populated, these 
people may also suffer through increased pressure on social and environmental 
resources. 
 
In order to minimise these risks, involvement of affected communities is essential 
from the planning phase throughout the duration of the project. 
 
3.2.2 Involving affected communities in decision-making 
There is a hierarchy of ways in which affected communities can be involved in 
decision-making about land and its use (MMSD, 2002, p.142): 
 At a minimum, they should be informed of the proposed mining development;  
 Anyone whose use and enjoyment of benefits from land could be affected by 
development has a right to be consulted; this includes those who have a vested 
interest in land and sites of spiritual, cultural, and natural significance. It involves 
access to the information necessary to develop an informed opinion, time to 
evaluate that information, and the ability to ask questions and get them 
answered; 
 A more formal public participation process is appropriate when some legally 
recognised interest is likely to be affected by the decision; 
 Individuals or groups who are required to surrender recognised legal or 
traditional rights for what is determined by government (through legislation, 
judicial decisions, or the issuance of permits, for instance) to be for the common 
good, are entitled to compensation; and 
 Affected communities can have a right of veto over some land use decisions. 
 
The ideal is to create conditions of resettlement that will be voluntarily accepted by 
the affected peoples. But it is hard to maintain, for example, that a handful of people 
should have a veto over the future of a major project that has been accepted by the 
majority, any more than that one recalcitrant landowner should be allowed to prevent 
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the building of a rail line or highway (MMSD, 2002, p.168). Furthermore, practical 
experience has shown that the landowner in question might be holding onto his land 
rights as a strategy to obtain more in compensation; and not necessarily because 
he/she opposes the project itself. 
 
Besides, even when MIDR is ostensibly voluntary, there have been problems, as the 
Rio Tinto/ PT KEM‘s Kelian Mine (Indonesia) relocation illustrates: 
The construction of the Kelian Mine involved the loss of land to make 
way for a river port. Land and assets of local people were 
appropriated; some were compensated, but at rates deemed unfair 
locally. Displaced people experienced a dramatic drop in living 
standards and resettled families were in many cases provided with a 
house plot, but no house – though one had been promised. Further, 
traditional economic activities such as small scale mining were 
discouraged. (Source: Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, Mining 
Ombudsman Report 2000–2001, in MMSD, 2002, p.159) 
 
In any event, mining companies and governments should recognize the rights of the 
directly affected community to say no when there is a clear indication from a well 
established collective or traditional decision-making process that the proposal has 
been rejected (MMSD, 2002, p.167). However, mineral rights are owned by the state 
and ―most often, consent of the people who live on and make their livelihoods from 
the land is viewed as unnecessary, as they have no right of decision. The 
government therefore has generally not sought permission for the use of community 
land, and the rights of occupants, both formal and informal, have been abrogated.” 
(MMSD, 2002, p.143) 
 
This situation is further aggravated by the fact that in many places, land is occupied 
by people who do not have the capacity to defend their rights to land. Poorer 
communities tend to have subsistence relationships with land and to lack legally 
protected property rights, and therefore, they are the ones who traditionally get 
moved, but not compensated. Given the thin margins on which many of these people 
exist, this is a serious threat to their well-being or even their survival. 
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Nonetheless, local resistance to MIDR is building in many places, as people and 
governments try to shield themselves from its transferred social and economic costs. 
In north western Peru, for instance, local farmers in the San Lorenzo valley wish to 
maintain the Tambo Grande area as a fertile agricultural zone rather than support 
plans for a large open pit copper, silver, and gold mine that would move 1600 families 
to new housing provided by the project. This dispute is portrayed as a battle between 
the rights of some local communities that object to government policy and the state‘s 
need to court foreign investment for development. A report commissioned by 
environmental groups and Oxfam America concluded that ―some of the short term 
impacts could be viewed as positive, however it is the long-term impacts to the 
community and the environment that will be most significant.‖ (MMSD, 2002, p.158) 
 
3.2.3 Compensation 
Most legal systems recognise the principle of compensation: when a surface 
landowner‘s rights are taken for purposes of mineral development, the owner must be 
compensated for the loss. This is designed to redress in financial terms the economic 
impacts of a lost opportunity caused by mining (MMSD, 2002, p.148). 
 
One should bear in mind that compensation is designed simply to prevent a loss, not 
to create a benefit. Compensation by itself cannot adequately restore and improve 
the income levels and livelihood standards of people subjected to expropriation and 
forced displacement (MMSD, 2002, p.160). But there is a growing view that there 
should be a plan for an organized resettlement into new settings in which people can 
earn livelihoods and maintain community ties. This plan should also spell out clearly 
the responsibility of the state and other actors to provide the compensation and 
benefits promised in negotiations with communities. (MMSD, 2002, p.161). 
 
Eligibility criteria 
Who should be compensated, and by how much, for which kinds of uses of land? A 
clear and comprehensive compensation policy is essential to redress the losses of 
those affected by mine development. The success of such compensation policy 
depends on a clear definition of land tenure and rights (MMSD, 2002, p.149). Where 
land is owned collectively or under traditional systems of landownership, legal and 
administrative mechanisms need to be in place to establish legitimate ownership 
under traditional systems, and to discourage opportunistic land claims. 
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Adverse effects 
Compensation, even when paid to the satisfaction of the local community and others, 
may have unintended consequences. For example, Bonnell found that the impact of 
large cash compensation payments at Porgera (Papua New Guinea) had a negative 
impact on women and marriage. Adultery, abandoned wives and children, and 
domestic violence became a major concern. The loss of land for food and gardening 
purposes also led to economic hardship for women, in particular those whose 
partners had left home to work in the mine (MMSD, 2002, p.149). 
 
In subsistence economies in particular, compensation must cover the time lag 
between resettlement and the re-establishment of assets such as crops. Views of 
what constitutes fair compensation may differ widely between traditional landowners 
and others. For example, an economic assessment of bequest value (the importance 
placed on transferring something to a future generation), option value (the value of 
keeping something for future use rather than using it today), or existence value (the 
value of knowing something is available for use, whether it is actually used or not) 
may not fully capture the value of land assets to indigenous groups, where loss of 
such assets could mean cultural demise (MMSD, 2002, p.149). Moreover, as 
Hernando de Soto pointed out, the market requires clear indices of title and 
ownership (De Soto, 2000, p.244). ―Since the poor often have unclear or disputable 
title, or even no title at all, markets are unlikely to assign much value to their 
holdings.‖ (MMSD, 2002, p.151) For these reasons, the valuation of assets should be 
done in close consultation with the community and with the use of experts such as 
resource economists (Sonnenberg & Münster, 2001). 
 
Equally, it does not make sense to relocate people to land that is less productive or 
that requires input of resources that are beyond the means of the resettled. In its 
article 25, the Declaration of Human Rights states that ‗no standards shall be 
diminished as a result of the relocation and compensation process‘ (MMSD, 2002, 
p.160). Similarly, where houses built with permanent materials replace traditional 
homes, for instance, communities may not have the skills required to maintain them. 
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3.3 MINING INDUCED DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT: REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK AND BEST PRACTICE 
Resettlement policies are inadequate and not harmonised across Southern Africa. In 
South Africa, there is a range of laws and initiatives dealing with some of the 
components of resettlement and a multiplicity of government departments are drawn 
into the resettlement process (Sonnenberg & Münster, 2001). No clear policy or 
single comprehensive law exists (MMSDSA, 2002, p.24). 
 
There is a huge potential for conflict to arise during relocation processes, especially if 
they are not managed well. However, conflict over resettlement proposals can be 
avoided or at least minimised in most cases by adherence to a basic set of practices, 
such as free and willing negotiation on the part of the community (and the host 
community, where there is one); full and fair compensation of the community for loss 
of assets and economic opportunity; and provision of alternative land of equal value 
and equal income-generating opportunity to the land lost. (MMSD, 2002, p.168) 
Following this line of thinking, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the 
World Bank have devised a series of guidelines to encourage best practice in mining 
induced resettlements. 
 
3.3.1 World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement OP 4.12 
The World Bank was one of the first international development aid agencies to 
formulate a policy on involuntary resettlement in 1980. The policy was first issued as 
an internal Operational Manual Statement (OMS 2.33). It was revised in 1990, as 
Operational Directive (OD) 4.30, as was converted to Operational Policy (OP) 4.12 in 
2002. It remains one of the most comprehensive resettlement policy statements, 
although it does not cover all of the social issues and impacts, which should be 
identified using tools such as the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(EIA/SIA). 
 
The World Bank‘s policy objectives are to: 
 Avoid involuntary resettlement where feasible, or at least minimise it, exploring 
all viable alternative project designs. 
 Conceive and execute resettlement activities as sustainable development 
programs, providing sufficient investment resources to enable the persons 
displaced by the project to share in project benefits. Displaced persons should be 
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meaningfully consulted and should have opportunities to participate in planning 
and implementing resettlement programs. 
 Assist displaced persons in their efforts to improve their livelihoods and 
standards of living or at least to restore them, in real terms, to pre-displacement 
levels or to levels prevailing prior to the beginning of project implementation, 
whichever is higher. 
 
The policy provides guidelines for resettlement planning, implementation and 
monitoring, and covers different aspects from consultation to compensation and 
support after displacement. 
 
3.3.2 IFC Performance Standard 5: ‘Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement’ 
According to the IFC (International Finance Corporation) Performance Standard 5: 
‗Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement‘ (IFC PS5), relocation is considered 
involuntary when affected individuals or communities do not have the rights to refuse 
land acquisition that results in displacement. This can occur in cases of:  
 Lawful expropriation or restrictions on land use based on eminent domain; and  
 Negotiated settlements in which the buyer can resort to expropriation or impose 
legal restrictions on land use if negotiations with the seller fail. (International 
Finance Corporation, Performance Standard 5, ―Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement‖, 2006) 
 
Involuntary displacement refers both to physical displacement (i.e. relocation of 
people resulting in a loss of shelter, productive assets or access to productive assets 
such as land, water and forests); and economic displacement (i.e. if land acquisition 
causes loss of income or livelihood, regardless of whether or not the affected people 
are physically displaced). 
 
The objectives of the IFC‘s PS5 are aligned with those of the World Bank OP 4.12., 
and it‘s requirements are similar, although more detailed than the World Bank OP 
4.12. 
 
3.3.3 South African legislation 
A few pieces of South African legislation can be mentioned with regards to mining 
induced resettlement. 
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Section 25  (1) of the Constitution specifies that “No one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property.” 
Section 25 (2): Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general 
application – 
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment 
 
Sections 5, 10 and 22.11, 12, 54, and 55 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) contain the requirements to notify and 
consult affected peoples. 
 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 31 of 1996 specifies that no 
person may be deprived of any informal right to land without his or her consent 
(section 2(1)). This is particularly critical as landlessness is arguably the greatest 
threat to displaced rural communities; even more so if land rights are difficult to 
establish. Without this security of tenure ―displaced communities may be at risk of 
losing land and livelihoods without receiving appropriate compensation for such 
losses.‖ (MMSDSA, 2002, p.23) 
 
 
 
This thesis deals not only with the relocation process per se and the way it unfolded 
in Lekgoropane (Rasimone); it also examines the role that the Bafokeng traditional 
authority played in it, and unveils the power dynamics at place between traditional 
leadership structures and people on the ground, rooted in 150 years of Bafokeng 
social and political history. A history shaped by the discovery of minerals, by 
repeated challenges of constituencies to the leadership and their respective constant 
repositioning in the balance of powers, and by the advent of representative 
democracy. The methods used to achieve those goals are presented in the next 
section. 
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4. METHODS  
Many aspects of a relocation process are regulated and the process itself, to a large 
extent follows a prescribed modus operandi. As a result, the overall framework in 
which the resettlement process takes place was known prior to the fieldwork, and the 
corresponding sections in the research were accordingly structured around it, 
following a chronological chain of events. Consequently, the research is of the pre-
structured type as far as the narrative of the relocation process is concerned. On the 
other hand, examining the socio-political issues uncovered by the resettlement 
process, notably with regards to the management and administration of land and 
associated power relations involved elements of unfolding, emerging research, and 
relied to a greater extent on open and semi-structured interviews. 
 
4.1 DESIGN: STRATEGY AND FRAMEWORK 
The method used was essentially qualitative field research, revolving around the use 
of interviews. The study of documents on the social and political history of the 
Bafokeng supported the interpretation and analysis of the findings from the empirical 
research.  
 
4.1.1 Choice of case study 
Convenience was a factor in choosing the case study. Indeed, at the time 
investigations commenced, none of the identified informants had in depth knowledge 
about any of the relocation cases which had occurred in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. 
The initial intention was to study a case which occurred in the mid-2000s, in order for 
the current leadership (in place since 2000) to be held directly accountable for it. One 
of my key informants, a researcher and activist, suggested an older case (late 
1990s - early 2000) which involved the relocation of a settlement (Lekgoropane) in 
the village of Rasimone. Retrospectively, the timeframe is ideal as the effects of the 
relocation are still visible (evidence of the old settlement remain), but as more time 
has passed, the whole process can be viewed into perspective. Interviews have 
moreover shown that informants‘ memories of the events are still vivid. The case of 
Rasimone was furthermore chosen for its intensity, in that it constitutes an 
information rich case, which manifests situations (such as social conflict and decision 
making processes) intensely, but not extremely. 
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4.1.2 Data collection 
It had been envisaged that documents, as well as primary materials would be used in 
this research. Some hurdles were however encountered and official documents and 
reports produced during the resettlement process proved to be inaccessible. 
Documents such as the Environmental Impact Assessment and Social Impact 
Assessment (EIA and SIA), the Environmental Management Plan (EMP), including 
the social baseline study and Resettlement Action Plan, as well as the social 
monitoring and audit reports, all record various aspects of the mining project 
(including relocation), from planning to post-construction monitoring.  
 
The Environmental and Social Impact Assessments by definition provide an 
evaluation of the nature and significance of impacts (both positive and negative) of 
the proposed mining project on the natural and social environment (i.e. ecological 
and human components). The information in the EIA and SIA are then used as a 
basis for the compilation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP).  
 
Before commencement of construction, physical audits were undertaken by 
professionals (architects in the case of Rasimone) in consultation with the kgosanas 
(headmen) and affected communities to identify all potentially affected persons and 
record the status and condition of all properties, assets and infrastructure affected by 
the project, as well as all activities, land uses and structures (e.g. fencing, boreholes, 
houses, etc.) within the affected site. 
 
This information formed the social baseline study, which typically includes 
photographs, including aerial photos and satellite imagery, site plans and maps. The 
purpose of the baseline study or ‗Status Quo Report‘ (as it was called) was to 
develop an adequate compensation framework, detailed in the Resettlement Action 
Plan. 
 
The RAP contains inter alia details of every directly affected person and property, the 
methodology for assessing losses and valuation of assets; organisational 
responsibility for implementation; implementation plan; grievance redress 
mechanisms; consultation mechanisms; monitoring plans, as well as input from 
affected stakeholders. This then forms the basis on which are developed the 
resettlement strategy and objectives; resettlement and compensation options and 
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packages; the institutional framework for responsibilities and decision-making; a 
monitoring and evaluation framework; and the relocation programme and budget. 
 
The RAP must be compliant with South African legislation, although to ensure best 
practice, it should also incorporate guiding principles for resettlement contained in the 
World Bank Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement OP 4.12, and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standard on Land Acquisition 
and Involuntary Resettlement PS 5. 
 
The regional office of the Department of Mining in Klerksdorp, the Royal Bafokeng 
Administration and the mine (Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine) have copies of 
these documents, as they are required by authorities considering the application by 
the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine to undertake blasting and proceed with the 
relocation of the residents of Lekgoropane. However, in spite of numerous attempts, I 
was unable to secure access to these records. This has a number of implications for 
this research that are discussed in section 4.3. As a result, the empirical research 
relied on informant interviews for a large part.  
 
4.1.3 Informant interviews 
The primary material analysed in this research are interviews conducted as part of 
research into the community. The material was collected during eighteen months of 
mostly informal interviews with key informants. Those took place through telephone 
calls, emails and direct contact with them; a relationship of trust was established with 
these individuals.  
 
A round of formal interviews with people on the ground in the relocated community (in 
Mafenya) took place in November 2009. Seven informants (selected according to the 
technique described in the following section) were interviewed. Due to language 
issues and for courtesy purposes, I was introduced by two of my local key informants, 
who explained who I was, why I was doing this research and what I was doing it for. 
Apart from the obvious practical purpose, I believe having two members of the 
Bafokeng with me also broke down certain barriers that I might have experienced if I 
was on the field alone. I also felt more comfortable being assisted by two informants 
whom I could trust, and who knew what the research was about in order to convey it 
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to the interviewees. Not to mention that in an environment I was not really familiar 
with, I felt safer. 
 
There was a very low non-response rate. Only one person refused outright to 
undertake the interview. But, the interview was cut short in other instances where the 
monosyllabic answers of one informant and the visible discomfort of another were 
enough to make us understand that we were intruding. Some informants wanted to 
confirm that I was neither from the mine, nor from the Bafokeng administration before 
proceeding with the interview. The majority of informants however were very 
welcoming and open, and willing to provide me with the material I needed, I am very 
grateful for their participation, without which this research would not have been 
possible. 
 
Semi structured, in-depth interviews were conducted to encourage informants to 
relate their point of view and experiences, and brought out a rich understanding of 
the relocation process from the perspective of affected people on the ground. 
Interviewees were encouraged to expand on each topic to the limit of their knowledge 
and enthusiasm. The material from these interviews was also used to extract 
qualitative data needed to develop an analysis of the nature of power relations at play 
during the relocation process. The interviews with the seven informants in Mafenya 
took place in their homes, and lasted between twenty five minutes and one hour and 
a half. 
 
4.1.4 Sampling technique 
The target population for this research was constituted by a small, purposive sample 
constituted by individuals selected because of the specific information they have as 
members or representatives of affected and broader communities. The choice of key 
informants was to a certain extent, influenced by convenience. However, some of the 
key informants were referred to me several times by different stakeholders, thereby 
providing an indication of how representative of a particular position or situation they 
were to a variety of stakeholders.  
 
Informant interviews involved people who were directly affected by the relocation as 
well as people who were involved as decision-makers in the process. With respect to 
the relocated community the sample was selected using the snowball sampling 
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technique, with some elements of random sampling. I was initially referred to two 
individuals by one of my key informants, who then suggested other people I could 
interview. After running out of contacts, I went door to door to request interviews. It is 
thus a non-probability sample and therefore is not necessarily representative of the 
entire community who was relocated. This has not proved a hindrance in this 
research as the emphasis was on a the analysis of experiences of people on the 
ground rather than a statistical exercise to achieve representativeness.  
 
Key informants 
Four people provided particularly useful insights into both the research and the 
methods to be used. Two informants from the Bafokeng Nation, involved in 
community activism (notably relating to mining issues) on the ground, provided 
valuable insights into the workings of the traditional authority and the dynamics at 
play between the traditional authority and its constituencies, and the evolution 
thereof. The two other key informants were researchers, who provided extremely 
useful background on the Bafokeng from an outsider point of view, as well as a 
critical analysis of power relations in the Royal Bafokeng Nation which allowed me to 
grasp the issues at play in the field with more accurateness. Three out of the four key 
informants did not want their identity to be disclosed. 
 
Informants involved in the relocation process 
Crucial to the research were the informants residing in ‗new‘ Mafenya, who lived the 
relocation process from 1998 to 2002, and who gave me their perspective on how the 
events unfolded.  Informants in Mafenya were not screened before the interviews. 
Out of seven people interviewed in Mafenya, three were women and four were men; 
their age ranged from 39 to 75 years, and among those who disclosed their 
occupations, I recorded two unemployed people, a pensioner, a farmer and an 
entrepreneur, so the sample was rather diverse. Informants from the relocated 
community included:  
 Mr. Edward Boikanyo (former secretary of the relocation committee, 
entrepreneur); 
 Mr. Eric Kgaditswe ( former relocation committee member); 
 Mr. Isaac Monei (pensioner); 
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 Ms. Teresa Tsiane*;  
 Mrs. Pitso* (unemployed); 
 Mr. Modise* (farmer); 
 Mrs. Modise* (unemployed). 
 
For the other side of the story, that of the mine and the Bafokeng traditional authority, 
Mr. George Khunou was my only informant. Indeed, I found that ten years down the 
line, many people involved in decision making processes at the time were no longer 
working for any of the two entities in charge of the project. Mr. Khunou, although he 
was no longer working in the Royal Bafokeng Administration (RBA), was still involved 
with the Bafokeng traditional authority as CEO of Royal Bafokeng Sports and was 
relatively easy to trace. He gave me his account of the relocation, based on his role 
in it, as a representative of the RBA, and member of the Bafokeng Rasimone 
Platinum Mine Joint Venture ‗development committee‘, responsible for facilitating the 
relocation process (see chapter 6.). He notably provided information on procedural 
matters that informants in Mafenya were not aware of or able to grasp. He also shed 
some light on the roles and responsibilities of the various parties involved in the 
relocation process, something that the members of the relocated community did not 
convey. 
 
Other informants 
Contact was made with RBA officials, regarding the requirements to fulfil to obtain an 
authorisation to undertake fieldwork in the Royal Bafokeng Nation, and to enquire 
about access to records. I was notably in contact with Ms. Sue Cook, anthropologist, 
in charge of all matters relating to research in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. The 
Bafokeng traditional authority, through its fieldwork authorisation procedure, required 
a maximum of information on the thesis, including the proposal, an affidavit from the 
University of the Witwatersrand confirming that I was indeed enrolled for the degree, 
and a consent letter to be distributed to all participants in the research (see 
Appendix C). 
 
Several mine officials were also contacted regarding access to information and 
records. 
                                               
 
*
 Not their real names. 
  
50 
 
The research did not aim to establish ownership of land in the areas where it is 
contested; there are land claims pending and the courts will determine that. 
Therefore, no representative of the state, in the land commission was interviewed to 
provide an analysis of the contested nature of land ownership in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation. 
 
In total, fourteen people were formally interviewed for this research. 
 
About the informants 
As much information as possible about the informants and their place in the 
community was gathered in order to assess the accuracy of the information, the 
following factors were considered noteworthy: 
 Language: not all the informants spoke fluent English, as for most of them it was 
their second language. This has implications in terms of concepts and 
vocabulary, as most people think in their first language, and this affects the way 
they understand other languages, as well as their ability to use language to 
describe an event; 
 Age and gender: all the key informants are adult males; the age and gender of 
the other informants are indicated above; 
 Education and employment: all the key informants are educated to at least matric 
level, and all of them are in relatively powerful positions (in terms of social status 
and resources) in the community. Education levels and employment were 
variable among members of the relocated community (see above). 
 
4.1.5 Reliability of data 
There is considerable controversy about the real meaning of verbal communication, 
and although most people try to be truthful in what they report, it is worth keeping a 
few things in mind: 
 The material supplied by informants may be unreliable because they may not be 
as knowledgeable as they seem, because they do not want the information to fall 
into the wrong hands; because it reflects unflatteringly on them; because it could 
be used against them; or because they are deliberately attempting to mislead the 
interviewer; 
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 Communications can also be affected by the respondent‘s feelings about the 
interviewer: small clues to status and attitudes can make the difference between 
cooperation and reliability or refusal to cooperate; 
 What is reported is filtered through the informants‘ position in society, including 
age, gender, education etc. (see above), as well as their values and opinions; 
 Individuals‘ recollections of events are subject to all the biases of unsystematic 
observation, rationalisation and memory decay. However, as Peil notes: 
“[Respondents‟] most important contribution is their well-considered 
interpretation of complex events.‖ (Peil, 1995) 
 
In order to better assess the accuracy of the information, as much information as 
possible about the informants and the community was collected. Although there will 
be some element of bias in any interview, inherent to the way informants remember 
and relate events, reliability was increased by checking all interview transcripts for 
internal consistency. Accounts of the relocation process by members of the relocated 
community in Mafenya for instance were internally consistent as well as consistent 
between each other. Finally, during and after fieldwork, perceptions and recollections 
of the relocation process were questioned and critically evaluated based on the 
literature, as well as the Bafokeng historical context. 
 
4.1.6 Generalisation of findings  
This piece of research focuses on the description of the relocation process in generic 
terms and on a set of context specific issues. With regards to the generalisation of 
findings, the part of the research detailing the relocation process will be a fairly 
accurate reflection of the way resettlement processes occur throughout the country 
(i.e. generalisable), as well as of the nature of relationships that are formed during 
that process. This is keeping in mind that mining companies face growing pressure 
from governments and society to avoid social conflict as much as possible; the 
approach may therefore have changed since, however, in terms of the process to be 
followed, the number and order of the various tasks are likely to remain the same. 
Other sections of the thesis, dealing with land administration and power relations are 
relevant for other cases in South Africa, notably in rural areas with traditional 
leadership structures and under communal land tenure regimes, and can provide 
useful insights on the conditions of the survival of traditional authorities in a 
democratic South Africa, but cannot be generalised as such. 
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4.1.7 Procedure for data collection  
The fieldwork for this thesis took place in 2008-2009, roughly ten years after the start 
of the relocation process. Key informants were interviewed on an ongoing basis, 
while other interviews took place at specific times.  
 
A first field trip in October 2008 allowed me to obtain an overview of the concrete field 
of research, orientate myself to the project I had in mind, as well as plan the modus 
operandi and range of investigation. 
 
I had made provision for a week in the field for interviews of identified informants in 
Mafenya. However, two days were sufficient to collect the necessary information. 
Indeed, a clear pattern emerged whereby informants provided very similar accounts 
of the relocation process, albeit in different terms (see chapter 6.). However, one 
issue requiring further investigation kept me a little longer in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation. Two more days were spent between the RBA offices and the mine, as I 
attempted to find out how and where to access records of the relocation, while 
officials and employees kept on passing the buck. After being promised a few times 
the above-mentioned documents by several people, but never actually managing to 
get copies, I accepted that I would not be granted access to them (see section 4.3. 
below).  
 
Interviews took place in Johannesburg, Phokeng, and Mafenya during office hours 
and on weekdays. Informants in Mafenya were interviewed in their homes. Mr. 
George Khunou was interviewed in Royal Bafokeng Holdings office premises in 
Melrose Arch, Johannesburg. Finally, some interviews with key informants took place 
in public places in Phokeng. 
 
Despite carrying a tape recording device with me at all interviews, only two interviews 
were recorded, for which an agreement with the interviewee had been reached in that 
regard beforehand. On the other hand, none of the interviews with the relocated 
community were recorded as it created visible discomfort or was outright rejected. 
Handwritten notes were taken alternatively. 
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Non-participant observation formed part of the methods utilised in this research to 
describe the environment and surroundings of the locations, and was be coupled with 
a photographic record. 
 
4.2 CONSENT, ACCESS AND PARTICIPANTS PROTECTION 
Most of the informants identified agreed to cooperate and allocate some time for the 
interviews. Part of the requirements of the RBA in order to issue a research 
authorisation was to draft a consent letter to be given to participants before each 
interview. This letter, together with the fieldwork authorisation, is included in 
Appendix D. 
 
Regarding participants‘ protection, before each interview, informants had an 
opportunity to choose to remain anonymous or to be quoted with their real names. 
The majority of informants requested to remain anonymous. Some on the contrary 
specifically asked to have their real names mentioned; two of them are former 
members of the community‘s relocation committee (see chapter 6.) and one is a 
retired farmer. It is worth noting that all three have been in open opposition to some 
aspects of the relocation process and have tried until recently to obtain reparation for 
the (perceived) violations of the terms of the compensation agreements through 
various interventions at the lekgotla, with the mine and the Kgosi himself.  
 
Given the background work that had already taken place, access to informants 
among the affected communities and main decision-makers was relatively trouble-
free. Access to documents however, to the extent that it relied on people‘s 
willingness to grant access and organisation‘s ability to keep records, was more 
problematic (see section 4.3); even though Sue Cook, from RBA, had assured that 
the Bafokeng administration would fully cooperate in this regard, once due 
procedures were followed and the required authorisation to conduct research was 
obtained (Appendix C). 
 
4.3 LIMITATIONS 
The conditions in which this research was conducted have had an impact on the 
completeness and accuracy of some of the information presented in this thesis. 
Consequently, there are certain limitations to the research that are discussed in the 
following sections. 
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4.3.1 Problems related to access to information 
Despite requesting the documentation relating to all aspects of the relocation for 
months, and even though several people (at the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine 
and the Royal Bafokeng Administration) promised to grant me access, I have not 
managed to obtain copies or even been able to page through those reports. This is 
after numerous emails sent to various people, telephone calls made and visits to the 
mine and Bafokeng Administration officials in charge of the records.  
 
I started at the BRPM in February 2009 with the environmental control person, who 
requested a full disclosure on what the information was for, how it would be used, 
whether it would be published etc. This information was then sent to the SED (Socio 
Economic Development) manager (in charge of all relations with neighbouring and 
affected communities), who replied that since he was not working at the BRPM at the 
time, he could not help me. Further requests to search through archives were met 
with radio silence. 
 
I then contacted the Department of Mineral Resources (former Department of 
Minerals and Energy) North West regional office in Klerksdorp. I had been warned by 
some in the know that their archiving was very bad and that it might be difficult to find 
the reports in question. After numerous fruitless attempts to talk to the person 
responsible for the filing and archiving in order to enquire about the conditions to 
access the Department‘s records, I eventually spoke to the general manager himself 
(directly in charge of processing this type of applications) who told me he did not 
know what I was referring to. I have not been able to get hold of him, or any relevant 
staff member since. 
 
My third option then was the Royal Bafokeng Administration (RBA). I had been told 
earlier in the year that the reports I needed existed, but that a research authorisation 
was required to access them. After been granted authorisation to conduct fieldwork 
by the RBA, I requested their copy of the reports. Regrettably I also encountered 
archiving problems. I was told that the report was certainly somewhere, but that 
nobody was able to locate it. Mr. Khunou also mentioned that it used to be in his 
office at the Royal Bafokeng Administration, but since he no longer worked there, he 
did not know what happened to the report. 
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I tried contacting the mine again a few months later (August) and this time I was told 
that those documents were legal and confidential. I can only presume that there was 
a genuine misunderstanding regarding the nature of those reports, or that the person 
was attempting to elude my request. I finally went to the mine and physically knocked 
at the door of the environmental control person to request the documentation. This 
time I came with a letter written on an RBA letterhead and adorned with the Royal 
Bafokeng Administration‘s stamp, authorising my research. I was received more 
cordially than the previous times and was told to speak directly to the General 
Manager, Mr. Glen Harris, as well as to mention the person who recommended I 
come at the Royal Bafokeng Administration (in this case, Ms. Sue Cook). I then 
spoke to the General Manager‘s PA, who told me that Mr. Harris was not available 
but that she knew what I was looking for and would revert back. As she did not, I 
asked again, but with the same result. The same scenario repeated itself a few times 
after one particular follow-up call I was even promised that I would receive all the 
documents the following morning by email. Unsurprisingly, I did not receive anything, 
and she finally referred me back to the SED manager. The SED manager referred 
me to Mr. Chris Kern, who worked for the BRPM on the actual relocation at the time. 
 
After multiple attempts to reach Mr. Kern (no longer working at the BRPM) and time 
running out, I decided to ask for Mr. Khunou‘s help in getting hold of him. I knew they 
had worked together on that project and that he mentioned he would be happy to 
assist and call him himself. This was also unsuccessful. I have not managed to obtain 
access to these documents. All records of communication in that regard were kept in 
a database for reference purposes. 
 
Although not a tragedy for this research, this has two major implications that need to 
be reckoned with. Firstly, it is a severe limitation in terms of the exact description of 
processes and associated timeframes, as well as institutional arrangements and 
roles and responsibilities. Ten years after the process commenced, memories are 
blurred and recollections less than accurate. However, interviews of Mr. Khunou and 
of members of the community show that standards procedures were followed (i.e. 
planning, ongoing consultation throughout, and post-construction monitoring). As a 
result, broad timeframes have been defined in the research, outlining the relocation 
process. I had been assured of the Royal Bafokeng Administration‘s staff‘s 
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cooperation in my research and I am grateful for the time they have spared for me. 
Nevertheless, despite numerous requests to use their resources to support in 
securing access to those reports, no one was willing to assist. 
 
I cannot speculate whether there is anything to read in this other than, a lack of time, 
lack of interest or simply apathy. Mr. Khunou did assure me that the process went 
smoothly and ―everybody was happy‖ in the end (Interview with Mr. George Khunou, 
2009). Indeed, due procedures were followed and authorisation was obtained from 
the competent authority for the relocation and blasting. No fatal flaws are likely to 
have gone through the net of authority consultation and authorisation. However, the 
essential point of discrepancy between Mr. Khunou‘s account of the relocation, and 
the residents‘ account, relating to the alleged lying and deliberate misleading of the 
relocated community cannot be verified, as access to public consultation records, 
notably minutes of meetings, was denied to me, which constitutes the second major 
limitation to this research. It is interesting to note that the two members of the 
committee representing the affected community who were interviewed have also 
requested those minutes (to the mine and to Royal Bafokeng Administration), to no 
avail. Those records were once in the public domain and formed part of the report 
submitted to the Department of Mineral and Energy (DME), who granted 
authorisation for the project to proceed on the basis of that report. Hence, these 
records are not confidential and should be available to the public, especially to 
directly affected parties such as the members of the relocation committee. 
 
4.3.2 Issues related to accuracy of information 
I have resorted to some approximations in the research that are largely attributable to 
the fact that no official records were available. The institutional framework has been 
outlined in chapter 6., to a certain level of exactitude. However, the distribution of 
responsibilities and parties involved in decision making, were blurred in the minds of 
informants from the relocated community, who referred to ―the Bafokeng 
administration‖, ―the mine‖, or to a very elusive ―they‖ with little appreciation of who 
was in charge of what. My interview with George Khunou and general knowledge of 
relocation processes has addressed this to some extent.  
 
Another factor that potentially affected the accuracy of information is related to the 
use of interpreters for the interviews of informants from the relocated community. 
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Although indispensable for the fieldwork required in this research, it may have been a 
hindrance in two respects: firstly, some meaning and content conveyed by 
interviewees is likely to have been lost in the translation exercise; and secondly, the 
interpreter‘s own interpretation and understanding of the questions and answers 
might have also influenced the manner in which they were translated. This impact 
was partly mitigated by the fact firstly there were two interpreters, who were able to 
rectify and expand on each other‘s translation, and secondly, they knew what the 
research was about and what information I wanted to get to convey it to the 
interviewees.  
 
 
The following chapters are the result of the application of the methods described 
above. They present firstly a background to the Royal Bafokeng Nation, notably the 
history of land acquisition and land tenure and administration arrangements and their 
implications in terms of the distribution of mineral wealth. Then, power relations are 
explored through the unfolding of the relocation process in chapter 6. 
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5. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY, DEMOCRACY AND THE LAND QUESTION IN 
THE ROYAL BAFOKENG NATION 
Land acquisition by the Bafokeng over the years has been a critical factor in 
preserving them from dispossession and exploitation during the colonial era, and is 
the foundation of their extraordinary wealth and unique degree of autonomy today. 
Outlining the history of land acquisition in the Royal Bafokeng Nation (section 5.2) is 
central to the topic at hand, as it explains to a great extent the role that the traditional 
authority played during the relocation of the community of Lekgoropane (cf. 
chapter 6).  
 
The process of land acquisition did not always benefit from the support of the entire 
community and some conflicts emerged over ownership of the land. These conflicts 
impacted on the relationship between the chief and his constituency; this relationship 
as well as some conflict resolution mechanisms that were resorted to will be 
examined in section 5.3. 
 
Finally, land administration and management arrangements, resulting from both 
custom and recent legal developments in present day Royal Bafokeng Nation, which 
were directly applicable in the relocation of the community of Lekgoropane, will be 
discussed in section 5.4. But first, section 5.1 will provide a brief introduction and 
contextualisation of the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘. 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE ROYAL BAFOKENG NATION 
The Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) is situated within the Rustenburg Local 
Municipality, which in turn is part of the Bojanala Platinum District Municipality, in the 
North West province (see map below). It is constituted by 29 villages, with a 
population estimated at 300 000* and encompasses a territory of about 1 200 km2. 
The town of Phokeng is the administrative centre of the RBN. 
 
                                               
 
*
 Estimate of the Royal Bafokeng Administration (source: www.bafokeng.com) 
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Figure 5-1: Location of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (source: www.bafokeng.com) 
 
The Bafokeng (People of the Dew in Setswana) started buying the land they 
occupied in the 1860s, over the years, they purchased a number of farms with 
community resources (cf. following section). The Bafokeng now own 120 000 ha of 
land in the Bushveld Complex. The Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC) extends for 400 
kilometres and contains the world‘s largest known deposits of platinum group metals 
(PGMs), with estimated reserves of 62 816 tons (about 55.7 per cent of the world‘s 
total) (Bench Marks Foundation, 2008, p. 29). 
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Figure 5-2: African communities in the central district of the Z.A.R in 1871 (source: 
Bergh, p.96) 
 
Farming was the primary occupation in the area until German geologist Hans 
Merensky discovered in the early 1920s substantial reserves of Platinum Group 
Metals (PGMs), such as platinum, palladium, ferrochrome, rhodium, ruthenium, 
iridium and osmium in the region. He gave his name to the Merensky Reef, which 
spans the North-West, Northern and Mpumalanga Provinces in an arc extending 300 
kilometres. It is characterised by its high PGM grades and the high ratio of platinum 
to the other PGMs. A second reef known as UG2 was subsequently found to underlie 
the Merensky Reef by between 60 metres and 400 metres. The reefs vary in 
thickness from 30 centimetres to 12 metres*. Mined at today's rates of extraction, 
mineral reserves on Bafokeng land are estimated to last for another 35 to 40 years. 
 
In 2007, the Bafokeng made about R 2 billion from platinum, including R 1.2 billion in 
royalties from Impala Platinum (News 24.com, ―What to do with R 34 bn?‖, 
                                               
 
*
 www.bafokeng.com 
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12/05/2008). This money is paid into a trust managed by Royal Bafokeng Holdings, 
the nation‘s investment vehicle. 
 
The Bafokeng have been dubbed ‗the richest tribe in Africa‘ (Mbenga and Manson, 
2003) due to the revenues they receive from mining companies exploiting the 
platinum rich land. These revenues have allowed the Bafokeng traditional authority, 
who administers the funds through a trust, to ensure that its people were better off 
than most communities in rural areas (cf. Bozzoli, 1991) over the years. Indeed, 
between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, the upsurge in platinum mining and 
corresponding royalties paid to the Bafokeng provided a great source of revenue to 
the chief (Chief Lebone at the time) to develop the community. Lebone offered a 
stand on which to live, free or subsidised health care, schools and bursaries for the 
youth. This made returning to the ―homeland‖ desirable for many Bafokeng who had 
gone to live and work in cities, and made it a good place to live for those who had 
remained in the area. Furthermore, as the apartheid government made life 
increasingly difficult for Africans in urban areas, Phokeng, as well as other parts of 
Bafokeng territory became a shelter for those who were no longer prepared to suffer 
the hardships of apartheid, or who were forcibly removed (Bozzoli, 1991, p.206). 
 
Services were improved through the development of infrastructure: boreholes were 
drilled, roads were tarred and new buildings, including the Civic Centre in Phokeng, 
were built. Chief Lebone was also committed to the improvement of education and 
the eradication of illiteracy in particular: “we are going to use every cent we get to 
fight illiteracy‖ (quoted in Bozzoli, 1991, p.28).  
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Picture 5-1: The Civic Centre in Phokeng 
 
This practice of service delivery continued over the years, and presently in the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation, the Royal Bafokeng Administration funds and implements selected 
infrastructure developments including roads, water reticulation, sanitation and street 
lighting. The rates charged for the services they provide to households, are generally 
lower than those of the municipality.  
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Picture 5-2: Road maintenance in Phokeng
*
 
 
The Bafokeng Administration has grown over the years and approximately 300 
people now work in the different departments, including legal and corporate affairs, 
finance, human resources, community development and town planning. 
 
                                               
 
*
 Source: www.bafokengholdings.com 
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Figure 5-3: Organisation of traditional leadership and administration of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation  
 
Several schools have also been built, as well as municipal buildings and the 
prestigious Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace, which hosts international football games. 
However, all projects undertaken by the Bafokeng administration must be approved 
by the local municipality in order to ensure that they are in line with the Rustenburg 
Municipality‘s Integrated Development Plan (IDP). From the side of the municipality, 
the Royal Bafokeng Administration has outperformed the Rustenburg Local 
Municipality the services provided by the Royal Bafokeng Administration have 
alleviated the Municipality of part of its service delivery duty in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation, and allowed it to concentrate on more urgent needs in other parts of the 
municipality. As a result, people in the Bafokeng nation tend to think of the Bafokeng 
administration as the primary provider of infrastructure and service delivery. 
 
  
65 
 
Picture 5-3: Royal Bafokeng Sports Palace* 
 
  Picture 5-4: Children learning PC skills* 
 
As a result, the Royal Bafokeng Nation is often held up as an example of the benefits 
of the mining industry to local communities, as well as of true ‗community based 
empowerment‘. Indeed, the Bafokeng are the only example of community 
representation at decision-making level in mining companies (on the board and / or 
senior management). This distinctive configuration of power relations has led to a 
unique synergy between the Bafokeng and the platinum mining sector; the 
implications and ramifications of which are continuously being unearthed and 
adjusted to. 
 
To be sure, one of the major consequences of the availability of such financial 
resources, and indeed one that is very much publicised, is that a significant 
proportion of mining revenue is reinvested directly into the surrounding communities, 
resulting in an expansion in communications, health, education and social amenities 
infrastructure (see above), and it is likely that ―the sustained growth of the PGM 
mining sector will produce extraordinary leverage in enhancing economic growth in 
the regional communities […].” (Mugodi and Fleming, 2003, p.505.) 
 
Nevertheless, such huge financial resources (the Royal Bafokeng Nation owns 
assets valued at over R30 billion†) have also created tensions and discontent among 
some members of the community, who believe they are mismanaged and misused. 
Furthermore, despite the representation of the Bafokeng on the board of Implats, and 
the stakes owned in other mining companies, communities still suffer from the 
                                               
 
*
 Source: www.bafokengholdings.com 
†
 Figure for 2007, source: www.bafokengholdings.com 
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negative impacts of mining activities, and not a word is mentioned on how the 
Bafokeng have used their influence and resources to mitigate this. 
 
In order to understand how this massive wealth came about, one has to start with the 
history of acquisition of the mineral rich land by the Bafokeng. 
 
5.2 LAND ACQUISITION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST DISPOSSESSION 
Most communal land is nominally owned by the state (cf. chapter 1), but the 
Bafokeng are part of the minority (as far as communal land tenure is concerned) who 
enjoy private ownership of their land*. 
 
Mokgatle† initiated the purchase of the first tracts of land that would allow the 
Bafokeng to fight off the worst ravages of colonialism. August Molotlegi continued the 
tradition of buying land and also managed the early relations with the prospectors 
that poured into the area after the discovery of Platinum. By the end of the 
19th century, the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ had acquired over twenty farms or portions of farms 
(see Figure 2-4). 
 
Land purchasing amongst the Bafokeng, was usually done on a communal basis; the 
complex process was led by the different chiefs with the help of lawyers. As the 
various purchases relied on collective resources, it required the support and co-
operation of the community who had to understand the benefits that would accrue to 
them from each particular purchase.  
 
This section will examine why, how, and under what conditions the Bafokeng 
acquired land from the mid-nineteenth century onward, as well as the way land was 
and is administered; and how this impacted on the relationship between certain 
sections of the Bafokeng and the traditional authority, especially from the time it was 
discovered that the Bafokeng were standing on one of the largest platinum reserves 
in the world.  
 
                                               
 
*
 Not all land in the Royal Bafokeng Nation is privately owned however, the village of Robega 
for instance is on state owned land and administered by the Bafokeng traditional authority. 
†
 A number of Bafokeng leaders since the 19
th
 century are mentioned in this chapter, a 
timeline of Bafokeng chiefs is included in Appendix A for reference purposes. 
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Figure 5-4: Farms and farm portions purchased by the Bafokeng during the 
19
th
 century (source: Bergh, p.104) 
 
5.2.1 Land acquisition in the 19th and 20th centuries 
The Bafokeng first began to purchase land under the leadership of Chief Mokgatle in 
the 1860s. At that time, there was a growing scarcity of land for the Bafokeng as 
Voortrekkers arriving in the area were given very generous amounts of land; and the 
Bafokeng found themselves increasingly living as tenants on Boer farms. Mokgatle 
was disturbed by this and persistently petitioned the SAR government for permission 
to buy the land that the Bafokeng had been occupying since their arrival in the 
Transvaal. His attempts having proved unsuccessful, he then turned to the 
missionaries for assistance. 
 
Indeed, it was around this time, in the mid 1860s, that Mokgatle decided to allow the 
Dutch Reformed Church to build a mission station amongst the Bafokeng. Mokgatle 
decided that farms would be bought in the name of the name of the Hermansburg 
Missionary Society, under the name of Reverend Penzhorn, thereby finding a way 
around the fact that black people were not allowed to own land. The principle was 
that land would be purchased communally, by collecting contributions from the whole 
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community. The first farm, Elansheuwel, was bought in 1869, and the second, 
Bierfontein, was purchased in 1883 (Nthau, 2002, p.56). Part of the resources used 
to purchase land in subsequent years came from levies paid by several hundreds of 
young Bafokeng men, whom Chief Mokgatle had ‗sent‘ to work on the diamond mines 
in Kimberley. Indeed, diamonds had been discovered in Kimberley in 1867, and 
people were migrating from all over South Africa to work on the diamond fields. 
(Bozzoli, 1991, p.37) 
 
Kgosi Mokgatle (1836-1891), the longest serving Kgosi to date, has a significant 
place in Bafokeng history. He was a popular and respected chief, which made it 
possible for him to mobilise young males in order to purchase land, and as a result, 
he is remembered for buying the land that secured the future of the community. 
 
Mokgatle died in 1889; he was succeeded by Chief Tumagole who ruled until 1896, 
after which Mokgatle‘s son, August Molotlegi came to power (1896-1938). Chief 
Molotlegi presided over the “the less comfortable era during which full-blooded 
capitalism and segregationism placed almost unbearable pressures upon his 
community and his office.‖ (Bozzoli, 1991, p.62) Nevertheless, the land surrounding 
Bafokeng territories was part of a ‗scheduled area‘ in terms of the 1913 Land Act 
(which prohibited Africans from owning land in prescribed areas), and Africans were 
allowed to purchase land communally in those areas. Hence, the Bafokeng were not 
dispossessed by the 1913 Land Act, and by retaining control on the land they had 
acquired during the more flexible years of Boer domination they remained relatively 
protected from the increasingly harsh colonial rules.  
 
In fact, the Bafokeng continued to buy land after the First World War. The expansion 
of Bafokeng territory was funded by a system of tribal levies upon migrants (Bozzoli, 
1991, p.62). According to Coertze: ―during [Molotegi‟s] reign no fewer than 26 farms, 
or sections of farms, were registered in the name of the Bafokeng. Some of these 
were bought in his own name, and paid for with money levied from his subjects. 
Others were paid for from income received from White prospectors: the search for 
platinum began during Molotlegi‟s reign.‖ (Coertze, 1987, p.53) 
 
The purchase of some of these farms, notably under the leadership of Molotlegi was 
contested by some elements within the community and conflicts emerged over the 
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ownership of land. These conflicts affected the governance characteristics of the 
Bafokeng traditional leadership and impacted on the relationship between the chief 
and his constituencies. This relationship, as well as some conflict resolution 
mechanisms that were resorted to, will be examined in the next section. 
 
5.2.2 Sources of conflict over land acquisition and ownership 
Throughout the twentieth century, there were three recurrent sources of conflict over 
land issues: 
 Migrants (typically young Bafokeng men from Phokeng and other villages who 
moved to town for work) felt they accumulated few real benefits from owning the 
land and were angered by the levies imposed by the chief and the lekgotla to 
alleviate debts on land purchases; 
 Community members contested the claims of different chief over the decades 
that the land was in their own names rather than in the name of the Bafokeng; 
and  
 Families, small groups and even individuals claimed individual land tenure as 
opposed to communal tenure over specific farms. 
 
A brief account of the first two sources of conflict over land acquisition and land 
ownership will be given; this will be followed by a more thorough examination of the 
third one, as it has become particularly significant with highly sought after minerals 
generating substantially higher stakes. More to the point though, should these claims 
be confirmed, this would have a major impact on land administration in the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation, and hence, affect the rationale on which the Bafokeng traditional 
authority based its role in the relocation of the community of Lekgoropane. 
 
Discrimination against migrants and unequal distribution of land  
In the 1920s, the Bafokeng faced a growing scarcity of land. As a result, it became 
more difficult to buy farms and the chief could no longer extend his patronage 
through the distribution of land, as he had done in the past. 
 
Chief August Molotlegi, as a strategy to maintain his power base, provided some 
sections of society with land and benefits, while others were marginalized. Young 
Bafokeng migrants who left their villages to go to town in order to find work were the 
first to suffer from this increasingly unequal distribution of land. They felt that despite 
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working hard, they were benefiting little from their labour. This feeling was 
exacerbated by the fact that the farms that the Bafokeng were still able to buy during 
this period were purchased with the remittances and annual levies raised from 
migrants, and such migrants became more inclined to resist chiefly control. Migrancy 
became a form of resisting chiefly control and establishing an alternative economic 
base; as a result, young Bafokeng men began to move to the cities to circumvent the 
control of the chief and his headmen. 
 
Although Chief Lebone revoked the levies and taxes received from migrants in the 
1980s, access to land and resources for Bafokeng migrants remained insecure 
throughout the 20th century, as was also the case in other African communities in 
South Africa. 
 
Ownership of land by the Kgosi 
Throughout Bafokeng history, Kgosi‟s claims to private ownership of land (Coertze, 
p.53) have never been well received within the population. Chief Molotlegi for 
instance had become something of an ―individual accumulator‖ over the years and 
was accused of squandering tribal funds for private purposes, much to the chagrin of 
some of his subjects (Bozzoli, 1991, p.62). In 1903, a portion of Farm Kookfontein 
was registered in the name of the Commissioner for Native Affairs in trust for Chief 
Molotlegi. Then for the second time in 1906, Chief Molotlegi tried to buy a farm with 
public resources for his own private use. However in 1926, perhaps in an attempt to 
buy back some favour with his community after the painful dispute with the ‗rebels‘ 
(described in some detail below), Chief Molotlegi relinquished personal rights in 
properties and declared that they belonged to the Bafokeng Tribe.  
 
Chief Lebone Molotlegi (1956-1995) was also involved in similar incidents. In 1962, 
four years after he was officially invested as chief, a series of lekgotla meetings 
established that the chief was in serious financial trouble. He had spent extravagantly 
and had taken out a number of loans from African leaders in the region. In an attempt 
to repay his debts, he carried out a number of actions that angered his followers, but 
it was his claim to personal tenure over two farms that most seriously infuriated the 
community. As the local Bantu Affairs Commissioner reviewed the status and claims 
to all Bafokeng farms to try and understand the financial position of the Bafokeng, it 
came to light that two farms had been bought in the names of chief Mokgatle and 
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Tumagole and not in the name of the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘. Chief Lebone immediately 
claimed right of ownership. Chief Lebone, who was probably driven by his precarious 
financial state at the time, offered to re-register the farms jointly in the name of the 
Bafokeng if he was paid an unspecified sum of money. Although, the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner defended Lebone‘s offer saying he was driven to make the proposal 
by necessity rather than greed, this offer inflamed matters and ultimately, Chief 
Lebone was forced to retract and sign an agreement to register the farms in trust for 
the Bafokeng in November 1962.  
 
Chief Molotlegi‘s misuse of tribal funds for private purposes led him to be perceived 
as more self-serving and caused him to be challenged by his people and his lekgotla. 
And Chief Lebone was subjected to the same feat. 
These incidents suggest that the Bafokeng people had the necessary influence to 
defend the interests of the community as a whole when they were threatened by the 
leadership‘s private and divergent interests.  
 
Rights to Individual land tenure 
There is contestation around the ownership of land, with some people claiming that 
they had bought land in their private name and that the Bafokeng traditional authority 
had effectively dispossessed them by either taking advantage of circumstances (in 
the times where people had to buy land through recognised chiefs), or by allegedly 
taking away title deeds, or generally by using intimidation, the traditional authority‘s 
control over resources, and their ability to afford a lengthy judicial process to 
discourage any land claims.  
 
Nowadays, elements within the Bafokeng leadership and administration label land 
claims as ‗opportunistic‘. The mineral rich land is surely very coveted, and some land 
claims may well be opportunistic. When viewed in a historical perspective however, 
others are clearly legitimate. Indeed, the same farms which were claimed by 
individuals at the beginning of the twentieth century, before platinum was even 
discovered in the region, are claimed by the grandchildren of these same individuals 
today. 
 
An early example of conflict around individual land tenure was in 1906, when a land 
claim was lodged with the then Transvaal High Court by the alleged buyers of farm 
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Turfontein 302JQ (land bought in the 1870s) to have the land registered in their 
names. The Court heard the case together with a similar claim on farm Klipfontein 
300JQ by community members in neighbouring Photsaneng (see Figure 5-5). In 
1908, a sub-chief, Modisakeng Petlele and his 24 followers, claimed exclusive rights 
to a property and refuted that it belonged to the rest of the Bafokeng. Petlele took the 
issue to the Supreme Court. He lost the case, the Native Affairs Department (NAD) 
arguing that a section of a tribe could not hold land apart from the tribe, and the 
communal status of the land was legally reaffirmed. Despite defeat, this case set a 
precedent and very soon thereafter, another individual brought a similar case to 
court. They too lost. Simpson argues that these conflicts over individual as opposed 
to communal land tenure shaped political and ideological disputes in Bafokeng 
society in the 1920s and 1930s. These disputes continued without being taken to 
court, particularly after the discovery of platinum deposits. After the third defeat of a 
similar case in 1936, it took several decades before members of the Bafokeng 
community started claiming individual ownership of land again through court action.  
 
Today, the grandchildren of the original buyers of farm Turfontein are claiming their 
land back, while at the same time the Bafokeng leadership has applied to have the 
farm registered in the name of the Bafokeng tribe‘. However, the Bafokeng land 
owners association has emerged as a determined and federative organisation to 
reclaim ownership of land which was not bought in the name of the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ 
(cf. Appendix E). 
 
Contestation of land ownership in the Royal Bafokeng Nation is caused by a number 
of factors, many of which are rooted in the convoluted land purchasing procedures for 
blacks that prevailed during colonial rule and apartheid. Indeed, due to restrictions 
regarding land acquisition by Africans, private land had to be registered in the name 
of a recognised chief, the nearest one for convenience, and therefore the name of the 
actual buyer(s) never appeared on the title deeds. Farms bought collectively by the 
Bafokeng had to be held in trust by the missionaries, and then the homeland 
government. In any event, title deeds rarely reflected the actual purchasers and 
rectifying this involves court procedures, which can result in conflicting land claims 
(see above). 
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One informant provided another angle on the issue of land claims, by explaining that 
community members did not feel that they were benefiting from mining activities, and 
that since promises of great benefits from mining had not materialised and 
expectations had not been met; in other words, since the land in the current tenure 
system was not benefiting them, they would rather have the land their forefathers 
bought in their individual capacity back, and have the opportunity to profit from that 
asset. 
 
Fighting for the acquisition and protection of their land forged the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation and made it this autonomous, cohesive, prosperous and resilient community, 
in an era marked by the dispossession and exploitation of blacks in South Africa. 
Ironically, fighting for land might ultimately be the cause of its disintegration: with too 
little wealth trickling down, mining adversely affecting populations, and the Bafokeng 
traditional authority‘s alleged intention to dispossess people of the land they have 
bought. 
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Figure 5-5: Bafokeng Territory in 1968  
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5.2.3 The advent and impact of mining: 1960s-present 
The discovery of one of the largest deposits of platinum in the world on Bafokeng 
owned land, the ensuing royalties, and numerous litigation cases have shaped 
modern Bafokeng society.  
 
From the 1940s until the 1960s, the mines were not very profitable, but in the 1960s 
the demand for platinum and its price began to rise after a lengthy slump and soon 
the mines became fully operational. Mines took over valuable farm land and they 
started to have a serious impact on Bafokeng life: notably, the declining peasant-
based economy and way of life was brought to a sharp end. 
 
Interestingly however, the 
Bafokeng at no point converted to 
being mineworkers. Bafokeng men 
worked in the Kimberley mines for 
about two or three generations, 
and after that, they progressively 
abandoned work in the mines. 
During apartheid, Bafokeng 
territory constituted ―one of the few 
economically viable regions in te 
homelands‖ (Bozzoli, 1991, p.206). 
Their relatively privileged economic 
conditions allowed them to access 
better jobs, mostly in 
Johannesburg and nearer towns. 
To this day, the vast majority of 
mineworkers in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation are migrants (i.e. non-
Bafokeng) (see Box 1).  
 
5.2.4 Challenging the apartheid state and white capitalism: the Bafokeng’s legal 
battles 
In 1972, Bophuthatswana became a ―self-governing homeland‖ and then in 1977, it 
was proclaimed an ―independent state‖. The Bafokeng found themselves under the 
BOX 1: Mining and migrancy 
When Impala Platinum began prospecting 
operations in the mid-60s a first wave of 
migrant workers arrived in the area. Indeed, 
the relatively privileged economic position of 
the Bafokeng in relation to other rural 
communities allowed them to access better 
jobs in the cities and as a result, Bafokeng 
men only constituted a small portion of 
mineworkers. The vast majority of 
mineworkers from the mid-60s up until present 
day have been migrant workers from outside 
the area.  
 
In the early to late 60s, most migrant workers 
came from Lesotho and the Transkei; but after 
1968 and the approval of Impala‘s application 
to mine, migrants were arriving from all over 
Southern Africa. In the early 1990s however, 
as Impala wanted a more settled and skilled 
workforce, more SeTswana speaking workers 
from the region were recruited. 
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rule of President Lucas Mangope‘s government, and tensions with the latter soon 
emerged. As Manson and Mbenga (2003) note: the hostility ―became more 
pronounced as the fight for mineral control heated up‖ (p.27).  
 
As a matter of fact, black South Africans under colonial rule and especially during 
apartheid have been constantly threatened with dispossession. The Bafokeng in 
general, and Chief Molotlegi in particular, have fought for their share of mineral rights 
and ownership of their land and ensured their economic and financial well-being by 
successfully resorting to legal assistance, no matter the cost, and thereby coming to 
the realisation that the government policies and decisions could be challenged 
through these means.*  
 
As President of Bophuthatswana, Mangope became trustee of the mineral rights. 
Chief Lebone fought against this: he took the matter to a court of law in 1983 and he 
announced the Bafokeng‘s intention to secede from Bophuthatswana. Mangope 
responded by declaring a State of Emergency over Phokeng and appointing a 
Commission of Inquiry into the (mal)administration of the Bafokeng under Chief 
Lebone. The Commission condemned the attempted secession as an ‗act of 
insubordination‘. Things deteriorated further after the Progressive People‘s Party 
(PPP), the official opposition party in Bophuthatswana, attempted to overthrow 
Mangope‘s government by force in 1988. Lebone was accused of supporting the 
failed coup, and detained. In March 1988, Kgosi Lebone fled to Botswana after 
finding a large contingent of police at his house as he arrived from work. He 
remained in exile there until 1994. He was replaced by his younger brother by 
decision of Mangope, despite the community having chosen someone else. Through 
him, Mangope managed to get access to mining royalties. ―The bulk of royalties were 
siphoned off to erect grandiose buildings in Mmabatho, the capital city of former 
Bophuthatswana.‖ (Nthau, 2002, p.57) 
 
Although platinum had been mined on Bafokeng land since the 1950s, it was only 
five years after the advent of democracy and dissolution of the ‗homelands‘ that the 
Bafokeng managed to obtain their share of the wealth beneath their feet. This was 
                                               
 
*
 A detailed account of the legal battles between the Bafokeng, mining companies and the 
homeland of Bophutatswana during the second half of the 20
th
 century is provided in Manson 
and Mbenga‘s article: ―The richest tribe in Africa‖. 
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after winning a court case now famous in the history of the Bafokeng, which came to 
a head in 1988. The dispute involved a conflict over mining royalties between Impala 
Platinum Mining Company (of which the General Mining Company of South Africa -
GENCOR- was a major shareholder at the time, a company in turn owned by 
Sanlam, one of the citadels of Afrikaner capital) and the Bafokeng. Kgosi Lebone 
instigated the court case against Impala Platinum which took long years to resolve 
but resulted in a lucrative settlement for the Bafokeng.  
 
The Bafokeng entered this battle with the odds stacked against them. Historically the 
relationship between a mining company and the owner of mineral rights is unequal, 
with the mining company having a strong ability, even in the law, to exploit the owner 
of mineral rights. This is so partly because mining companies have far more legal 
experience and knowledge of mining than the farmers or black communities who own 
the mineral rights to the land (Manson and Mbenga, 2003, p.28). As the owners of 
the mineral rights, the Bafokeng were entitled to royalties, which were calculated 
according to taxable income generated by the mines. However, this was a very 
arbitrary amount and could be manipulated to suit the mining company. Indeed, 
because of the enormous amount of capital needed to prospect and open a mine, it is 
possible for the mining company to get some form of tax relief for many years despite 
the profit the mine may be generating. Moreover, as mines eventually do become 
unprofitable it is also possible for future costs to be deducted from taxable income. 
Hence, owners of mineral rights entitled to royalties are often left dry even though the 
mining companies are making a profit. This was the case with ―1977 agreements‖, 
which gave Impala the rights to mine certain reserves, and entitled the Bafokeng to 
royalties of 13 per cent on taxable income. The Bafokeng received derisory royalties 
and it was never acknowledged that the method for calculating royalties was unfair 
(Manson and Mbenga, 2003, p.29). 
 
An opportunity to renegotiate royalty payments arose when Impala needed access to 
a reef which was on land held by the then Bophuthatswana government in trust for 
the Bafokeng. In the mid 1980s, the UG2 reef (which Impala had gained access to in 
the 1977 agreement) was becoming less profitable and another reef: ―the Deeps‖ 
was identified for further mining. In 1986, Kgosi Lebone made a deal with Bafokeng 
Minerals which gave Impala the mining rights and gave him 25 per cent ownership of 
the company. However, the area could not be mined without certain information 
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relating to ‗the Deeps‘ prospecting and mineral deposits, which Impala had access to 
but refused to provide. Impala was supported in this by Mangope, President of the 
Bophuthatswana government, who had singled out the Bafokeng as the community 
from which most of his political opposition came from (Manson and Mbenga, 2003, 
p.31). The Bafokeng then took Impala to the Bophutatswana Supreme Court to 
cancel their notarial cession. Judge Smith ruled against the Bafokeng, stating that the 
Bafokeng did not in fact own the land, but Mangope, as Trustee, owned it. 
 
A "David and Goliath" battle followed in the 1990s between the Bafokeng and Impala 
Platinum. The Bafokeng and their lawyers continued to challenge Impala‘s right to 
mine the land, while Impala tried to avoid or delay the hearing of the Bafokeng‘s 
case. Finally in 1999, after ten years of acrimonious legal battles, an agreement was 
reached between the Bafokeng and Impala Platinum whereby royalties were 
increased to 22 per cent of taxable income, the royalties were subsequently 
converted into equity in 2007 and the Bafokeng received one million shares in Impala 
Platinum Holdings (valued at R 100 million at the time), and nominated a person to sit 
on the Board. It has been argued that with this Black Economic Empowerment deal 
(BEE), ―the RBN, […] heralded as a shining example of true community-based 
economic empowerment, is cementing its position as an icon for social development, 
and an investment powerhouse.‖ (Soraya Spadavecchia O., ―300 000 said to benefit 
from community-based empowerment‖, Mining Weekly, 6th July 2007) 
 
However, although there is a recognition that mining revenues have enabled the chief 
to improve the life of the Bafokeng and provide support for his subjects, many feel 
that the revenue from the mines is in the hands of a few and does not benefit the 
community as a whole, that decisions regarding the spending of these revenues are 
not taken in consultation with Bafokeng communities, and the misuse of these 
revenues causes much grumbling. 
 
A few decades ago already, some people on the ground were critical of Chief Lebone 
In Women of Phokeng (1991), some of the informants deplored the ‗spoiling‘ of the 
chiefship resulting from the revenue from the mines; and expressed resentment that 
the mines, despite being owned communally by the Bafokeng, were actually in the 
personal control of the chief:  
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“[…] that mine belongs to the tribe, it is Bafokeng mine. Now, can I as 
an individual, spend money that they got from that mine? No, I 
cannot. We as Bafokeng tribe spend that money through building 
schools for our children. But we do not have direct control over that 
money.” (Mrs. Phalatse, quoted in Bozzoli, 1991, p.217) 
 
5.3 LAND RELATED CONFLICTS AND POWER RELATIONS IN THE 
ROYAL BAFOKENG NATION 
Bozzoli explains that ―the progressive agricultural, educational, and land-buying 
strategies pursued by the community began to give rise to a stratum with distinctly 
modern ideas about „traditional‟ society.‖ (Bozzoli, 1991, p.62) This stratum preferred 
individual ownership of land to traditions of communalism, which threatened the 
survival of the chieftaincy. Indeed, the survival of the chieftaincy as a legitimate 
institution depended upon the ability of the Chief ―to retain access to some of the 
more traditional means of power, redistribution, and social reproduction.” (Bozzoli, 
1991, p.62) 
 
5.3.1 Authority Contestation and the balance of power in the Royal Bafokeng Nation 
Since the 1920s, when Chief August Molotlegi was challenged in court (Simpson, 
1986, and Bozzoli, 1991), no Bafokeng chief has been without some form of 
opposition from the community. The grievances and internal tensions that have most 
often emerged, historically and in recent times, relate to the role of the Kgosi and the 
extent of his chiefly authority; the rights to land and land distribution; and the costs 
and benefits of mining. These issues have all come to light in the case of mining 
induced resettlement at hand. Some background will be provided for each one of 
these issues in this section and they will be viewed in the specific context of the 
relocation case in the next chapter. 
 
A few cases drawn from Bafokeng history illustrate the recurring contestation of the 
Traditional Authority‘s leadership. 
 
 
The mill boycott – 1920-1922 
Chief Molotlegi‘s hold over the Bafokeng was challenged by a significant 
―progressive‖ segment of society, ―including the leading members of his lekgotla, and 
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during which the values of Westernism, individualism, and democracy were posed as 
alternatives to the paternalistic and conservative communalism which the chief […] 
represented.‖ (Bozzoli, 1991, p.76) A series of conflicts around a mill that villagers in 
Phokeng decided to boycott sparked off this conflict.  
 
“[The grain mill] was situated on the Indian‟s plot of land. The Indian was charging 
exorbitant prices for the use of his mill, and thus it was concluded after a discussion 
between the village elders that the grain mill should be boycotted.” (Bozzoli, 1991, 
p.76) Despite this decision taken by the community, the Kgosi continued to use the 
mill. This caused uproar and divided the people of Phokeng. “There became a group 
called the rebels who wanted the chief to be brought before the kgotla to answer for 
himself”; while the moderates believed the chief made a mistake and should be 
forgiven. (Bozzoli, 1991, p.76) The conflict escalated to the point where the chief and 
his wife were sent into ‗exile‘ in the mountains for a month and those close to the 
chief were ordered to stop visiting him. 
 
On this matter, members of the Bafokeng were split into the ―rebels‖ and the 
―loyalists‖. The rebels were members of the lekgotla and made up an educated, 
slightly more political and affluent group in the Bafokeng. There were nine men in 
particular who directly challenged the chief, and remarkably, a few of them had royal 
blood. They questioned the authority of the chief while the loyalists defended the 
chief‘s right to authoritarian rule.   
 
The ‗rebels‘ at this time raised many more grievances against the chief, not strictly 
relating to mill prices. They alleged that between 1911 and 1916, their chief had 
misappropriated tribal levies, acted corruptly, behaved abusively and often got drunk. 
A lengthy dispute also erupted over the Kgosi‘s attempts to privately buy a farm, as 
has been explored in more detail above. Similar grievances were expressed by the 
lekgotla when they testified about the dissension to the Native Commissioner in 
1923: 
 
“We would like to know from the chief what has become of all the 
tribal monies? Has he kept an account of the tribal receipts and 
payments? And if so is he prepared to show them to his lekgotla?” 
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“We do not know what has become of the site rents. We never see 
them. There are three blacksmith shops and we do not know on 
whose authority they are there.” 
“He is not a fit and proper person to be our chief and yet we are told 
that we must be satisfied with him and act loyally under him and obey 
all his commands.”  
“The lekgotla of Phokeng […] feel that our administrative functions in 
all tribal affairs have been over-ridden, disregarded and totally 
ignored by our Chief, who has taken upon himself the autocratic 
control of the tribe, and who refuses to listen to us or seek our advice. 
This is a state of affairs which we, in all honesty of purpose, feel that 
we cannot submit to and this grievance is the first of the many that 
must be removed.” (quoted in Simpson, 1986, pp.205 - 207) 
 
Reacting to these serious accusations levelled against the chief, some community 
members chose to resist paying extra levies and taxes, a form of protest that 
repeated itself whenever residents felt that they were not benefiting from the way in 
which their money had been spent (Simpson, 1986, p.206). The chief retaliated to 
this insubordination by denying the rebels access to essential resources. An example 
of this is when the chief decided to build a dam on the farm Boschfontein. Chief 
Molotlegi expected community members to pay a levy towards a dam at a cost that to 
them seemed too high. When some people refused to contribute towards the levy, 
Molotlegi stationed a guard at the farm‘s water supply. Those who would not pay 
were denied access to the basic resource of water. 
 
Bafokeng ‗loyalists‘, on the other hand, thought that the ―rebels‖ should be forced to 
contribute to communal funds; they argued that it was unacceptable for anyone to 
challenge the chief‘s authority and believed that the rebels were destabilising 
Bafokeng society. 
 
The conflict between the loyalists and the rebels came to a head between the years 
1921 and 1926. The situation was so serious that the Secretary for Native Affairs 
commented at the time that ―the tribe is numerous and rich but full of dissension 
which is paralyzing their business affairs‖ (quoted in Simpson, 1986, p.202). The 
‗rebels‘ insisted that the chief pay a fine and became accountable to the lekgotla and 
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the community. Eventually the chief decided to banish the ‗rebels‘. After a first appeal 
failed, the rebels took their case to the Supreme Court in Bloemfontein (Simpson, 
1986, p.229). 
 
There were two opposing points of view: the ‗royalists‘ and the Native Affairs 
Department (NAD) on one hand asserted that the paramount chief had the power to 
do whatever he liked, that his word was final, and that this fact was fundamental to 
customary law. Thus, the lekgotla was simply seen an advisory body and was 
considered out of line in expecting to have any kind of equal footing with the chief 
(Simpson, 1986, p.236). Customary law, the NAD argued, should be kept in place, as 
it was and was essential in keeping the ‗unity‘ of the tribe (Simpson, 1986, p.230).  
 
On the other hand, the ‗rebels‘ did support the system of chieftaincy but wanted it to 
become less autocratic and more democratic. They denied that the chief had a right 
to autocratic rule, and stated that the lekgotla was above the Kgosi. David Mokgatle, 
a member of the lekgotla and one of the central figures in opposition to August at the 
time, asserted that ―under customary law, the lekgotla was effectively the most 
powerful body in the chiefdom. In doing so he also cast some aspersions on the 
authority of the „supreme chief‟ in the form of a representative government‖: the 
lekgotla (Simpson, 1986, p.244). The ‗rebels‘ insisted that a more democratic 
chieftaincy was a part of African custom and tradition, and it was only recently that 
this had changed. They stated that it had definitely never been a part of custom for a 
chief to expel people for opposing him.  
 
The conflict between the ‗rebels‘ and the chief was in fact about land as much as 
about mill prices. The former had ambitions to individual land tenure and a 
Westernised community, while the latter was resisting this because it would 
undermine his authority. The same conflicts take place in modern day Bafokeng 
nation, with chiefly authority resisting to maintain its authority, but also its control over 
mining revenues. Indeed, the ‗rebels‘ were supported by a more educated stratum of 
Bafokeng society, those who were paying for, but not necessarily benefiting from, 
communal land ownership. The great majority of the witnesses for the plaintiffs were 
not living in Phokeng, which shows that the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs did 
have a broader base.  
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Judges Tindall and Curlewis ruled in favour of the defendant, Chief August. They said 
that the chief had the power, according to customary law, to banish those who 
opposed him. The Judges claimed that Sol Plaatje, one of the witnesses for the 
plaintiffs who may be taken to represent their point of view, ―was projecting 
unconsciously his desire for democratic tribal government into the sphere of 
customary law where it did not really apply.‖ (Judgement from the case Daniel 
Mokgatle versus Herzog, quoted in Simpson, 1986, p.248) The plaintiffs‘ plea for the 
‗democratisation of chiefly authority‘ went against the Judges‘ keen sense that any 
obvious links with ‗western civilization‘ would lead to ‗detribalisation‘ and the 
breakdown of control: ―The crisis of control in the Fokeng chiefdom reflected a wider 
crisis of control for the NAD.‖ (Simpson, 1986, p.249).  
 
The chief‘s victory was double-edged. It destroyed the power of his lekgotla and 
undoubtedly undermined his own legitimacy to lead. After the judgment in June 1926, 
the nine leaders of the rebels were expelled from Phokeng and went to a place near 
Luka called Malebogo, joined by 351 of their followers, an experience recalled by 
many as painful: 
 
“They left their houses vacant and decided to move into places 
unknown to them. […] Most of those who settled at Malebogo had left 
beautiful houses in Phokeng. After a long period of time, there were 
some who desired to return to Phokeng and reoccupy their houses, 
but were advised that their intended action would lose them any 
credibility they had gained by opting out of the chief‟s jurisdiction.”  
“Those who could not stand the hardships of foreign lands returned to 
occupy their former houses, but the majority that left did not come 
back.” (Mrs. Setshedi, quoted in Bozzoli, 1991, p.79) 
 
The bitter taste left amongst some groups of the Bafokeng only went away when the 
rebels were allowed to come home after a series of talks between the chief, elders 
and the rebels (Bozzoli, 1991, p.80). But more than eighty years later, Malebogo is 
still synonymous with great distress and hardship: according to one informant, 
communities living in Bafokeng territory to this day are reluctant to openly oppose the 
chief for fear of being exiled to Malebogo.  
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The role of the chief, his relationship to the lekgotla and other governing or 
representative bodies, and to the wider community are the cause of recurring 
problems in the Royal Bafokeng Nation; indeed, the issue of the chief‘s assertion of 
his authority at the expense of the desires of the community has recurred in other 
periods of rule. Remarkably similar grievances were expressed in relation to Chief 
Lebone: Chief Lebone imposed decisions on the community, who did not participate 
and was never consulted.  
 
5.3.2 Modern dissidence and contestation of the Bafokeng Traditional Authority 
The tendency of the chief to rule autocratically instead of through his lekgotla and 
elders has been considered by some the most important challenge to Bafokeng 
identity and unity through the decades. The initial challenges against Kgosi Molotlegi 
in the 1920s were led by members of the lekgotla made up of mission-educated, 
slightly more political and affluent groupings amongst the Bafokeng. Men in this 
group generally had experience in cities, and sometimes had links with national 
political parties. These men were interested in obtaining a more democratic form of 
leadership, with a chief as head but a lekgotla making up the ―parliament‖, and 
private ownership of land. One of the groups currently challenging the ―traditional‖ 
authority of the Kgosi is the Mariga Resident‘s Council (MRC), which is primarily 
concerned with how their environmental complaints are being addressed. Residents 
of Mariga, a village near Phokeng home to Impala Platinum mines have experienced 
a decline in health, as well as general degradation of the environment as a result of 
mining activities and have complained about air and water pollution, as well of the 
drying up of the Legadigadi, a stream that used to provide the village with water. 
Other groups inside the ‗Bafokeng Nation‘ contest the Kgosi‟s authority and the way it 
is exercised. 
 
Much conflict revolves around, or has its roots in land management and 
administration in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. The following section presents the 
terms thereof. 
 
5.4 LAND MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN PRESENT DAY 
ROYAL BAFOKENG NATION  
The Communal Land Rights Act (RSA, 2003) specifies the role of traditional 
authorities in land administration. Traditional councils (established in terms of the 
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Traditional Leadership and Governance framework Act) are given land allocation and 
administration powers and functions in communal areas. In terms of Section 21(2) of 
the Communal Land Rights Act: ―If a community has a recognised traditional council, 
the powers and duties of the land administration committee may be exercised and 
performed by such council.‖ In the Royal Bafokeng Nation, this function is performed 
by the ‗executive council‘. 
 
5.4.1 The allocation of land  
Tribal land is held in trust by the traditional leader (on behalf of his subjects) who has 
the title deed for the communal land. Land is allocated by him, assisted by his 
kgosanas (headmen).  
 
The Kgosana had indeed allocated all informants their plot of land in Lekgoropane, 
as Isaac Monei explains: “I arrived in 1952 in Lekgoropane, I gave the kgosana a 
cow, and he gave me two plots of land: one to farm, and one to build a house.‖ 
(translated from interview with Mr. Isaac Monei, 2009). This system is accepted and 
functioned well as far as my informants were concerned; however, it creates a 
relationship of dependency that can be detrimental for people on the ground when 
things go wrong. Indeed, people need privileges through the chief, they do not have 
title deeds to their houses and conflictual relationships with the leadership have led to 
people‘s houses being broken down and people being exiled. The fear of chiefs is 
directly linked to its land administration prerogatives and the relationship of 
dependency that exists between community members and the traditional authority 
regarding access to land and resources. This is consistent with Ntsebeza‘s argument 
that the fear of the Kgosi is deeply bred and is bound up with the privileges 
dispensed by him and his capacity to allocate resources. 
 
Family status, gender and age are all factors contributing to ―a widely agreed 
hierarchy of entitlement to land, with married, older men at the top and unmarried 
younger women at the bottom.‖ (Lahiff, 2000, p.57) This is applicable to members of 
the Bafokeng community as well: as Kgosi Leruo indicated, unmarried young women 
are denied access to land ―to maintain respect and dignity of tradition. As long as one 
is not married, she remains a child to be cared for by parents”, only when a woman 
reaches 35 and ―has demonstrated a sense of responsibility in terms of maintaining 
respect and having a job‖ does she qualify to access land (Nthau, 2002, p.59). 
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Communal land ownership with land administration prerogatives attributed to 
appointees of the Bafokeng leadership means that land tenure is potentially insecure. 
If for example the Bafokeng leadership decides to give land to a mining company to 
extend its operations, land on which a community is living, thereby effectively 
implying their removal. This was the case in the late 1990s for the Bafokeng 
Rasimone Platinum Mine for instance: Bafokeng land is privately owned* and as 
such, cannot be subjected to any state interference. The Bafokeng traditional 
authority is the administrator of the land by virtue of customary law and more recently 
by virtue of the Communal Land Rights Act of 2003. Consequently, the traditional 
authority, can make unilateral decisions on land allocation and land use, without any 
prerequisite of consultation of affected communities (although on paper those 
mechanisms do exist, they are either useless if agents are co-opted or ‗toothless‘ or 
corrupted with intimidation practices, cf. chapter 7.). In other words, Mahmood 
Mamdani‘s decentralised despotism, although toned down and very well disguised, is 
well and alive in the RBN.  
 
5.4.2 Land use management 
Decisions around the use of land for mining, at the expense of other land uses such 
as agriculture and residential, need to be taken carefully. Notwithstanding all the 
issues related to social and environmental impacts on neighbouring communities 
during mining operations, the issue of the sustainability of livelihoods in these 
communities after mining activities have ceased needs to be seriously considered. As 
large scale mining leaves behind land that is virtually unusable for any other purpose 
(notably agriculture). This has important implications in terms of the long term vision 
for the development of communities in the Royal Bafokeng Nation: once the minerals 
are depleted, what will people be doing to sustain their livelihoods? 
 
 
 
Struggles to assert ownership of the land have influenced the evolution of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation and continue to shape political relations in modern day Bafokeng 
society, albeit in a very different manner. Indeed, both historically and in recent times, 
                                               
 
*
 Not all land in the Royal Bafokeng Nation is privately owned however, the village of Robega 
for instance is on state owned land and administered by the Bafokeng traditional authority. 
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the causes of contestation of the Bafokeng Traditional Authority, have related to the 
role of the chief and the extent of his chiefly authority; the rights to land and land 
administration; and the costs and benefits of mining. These issues have all 
manifested, albeit at a micro level, during the relocation case discussed in the 
following chapter, and confirm their significance in the context of the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation.
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6. THE UNFOLDING OF THE RELOCATION PROCESS  
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
Early 2002, around eighty households living in Lekgoropane (a village constituting an 
extension of Rasimone) (see Figure 5.1), were relocated to a new location in 
Mafenya, a village approximately seven kilometres away. The move had to take 
place as the nearby ‗Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine‘ (a 50:50 Joint Venture 
between the Royal Bafokeng Nation and Anglo Platinum) was to undertake blasting 
in the area, which would have caused major disturbances to the residents staying in 
the area. 
 
The need for relocation of the community living in Lekgoropane arose in 1997-98, 
and it was only after four years of planning, consultation, specialist studies and 
construction, that the community of Lekgoropane moved into their new houses. The 
following sections will detail the chain of events which led to the displacement and 
relocation of the inhabitants of Lekgoropane, and provide insight into the views of the 
main stakeholders in the process. Given the fact that responses collected during the 
interviews that were conducted in Mafenya were fairly similar in substance, they have 
in a number of instances been blended together to reconstruct the chain of events in 
a manner as complete as possible.  
 
The Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine‘s (BRPM) operations take place on farm 
Boschkoppie 104 JQ and Styldrift 90 JQ (a subsequent and recent extension of 
mining operations) (see Figure 6.1). The Royal Bafokeng Nation owns both the land 
and mineral rights to farm Styldrift, but only the surface land rights to farm 
Boschkoppie (the mineral rights belong to Anglo American) (see deeds registry 
documents in Appendix D). Adjacent to the BRPM, are the villages of Chaneng, 
Rasimone and Robega. The first two are on land owned by the Bafokeng, while the 
latter is on land nominally owned by the state and administered by the Bafokeng 
traditional authority (Interview with Mr. Khunou). 
 
At the time, Anglo Platinum was mining PGM reserves on farm Boschkoppie; mining 
activities have recently extended to farm Styldrift where the village of Chaneng is 
located (see figure below). 
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Figure 6-1: Mining activities on farm Boschkoppie 104JQ and indication of future 
mining operations on farm Styldrift 90JQ (source: Amplats Annual Report 2001)
*
 
 
                                               
 
*
 Mining on farm Styldrift has been authorised since. 
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6.2 RELOCATION PLANNING AND CONSULTATION 
The four years that preceded the relocation constituted the most crucial phase in the 
relocation process. It was during that phase that key decisions as to the conditions of 
the relocation, including housing arrangements and compensation details, were 
taken; it was during the pre-relocation phase that the affected community had the 
opportunity to voice concerns and attempt to influence the negotiations that were to 
determine their future living conditions.  
 
6.2.1 Key stakeholders and decision-makers 
The main parties involved in the relocation were: 
 Anglo Platinum; 
 The Bafokeng traditional authority (the RBA specifically); 
 The Bafokeng community of Lekgoropane. 
 
At that time (1998), the Bafokeng were involved in a 50:50 Joint Venture with 
Anglo Platinum for the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine. As a result, both parties 
were represented jointly in the relocation process in the form of a ‗Development 
Committee‘. 
 
The ‘Development Committee’ 
The ‗Development Committee‘ assumed the leading role in the management and 
facilitation of the relocation process. It was constituted of 50 per cent of mine officials 
and 50 per cent of representatives of the Bafokeng administration. Mr. Khunou, one 
of the informants, was the head of the Project department in the Royal Bafokeng 
Administration at the time, and as such was involved as a member of the Joint 
Venture‘s Development Committee. The committee acted as an intermediary 
between the mine and the community; in other words, decisions made by the mine 
were relayed to affected parties by the Development Committee, who would then 
revert back to the mine with feedback. It also planned and organised the relocation 
together with a team of consultants. 
 
The community of Lekgoropane 
At the time, there were approximately 80 households residing in Lekgoropane, a 
settlement forming an extension to the village of Rasimone. All inhabitants of 
Lekgoropane were due to relocate. For about two years, the public consultation 
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process was carried out without the community having a dedicated body to represent 
and defend its interests. However, after conflicts regarding housing and 
compensation started growing, some community members decided to organise 
themselves and form a ‗Relocation Committee‘, in order to provide a platform to voice 
people‘s concerns and attempt to obtain better relocation conditions. 
 
The ‘Relocation Committee’ 
The Relocation Committee was formed after it appeared that verbal agreements 
regarding the houses‘ structures and sizes, as well as compensation for community 
boreholes and other assets that were reached were not adhered to. As Edward 
Boikanyo and Eric Kgaditswe, two former committee members explain: the 
Relocation Committee constituted an interface between the facilitators of the 
relocation process (i.e. the Development Committee), including the Bafokeng 
administration (notably George Khunou) and the mine on one hand, and the 
community on the other hand. 
 
Other important stakeholders included the Bafokeng traditional authority (in its 
own capacity this time), mainly in the person of the local kgosana (headman). The 
kgosana in Lekgoropane, represented higher instances of the traditional authority at 
the local level, and was directly involved in the process. The kgosana was not 
involved as a facilitator, but as a representative of the traditional authority, and his 
role was to assist in resolving problems and addressing the concerns of his 
constituencies as well as request the assistance of higher institutions of traditional 
authority, including kgosi if applicable to deal with matters arising during the process. 
 
Although the Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine was the project proponent and 
project implementer, the mine itself was practically not mentioned in any of the 
interviews and was virtually absent from the process. Its role as the project proponent 
was to fund and implement the project. All the negotiation and facilitation tasks were 
undertaken by the Development Committee. 
 
6.2.2 Status quo determination and planning 
The RBA, jointly with Anglo Platinum, appointed a team of architects to undertake a 
baseline study and compile a ‗Status Quo Report‘ (1998). The architects worked with 
the local kgosana and went to each affected household to record the characteristics 
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of houses, including size and type (e.g. shack or brick house), as well as other assets 
such as trees and fences. This report contained the information that determined the 
conditions of the relocation and formed the basis on which negotiations between the 
Development Committee and the relocated community took place. 
 
It appears that during that process, some inhabitants of Lekgoropane tried to take 
advantage of the system and subdivided their plots, building a shack on the other half 
of the stand and then arguing that they had double plots with two houses. Mr. 
Khunou explained that it was mostly the case with shack owners, and that the 
agreement was such that if they had two shacks, they would get two houses. In the 
end, about one hundred new houses were built in Mafenya for the relocated 
community, even though there were initially around 80 households in Lekgoropane 
(Interview with Mr. Khunou, 2009). 
 
The architects‘ study concluded that the new houses to be built for the displaced 
would be categorised from A to F, according to the size of the original houses. 
Category A houses were to replace ‗tin houses‘, and were about 40 m2 (slightly 
bigger than the standard RDP houses at the time); whereas houses in category F 
would replace the biggest brick houses. All houses in one given category were to be 
built on the same plan. Several informants mentioned however that the architects 
asked homeowners who were able to, to provide the plans of their original houses to 
them and that their respective houses would be built according to these plans, as 
opposed to the standard houses proposed in the category (Interviews with Mrs. 
Modise, Mr. Monei, 2009). This was however a verbal agreement, and the agreement 
signed with each homeowner did not reflect this, which was a major cause of conflict 
after the agreements were signed. 
 
After this process was conducted, the Development Committee then planned the new 
settlement. They chose to relocate the residents of Lekgoropane to Mafenya 
(approximately 7 km away), in order to maintain proximity with the former settlement 
and preserve ties with neighbouring communities, as Mr. Khunou explained. He 
added that in the former settlement, they (the Royal Bafokeng Administration) were 
struggling to build roads as there was no defined structure in the settlement. He 
argued that from a town planning perspective, the new settlement in Mafenya was 
sound and allowed them to build roads. Indeed, from Rasimone, as one turns left into 
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‗new‘ Mafenya, there is a long road with turn-offs to the right. All the houses were 
built on the right hand side of the road, in an orderly fashion. The new part of 
Mafenya is distinctly different from surrounding villages, resembling the city centres 
of Pretoria or other towns, with streets at 90 degree angles at regular intervals and 
houses neatly aligned. 
 
6.2.3 Consultation processes: major milestones 
1998-2000: from inclusivity to alienation 
The public consultation process was initiated under the rule of the late Kgosi 
Mollwane Molotlegi by an official from the Royal Bafokeng Nation, whom Mr. Modise 
described as ―very good‖: Mr. Modise recalled he felt involved and that his input was 
meaningful. In contrast, after Kgosi‘s death in 2000, the kgosanas took over as 
representatives of the community and it seemed as though there were on the side of 
the mine and not of defending the interests of the affected community (interview with 
Mr. Modise). Mr. Monei also stated that he was happy with the way people were 
being consulted until he realised that promises were not being kept. He complained 
about this to the lekgotla, but nothing was done to follow up on it. All informants in 
Mafenya confirmed that participation processes became increasingly unsatisfactory 
and relations rapidly deteriorated as they felt their concerns were not being 
addressed adequately. As a result, at a stage where the affected community saw the 
impasse they had reached through formal consultation processes and established 
channels of communication (mainly through the kgosanas), they embarked on a 
march to Legato (a village approximately 10 km away) to express the discontent with 
the way the relocation process was managed, and the fact that their main concerns 
remained unresolved.  
 
The march took place during the period after the death of Kgosi Mollwane Molotlegi 
and before his successor, the current Kgosi Leruo came into power. In the views of 
Mr. Modise, the mines took advantage of this gap in leadership to speed up the 
process and from that time, he remembers the frustration and discontent amongst 
members of the community progressively intensifying as people felt less and less in 
control and less and less listened to. The march to Legato was in protest of bad 
representation by the kgosanas in the matter, and the fact that grievance redress 
mechanisms, although existent, were perceived as completely futile. Ms. Tsiane 
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explained that the march to Legato was a last recourse as there was ―no one to talk 
to‖ anymore. 
 
2000-2001: building up of conflict and community organisation  
Consultation resumed after the march with no actual change in the way the process 
was conducted, and as a result, conflicts regarding the conditions of the relocation 
soon re-emerged. When the residents of Lekgoropane realised that promises made 
were not being adhered to and that they had no grip on how their own houses were 
being built, and, by extension the way they were to live their lives, some residents 
decided to form their own committee to rally support in the community and voice their 
concerns. They nominated members such as Edward Boikanyo and Eric Kgaditswe 
to represent them and take those issues up with mine officials (notably Mr. Chris 
Kene) and the Bafokeng administration (represented by Mr. Khunou).  
 
The committee concentrated on the main reasons for discontent among displaced 
residents: the size of the houses, and, to a lesser extent, the structure of the houses. 
Ultimately, the aim of the Relocation Committee was to obtain fair compensation and 
hold the Development Committee and the architects to their word, as well as avoid 
further ‗miscommunication‘. By the time the Relocation Committee was formed and 
started raising these grievances, foundations had been laid, walls were up, and in 
some cases entire houses had been built; a late reaction Mr. Khunou struggled to 
comprehend (Interview with Mr. Khunou, 2009). From the perspective of the 
community though, people had repeatedly been promised bigger and better houses 
than their original ones, built according to their own plans (even though written 
agreements stipulated something else), and had no reason to complain about them 
until they saw what was actually taking place. Sonneberg and Münster (2001, p.46) 
commented that it was not unusual for disputes to ―arise after agreements have been 
made regarding the type of compensation, the timing of relocation and the type of 
infrastructure provided.‖  
 
The issues of the size, and, to a lesser extent, the structure of the houses did indeed 
constitute major bones of contention. In one particular public meeting, residents told 
the Development Committee that the houses were too small and that they did not 
want them (Interview with Mr. Khunou, 2009). Mr. Khunou recalls telling disgruntled 
residents that they had signed the plans of their houses, specifying the size and 
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structure thereof, and that it was too late to change those specifications now that 
houses were almost complete. Residents argued that they had signed indeed, but 
that they ―did not understand‖ the terms of the agreement. This argument was 
rejected as invalid by the Development Committee, but it clearly indicates that the 
Development Committee facilitating the relocation on behalf of the mine failed to 
achieve informed consent. In fact, accounts from relocated people in Mafenya 
suggest that proper informed consent was never sought. The Relocation Committee 
formed by members of the community then called a meeting at a school, which was 
attended by the Joint Venture‘s Development Committee and Kgosi Leruo. Once 
again the issue of the size of the houses was raised. Mr. Khunou intervened and 
asked one woman whom he knew had a large house in Lekgoropane and had also a 
large house built for her in the new settlement in Mafenya: ―do you want to talk about 
your own house in front of everyone?‖ The woman, driven into a corner, responded 
that she did not want to, and the question left many other participants puzzled. Mr. 
Khunou then suggested that everyone move into their house first, and that once they 
had moved in, each household‘s problems would be addressed on a case by case 
basis, instead of anticipating problems in public meetings (Interview with Mr. Khunou, 
2009). This ‗strategy‘ was effective and resulted in the breakdown of community 
mobilisation and paved the way to a peaceful move to the new settlement. 
 
6.2.4 Agreements reached during the consultation process 
One of the principal objectives of the consultation process between the Development 
Committee and the inhabitants of Lekgoropane was to reach agreements regarding a 
number of practical implications of the displacement and relocation of approximately 
80 households, notably related to housing matters. Findings from the interviews show 
that what the community perceived as agreements, reached through discussion and 
based on a common understanding, were in reality empty promises; the 
Development Committee‘s version of agreements was (contractually) imposed. 
 
Arrangements pertaining to the location of stands 
During the meetings preceding the move to Mafenya, residents were told that they 
would be allowed an opportunity to decide on the location of their stand within the 
area designated for resettlement (Interview with Mr. Khunou, 2009). In fact, to avoid 
conflicts around the location of the stands, the Development Committee had 
organised a draw: they set up a box containing papers with all the stand numbers 
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written on them, residents picked a piece of paper and were allocated the 
corresponding plot. That is how stands were allocated and Mr. Khunou asserted that 
everyone was happy with what they had got. 
 
Compensation for assets owned in Lekgoropane 
The Development Committee requested the plans of the houses in Lekgoropane in 
order to replicate them in the new settlement. Those who had the plans of their 
houses in Lekgoropane, like Mr. and Mrs Modise and Mr. Monei, provided them, 
while those who did not have any plans were to get standard houses, as drawn by 
the architects. In all cases, residents were assured that they would not only get a 
house of the same size and structure (regardless of the condition of the houses they 
were leaving behind), but that their houses would be bigger and/or have additional 
rooms. The size of the houses is one point on which the version of the informants on 
the ground and that of Mr. Khunou differ greatly. Indeed, all the relocated residents 
complained that their houses in Mafenya were smaller than the ones they used to 
have in Lekgoropane. Whereas, Mr. Khunou asserted that houses were on average 
30 per cent bigger than the houses they replaced, across all categories. During the 
meetings preceding the move to Mafenya, residents were also told that they would be 
able to see the foundations of their future houses and confirm the size and structure 
thereof.  
 
Other improvements or changes to the houses had to be negotiated and were 
subjected to trade-offs. Edward Boikanyo and Eric Kgaditswe pointed out that every 
time the architects gave something extra to the future homeowner, they took 
something away. This was confirmed with other interviewees, such as Ms. Tsiane, 
who indicated that she had a lapa (a low, circular clay wall constructed at the back of 
the house where visitors and friends are seated on social occasions) in her former 
house in Lekgoropane, and she agreed to give it up in order to have tiles in her new 
house. In the same way, Mr. Monei stated that, since the architects gave him a better 
ceiling, they did not finish the verandas, which still needed to be cemented.  
 
Residents were also told that they would be compensated for all the improvements 
brought to their homes as well, such as gardens and garages; and that whatever they 
had that the mine was not able to replace would be subject to an indemnity.  
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These were the agreements as understood by informants in Mafenya, and confirmed 
by Mr. Khunou. However, the actual houses looked very different to what people 
expected. And all informants complained that not all other assets were compensated 
for; fences, in particular were never replaced. Instead, Mr. Modise explained that a 
truck full of fences came to the village and people had to buy their own fences. 
Community boreholes and trees were to be replaced or compensated for, but all the 
informants said that they were never replaced, and that no money was paid in 
compensation. Mr. Monei never received compensation for the farm he owned in 
Lekgoropane. He brought the matter to the attention of the lekgotla, but to no avail. 
 
Other claims 
Subsequently, other claims were put to the Development Committee, such as an 
‗inconveniency fee‘ for having to move from one village to the other. Mr. Khunou 
recalls that they ―won that battle”, arguing that residents got better structures in 
Mafenya, structures that they could not have built themselves, and that this in itself 
rendered any type of indemnity or ‗inconveniency fee‘ illegitimate and unjustifiable. 
 
Discrepancies between verbal and written agreements 
Once the stands in Mafenya had been attributed to the different households, and 
after the Development Committee and affected parties in Lekgoropane had 
discussed the compensation packages and (apparently) reached an understanding 
on the matter, the architects then went house to house in Lekgoropane to get the 
plans for the new houses approved and signed by their owners.  
 
Mrs. Modise explained that the agreement they had signed stated the value of the 
house and displayed the plans of the house to be built. The plans in the agreement 
were not those agreed upon during the consultation phase. Mr. and Mrs. Modise 
were told that indeed, the written agreement they were to sign showed different plans 
(for a standard house), but that their house would be built according to their own 
plans. Recouping information from the different informants, it seems that the 
architects were those who had those agreements signed and deliberately or 
ingenuously mislead the residents by telling them that although they were signing to 
have a standard house built, they would get their house built according to their 
original plans. In any event, it is clear that informed consent was not achieved on 
those particular contractual agreements. Whatever the case may be, when they saw 
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the foundations of their new house (under construction), they realised that it was not 
what they were promised and from then on, started a fruitless struggle to have the 
Development Committee adhere to what they had understood to be the agreement. 
Mr. Monei, Mrs. Pitso, Ms. Tsiane, Mr. Kgaditswe and Mr. Boikanyo went through the 
same tribulations, as they attempted, some through collective action, to make the 
Development Committee keep its promises. 
 
6.3 MOVING TO MAFENYA 
After dismissing complaints of residents regarding their new houses, the 
Development Committee then drew up a schedule for removals, all residents were 
told when they were scheduled to move and in Mr. Khunou‘s words, ―everyone was 
happy‖. People with trucks, bakkies and carts pulled by donkeys were hired by the 
Development Committee to transport the belongings of residents moving to Mafenya. 
They were paid according to the number of houses they moved, and as a result, 
there was a great efficiency in moving the maximum of households in the minimum 
time. “That‟s how we got people to move; […] it was a very smooth type of 
arrangement” (Interview with Mr. Khunou, 2009). 
 
Yet, several informants remember this experience as a source of anxiety, as they felt 
a lot of pressure to move speedily, Mr. Modise even compared it to Apartheid forced 
removals. The technique adopted by the Development Committee of hiring people 
who were being paid according to the number of households they could move in one 
day may well have contributed to increase the pressure, as truck drivers and donkey 
cart pullers themselves urged people to move fast.  
 
For Mrs. Pitso, moving was also quite trying: in the space of 24 hours she went from 
excited to disenchanted. When Mrs. Pitso and her husband went to visit their 
allocated house in Mafenya for the first time, the house was already complete and 
they were told to move in the following day. As they moved in their new house, some 
of their belongings did not fit in the house, furthermore, as there was no garage in the 
new house (as opposed to the older one), they had to leave these items outside the 
house. Although in many cases residents felt distressed, they did not offer much 
resistance; Mr. Monei explained that he could not refuse to move when everyone 
else had accepted, adding that he was confident that he would ‗get the same or 
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more‘ in Mafenya. And within two weeks, all households had moved to the newly built 
settlement in Mafenya.  
 
 
Picture 6-1: A typical ‘Category A’ house in Mafenya with pit latrine
*
 
 
6.4 POST-RELOCATION: OUTCOMES  
6.4.1 Outstanding issues 
Many issues that had been raised before the relocation remained unresolved after; 
and had just become more difficult to address. 
 
Mr. Modise said he moved into a house so small it could have fitted in his former 
dining room. The issue of the size of the houses on one hand, and the structure and 
quality of the houses on the other, were the two major issues in order of importance 
that the informants felt duped on. A few informants stated that they only realised the 
house and services were not what they had expected when they moved to the new 
settlement. However, members of the Relocation Committee confirmed that these 
matters had been discussed before the relocation, as houses were still being built.  
                                               
 
*
 As there was no sanitation in the new settlement, portable toilets (VIP toilet types) were 
installed inside every house. However, when people moved into their new houses the toilets 
started smelling. They were then closed, and pit latrines were built outside the houses in 
replacement. 
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Poor workmanship in the houses is an issue that is still adversely affecting many 
members of the relocated community. Two informants reported that the geyser 
started leaking a few days after moving in and many snags that were recorded were 
never fixed. Four informants complained about cracks in the walls, and two 
informants reported that they could hear and feel blasting under the ground for a 
while after they moved into the new house, a plausible explanation for the cracks that 
began to appear in the new houses. Although Mr. Khunou indicated that there was a 
five months ‗maintenance period‘ during which residents were able to submit any 
issues related to snags, most, if not all complaints were left outstanding. 
 
In 2002, the Relocation Committee organised door to door visits in the village and 
compiled a list of problems people were experiencing due to poor quality houses 
(such as cracks in the walls, leaking geysers etc.). This list was taken to the RBA, 
which in turn commissioned a group of youth to do another audit, as it appeared they 
did not trust the committee to be honest. Nothing has happened since then, and 
these issues are still outstanding.  
 
The compensation of assets such as trees, fences and boreholes were another issue 
which remained unattended to. 
 
Access to facilities and service delivery issues were also key. Lekgoropane was 
close to schools, and other facilities such as the graveyard; but residents now living 
in Mafenya are too far from these amenities to be able to walk there. As a result, they 
have to pay for transport to take the children to school; they also have to hire a bus to 
transport people to the cemetery, which is in Rasimone, when there are funerals, 
which is also a cause of important unforeseen expenses. All respondents complained 
about services, one issue in particular was street lights. Despite repeatedly 
requesting that street lights be installed, nothing happened, and people were feeling 
unsafe, a few years ago a child was raped on her way from school as she was 
walking back home, a regrettable incident which one informant attributed partly to the 
absence of street lighting (Interview with Mr. Modise, 2009). 
 
  
101 
 
Picture 6-2: The graveyard in Lekgoropane (2008) 
Back in Lekgoropane, the graveyard was left unattended, in the middle of a field and 
unsecured, when it had been agreed that it would be fenced (see Picture 6.2). 
 
6.4.2 Grievance redress mechanisms 
Issues were raised by the affected community on an ongoing basis from the start of 
the planning and consultation phase until several months after the relocation had 
taken place. Some were outright dismissed by the Development Committee, some 
were dealt with using deceit and empty promises to achieve temporary peace, while 
others were simply ignored until it became too late to address them. 
 
Although a formal public participation process was in place where the project was 
discussed and input could be provided, there were no dedicated mechanisms to 
receive and address grievances from the affected community. As a result, when 
agreement could not be reached in the formal consultation forum, or alternatively, 
when agreements reached during consultation were not honoured in the 
implementation phase, affected people had no one to turn to from the side of the 
mine. The only interlocutor available was the Development Committee, who kept on 
delaying any sort of intervention until people moved to the new houses and it 
eventually became too late.  
 
Mechanisms internal to the Bafokeng were available to people however, and were 
used in addition to consultation with the Development Committee. Mr. Modise for 
example asked the kgosana to intervene to address all the grievances that he raised, 
notably pertaining to the size and structure of his house and of the rooms. The 
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kgosana then wrote to the Bafokeng administration requesting assistance in resolving 
these issues. The Royal Bafokeng Administration organised a meeting with the 
architects in Phokeng to discuss the issues and after that, the architects came to Mr. 
Modise‘s house. They offered to build an extension separate to the house with two 
rooms. Mr. Modise is still very unhappy about the extension that was built, it is barely 
the size of a garage and he considers that it is no compensation for the house being 
so small. Mrs. Pitso also criticised the kgosana‘s representation and said that they 
felt abandoned by the authority. She added that after the relocation debacle, she 
didn‘t feel that if she raised a concern to the authority, it would make any difference. 
 
As to Mr. Monei, he took his complaints to the lekgotla, but they did not follow up on 
it. During this process, and especially after former Kgosi Mollwane Lebone Molotlegi 
died (2000), the Bafokeng traditional authority was seen as furthering the interests of 
the mine instead of defending the interests of the community. 
 
Collective action failed as well: in spite of the Relocation Committee communicating 
the grievances of people they were representing to the Bafokeng administration, to 
mine officials and even the Kgosi (who all promised they would be resolved), nothing 
was done to address them. Mrs. Pitso reckoned that the Relocation Committee did 
what it could but it was facing more powerful forces. 
 
The Joint Venture agreement between the Bafokeng traditional authority and Anglo 
Platinum de facto entailed the displacement and relocation of the community living in 
Lekgoropane. Although residents were largely unhappy with both the outcome of the 
relocation process and the manner in which their grievances were dealt with before 
and after they relocated, their recourses were virtually non-existent as they were 
denied access to official records which might have proven that the community was 
deliberately mislead; attempts to negotiate the terms of the relocation directly with the 
facilitators (in this case the ‗Development Committee constituted by representatives 
of Anglo Platinum and of the Bafokeng administration) only led to unfulfilled 
promises; and their normal grievance redress mechanisms (through traditional 
leadership representatives such as the kgosanas) failed repeatedly. 
 
All informants in Mafenya indicated they were unhappy about the whole process and 
were better off before the relocation. The successive disappointments of broken 
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promises, the lack of meaningful participation of the affected community in 
decision making, coupled with poor representation and ineffective grievance redress 
mechanisms engendered a feeling of disempowerment that was perceptible during all 
the interviews with members of the relocated community, and brought them to a state 
of irreversible disgruntlement. 
 
6.5 THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF THE RELOCATION PROCESS 
6.5.1 A relative success? 
Displacement and relocation processes tend to be difficult for affected communities 
to say the least, no matter how well they are managed. In the case examined here, 
due procedures were followed, public participation was undertaken, and authorisation 
was obtained by the relevant government department. However, the uprooting of 
communities causes the destruction of immaterial and unquantifiable social ties that 
no social impact assessment expert can evaluate.  
 
As Sonneberg and Münster (2001, p.38) note: ―involuntary resettlement will always 
be accompanied by trauma. This trauma can manifest in many ways, for example, 
social disintegration, economic decline, depression, illness, violence, and 
environmental degradation. It is the degree to which the above manifest that often 
characterises the success or failure of a resettlement.‖ In comparison to other Mining 
Induced Displacement and Resettlement cases, the relocation to Mafenya can to a 
large extent be considered successful, as few of the commonly observed impacts 
were felt by the affected community, and where there were impacts, they were felt at 
relatively small intensity. 
 
Indeed, the relocation from Lekgoropane to Mafenya did not result in homelessness; 
each household was given a replacement house and residents who were living in 
shacks resettled into brick houses. Access to common property resources was 
maintained (notably grazing land) (see Picture 6.3 below) and food security was not 
threatened. There was no evidence that it had caused joblessness or marginalisation 
either; in fact, the host community was very welcoming according to one informant. 
Loss of access to public services was only relative in the sense that facilities and 
services were still accessible, but at a higher cost (in time and money). The 
displacement did not result in landlessness, although it did pose the question of land 
tenure security; and it did not cause absolute social breakdown, even though the 
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community experienced internal divisions as a result of the relocation process (cf. 
section 6.5.3).  
 
 
Picture 6-3: Communal land used for grazing 
 
It is reasonable to say then that the relocation process did avoid many of the pitfalls 
associated with MIDR; however, the affected community did experience a 
deterioration of its quality of life due to inadequate  and partial compensation for 
housing and increased costs of access to services. The implementers of the 
resettlement failed to restore, let alone improve, livelihoods and standards of living to 
pre-displacement levels. Furthermore, ensuring the long-term well-being of the 
resettled community necessitated the definition of roles and responsibilities post-
relocation, which they neglected, leaving people with no follow up support, and thus 
failing to comply with international standards and best practice (cf. sections 3.2. and 
3.3.). This arguably held people back and prevented them from moving on for a long 
time, many informants at the time of the interviews were still hoping to obtain fair 
reparation. 
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6.5.2 The effective impoverishment of affected communities 
The Development Committee did not envisage compensation in financial terms (i.e. 
cash compensation*), as Mr. Khunou explained, but rather in terms of better living 
conditions; the idea being to offer displaced people better living conditions in the new 
settlement. The criteria defining superior living conditions were however set 
unilaterally by the Development Committee and did not fully correspond to people‘s 
views of an improved quality of life. Indeed, while the Development Committee, and 
more specifically the Royal Bafokeng Administration component of the Development 
Committee, valued the ability to build roads in the settlement and the eradication of 
informal housing (i.e. tin houses), people on the ground valued proximity to facilities 
and services and the individual character of their homes. People effectively 
experienced a drop in living standards and consistently stated that they were better 
off before. 
 
Informants were very factual in their grievances (size of houses, cost of transport, 
lack of street lighting etc.) and they did not mention any loss of social capital per se, 
suggesting that the relocation did not have any significant impact on community 
institutions, social networks, the proximity of kin groups or potential for mutual help. It 
is also very possible that practical economic considerations may have overshadowed 
these issues. Indeed, the direct economic consequences of the relocation and the 
immediate deterioration in living conditions were more tangible and were in all 
likelihood felt more intensely; in addition, the gap between expectations that had 
been created and the reality of the process probably contributed to intensify this 
feeling. On the other hand, the organisation of the community against the relocation, 
or rather against the terms of the relocation, can be considered as the creation of 
new social capital. 
 
6.5.3 Divisions within the community 
Beyond its impact on individuals, the relocation also created divisions within the 
community. While informants in Mafenya indicated that they were not willing to move 
under the conditions set by the Development Committee, they pointed out that people 
living in shacks were happy to go to Mafenya as they were going to move into solid 
                                               
 
*
 Only boreholes were to be compensated by cash; the RBA did not agree to replace them as 
they had not been approved in Lekgoropane in the first place. 
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brick houses*. This is important in the sense that although many residents 
complained about the conditions of the relocation, and the broken promises of 
compensation, some, notably shack owners, were satisfied with what they had got, 
and as a result, the community was not fully mobilised, which, Mr. Modise reckons, 
helped the project proceed.  
 
Broken promises in relation to compensation also caused some havoc in the 
community. On behalf of community members, the Relocation Committee claimed 
money promised by the mine to replace community boreholes. It was agreed that the 
money would be paid to Eric Kgaditswe (committee member) and that it would then 
be used to replace the boreholes. Mr. Kgaditswe explained that they were 
unsuccessful in obtaining the said money, but subsequently, he became suspected of 
stealing the money and keeping it for himself by some community members. In 
Victoria (Australia) as well, conflict around mining projects spilled from formal 
consultation forums into interactions between families, friends, and caused divisions 
among the community: 
 
“The proposal has split the community like you wouldn't believe. I was 
accused of having shares in [the company] just because I've been 
laid back and haven't screamed „not over my dead body‟. I had to 
stand up in a public meeting. Just ends up in a screaming match at 
meetings. [People] accuse others in the community of not caring, why 
aren't they objecting, but not everyone wants to verbally object in a 
big way. Not everyone approves, but not everyone shows disapproval 
in this way.” (Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, 
p.19) 
 
 
 
Having the traditional authority involved in the relocation process created certain 
expectations in terms of the nature of the consultation that would be undertaken: an 
empowering one, emphasising inclusivity and meaningful participation. Such 
expectations were based on the traditional forms of participatory democracy that had 
                                               
 
*
 I have not been able to verify this as I have not been in contact with former shack owners. 
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prevailed at one stage in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that people used traditional institutions such as their headman and the lekgotla in an 
attempt to have their grievances addressed. However, traditional forms of conflict 
resolution and established forms of counter power are no longer fully functional in the 
Royal Bafokeng Nation. In fact, traditional forms of participatory democracy are 
progressively being eroded in the Royal Bafokeng Nation and counter powers are 
being undermined. As a result, the reality was one experienced by many relocated 
communities before them: where unequal power relations dictated the conditions of 
the relocation and where powerless communities had no recourses to defend their 
interests. The evolution and current nature of power dynamics in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation are explored in more detail in the following sections. 
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7. SOCIO-POLITICAL ISSUES UNCOVERED BY THE RELOCATION  
7.1 POWER DYNAMICS IN THE RELOCATION PROCESS  
7.1.1 Public consultation: an empowering tool? 
In South Africa, a public participation process (PPP) is mandatory for almost any 
project of a certain scale or impact, and any mining project for that matter. Proof must 
be given to the government department issuing the authorisation that all affected 
parties have been offered an opportunity to submit any comments and/or objections 
that they might have, in order to secure approval for the project. Public participation 
processes are designed to be empowering tools for local communities; however, 
there is no mention of the extent to which these comments and objections should be 
taken into account in the final project design and management. From this ambiguity 
stems much of the frustration and disillusionment experienced by people on the 
ground, who envisage public participation as involvement in decision making, while 
the project proponent and facilitators tend to view it as a box to tick. Due to the power 
imbalance prevailing in this type of relationship between mines and communities, it is 
the mine‘s conception of public participation that is imposed. This is what happened 
in the relocation case studied here. 
 
The need to relocate the people of Lekgoropane arose in 1997; the Bafokeng 
Rasimone Platinum Mine, a Joint Venture between the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ and Anglo 
Platinum decided unilaterally that the community would be displaced to allow mining 
activities (in this case: blasting) to take place. By the time the consultation process 
started in 1998, people in Lekgoropane were presented with a fait accompli, with no 
right to veto the proposed development.  
 
This is congruent with findings from the MMSD project which show that since mineral 
rights are often owned by the state, ―most often, consent of the people who live on 
and make their livelihoods from the land is viewed as unnecessary, as they have no 
right of decision. […]” (MMSD, 2002, p.143) (See section 3.2) Similarly, rights to land 
and in some cases mineral rights belong de facto to the Bafokeng traditional 
authority, who did not seek permission for the use of communal land, did not present 
the affected community with an opportunity to reject the project, and the rights of 
occupants, both formal and informal, have been abrogated. Since the ‗no-go‘ option 
was virtually non-existent, community members could only negotiate the terms of the 
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relocation, which turned out to be effectively predetermined anyway. This was only 
possible because although the mine was the project proponent, the Bafokeng 
traditional authority was involved in the Joint Venture and was therefore also an 
instigator of the relocation. This, combined with its position as land owner and land 
administrator, entitled the traditional authority to pursue the project it had for use of 
the land*. This made possible the displacement of the community of Lekgoropane, as 
decided by the owners and administrators of the land, with little meaningful 
participation from the community, who bears the disproportionate costs of the 
expansion of mining activities. 
 
Even though Mr. Khunou stated that consultation was key is eliminating disputes, and 
fostering buy-in, this was short-lived. As the process started, informants† did say they 
were ―excited‖ about the relocation and happy to move to Mafenya, as promises of 
generous compensation had created great expectations. However, informants 
ultimately found the process strenuous and unsatisfactory. 
 
The fact is that unequal power relations were very much prevalent in the public 
participation process and largely contributed to the frustration and general 
powerlessness experienced by people in Mafenya.  
 
7.1.2 An analysis of power relations during the relocation process 
People involved in this type of relationship with a mining company, in which 
livelihoods are at stake, experience powerlessness and frustration due to 
meaningless participation. In the Victoria case studies, as in the relocation case 
examined here, the discourse was centred on unmet expectations (of both the 
participation process and the outcome), and conflict. Indeed, people come to the 
discussion table with a variety of agendas and expectations; and views vary 
considerably among the different parties as to what participation processes are for 
and what roles each party should play. 
 
                                               
 
*
 In theory, all important matters relating to land are discussed with the community, however, 
in reality, the Kgosi and his advisors makes the final decision. 
†
 Only Ms. Tsiane was against moving to Mafenya at the time as the mine and the Bafokeng 
traditional authority had given affected people the option of relocating to another village and 
she had chosen to relocate to Robega. The kgosana in Lekgoropane however wanted 
everyone to move to Mafenya to have enough of his constituencies in that village. 
  
110 
As a result, informants in Mafenya, like informants in Victoria, Australia (See section 
3.1) experienced the public participation process for the relocation as stressful and 
conflictual, and in some instances felt uncomfortable or intimidated, and less free to 
provide their input as a result. 
 
Mr. Khunou painted a picture of the consultation processes as confrontational, as a 
case of ‗us‘ and ‗them‘, and used warfare analogies such as ‗winning the battle‘. The 
relocated community on the other hand envisaged them as forums of discussion 
aiming at reaching the best possible agreement for all. However, after they realised 
they had reached an impasse in these discussions, and that they could not have their 
concerns addressed, they also adopted a more antagonistic approach with the march 
to Legato and the creation of the Relocation Committee. 
 
Group organisation is a commonly observed response to a power imbalance: 
Labonte (1997) notes that powerless individuals in conflict with or opposition to 
organisations and people that are more powerful than they are tend to create an 
identity as a community group, in order to address the power imbalance (cf. section 
3.1.). This was in all likelihood the rationale behind the formation of the Relocation 
Committee in Mafenya, which constituted a strong source of advocacy and identity 
for its members. The Relocation Committee was perceived as doing what it could, but 
that it was not enough. 
 
People voiced their concerns on multiple occasions, to a number of decision makers 
and powerful actors (in the mine and the traditional authority), to no avail. The 
concerns raised by community members were never addressed by the people in 
charge; ‗participation‘ in the case of the relocation of people to Mafenya, was limited 
to mere information, and meaningless consultation. This exacerbated feelings of 
powerlessness, as traditional leadership structures, including Kgosi, were perceived 
as being not responsive to the local community‘s interests. Nothing changed after 
people raised their concerns, and they felt that whatever they said, it did not matter. 
In addition to their lack of power (i.e. the ability to bring about decisions that shape 
and determine outcomes) on an individual level, people in Mafenya suffered from the 
way the structure of the political and economic systems favours the interests of the 
mine over those of affected communities at the level of the system. 
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One of the main problems experienced by relocated people and associated with their 
powerlessness was thus the lack of effective entities where grievances could be 
addressed. The prevailing feelings of powerlessness and resignation were largely 
due to the major political and economic forces driving the process and the lack of 
meaningful participation. Members of the relocated community in Mafenya 
progressively lost control over their surrounding environment to more powerful 
stakeholders, and ultimately, they lost control over where and how they were to live 
their lives. This experience of the relocation process corresponds to the definition of 
powerlessness, as envisaged by Syme (cf. section 3.1). Members of the relocated 
community were powerless, insofar as they were able to express themselves but they 
were not listened to. When people who participate feel their input is disregarded and 
promises are broken, there is a break down of trust in the relationship. 
 
“I think the most damaging development was the alienation of the 
people of this community from the control of their own lives.” 
(Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.23) 
 
7.1.3 Broken promises and break down of trust 
Claus Offe defines trust as ―the belief […] that others will do certain things or refrain 
from doing certain things, which in either case affects the well-being of the holder of 
the belief […]. Trust is the belief that others, through their action or inaction, will 
contribute to my / our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me / us.‖ 
(quoted in Warren, 1999, p.47). Consequently, the building of trust over time is based 
on the perceived consistency, predictability and robustness of the behaviour of 
others.  
 
Broken promises result in a break down of trust in the relationship. In the same way, 
trust can be lost when people who participate feel their input is disregarded. There 
were examples in Victoria where people felt they were being listened to at the time, 
but subsequently felt ignored: 
 
“[…] I was surprised when I read the report though; it seemed a lot of 
things which appeared to have been taken on board at the time had 
somehow disappeared. […] A lot of things seemed glossed over or 
not put in which had been raised by the community. At the time I felt 
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like we were being listened to and it was a fair process, but when we 
saw the report it was as though there had been a hidden agenda. 
(Community participant, quoted in Cheney et al., 2002, p.25) 
 
Community members in Lekgoropane and then Mafenya experienced the same loss 
of trust. As issues that were supposedly dealt with during public meetings re-
emerged and ultimately became major bones of contention. Retrospectively, Eric and 
Edward believe they were deliberately misled into believing in the promises made in 
order to avoid a struggle. 
 
After it appeared that the Development Committee could not be fully trusted, the lack 
of independent information (emanating from an entity different from the mining 
companies proposing the project) became a cause for concern for many in Mafenya. 
Some informants claimed that they were provided inaccurate and misleading 
information. Many people in the Victoria case studies conveyed frustration with the 
degree of secrecy surrounding information on mining projects (cf. section 3.1), and 
informants in Mafenya had the same grievances. 
 
The impact of financial interests is according to Cheney et al. a major factor that can 
influence trust in mining – community relationships. Community participants in 
Victoria, Australia, found that financial interests skewed stakeholders‘ views on the 
proposed mining projects, whether they were mine officials, government agencies or 
‗independent‘ consultants‘. The architects contracted by the Development Committee 
were in the same situation of financial dependency towards the latter; it appears they 
promised a number of things to people in Lekgoropane regarding the type of houses 
they would get, and these promises did not materialise, the architects were ultimately 
accountable before the mine, and members of the community could not hold them to 
their promises. 
 
Communities in Victoria, Australia, deplored that government structures were so 
receptive to financial ―incentives‖: 
 
“[…] I found out that the mine had just given […] their bit of funding to 
the school. So I thought, well that's just to keep them quiet, you know, 
throw a bit of a thousand dollar donation at them every now and 
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again and that will shut them up.” (Community participant, quoted in 
Cheney et al., 2002, p.26) 
 
In Lekgoropane, community members themselves were not so impervious to the 
financial factor: according to one informant, some members in the Relocation 
Committee were allegedly co-opted by the relocation facilitators. Indeed, it appears 
that some members of the committee were given houses that they were not 
supposed to get in terms of the relocation agreements and suddenly ―became quiet‖, 
according to Ms. Tsiane, who used to be a member of the Relocation Committee. 
She did not elaborate but this clearly was an insinuation that some vocal elements in 
the committee were co-opted. 
 
In the same way community members in Victoria, Australia experienced the deceitful 
behaviour of mining companies (cf. section 3.1), people in Lekgoropane were made 
to believe in empty promises in order to ensure a relatively peaceful public 
participation process, and ultimately a trouble free move. 
 
I have had no reasons to doubt the truthfulness of the accounts that people in 
Mafenya provided. They were internally consistent, and the similar descriptions of the 
process, as well as the recurrence of certain grievances across the interviews also 
strengthened this belief. However, Mr. Khunou denied any problems regarding the 
size and structures of the houses provided, and came to the conclusion that 
everyone was happy with the way the process was conducted, with perhaps the 
exception of former shack dwellers. Mr. Khunou seemed very genuine, and I have no 
reasons to believe he was not truthful either. It is also possible that it all boiled down 
to problems of miscommunication and perceptions. Minutes of meetings could have 
possibly set the record straight on that matter. As a matter of fact, when they realised 
the promises were empty, Eric Kgaditswe and Edward Boikanyo from the Relocation 
Committee actually requested copies of the minutes, to support their appeals to have 
their issues addressed. According to mine officials however, no minutes were kept, 
even though informants saw someone taking minutes at those meetings. They 
requested the minutes from the Royal Bafokeng Administration as well, to no avail. I 
also asked for these public participation records, in order to document the 
consultation process. But neither myself, nor the members of the Relocation 
Committee could lay hands on them, suggesting that once more unequal power 
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relations were at play (see section 3.1.), and affected communities were denied the 
evidence they could have used to argue their case. 
 
Persistent refusal to access official records despite assurance that all legal 
requirements were complied with, that the process was transparent and without any 
major problems, and that there were no outstanding issues (cf. interview with George 
Khunou) could plausibly point to the deliberate misleading of the affected community 
with regards to what they could expect in their future location, and hence, validate the 
version of the story told by people on the ground.  
 
Mr. Modise started the interview, with this statement, which is a reflection of the 
overall feeling of the informants concerning the relocation: ―The process did not 
satisfy us, I am still feeling emotional about it.‖ The facilitators of the relocation 
created great expectations, but empty promises, the deliberate misleading of the 
people of Lekgoropane in order to ensure a peaceful move, and the consequent 
break down of trust caused bitter disappointment. 
 
7.1.4 Ideas for better relocation practice 
With its enticing promises, the relocation process created great expectations 
amongst the relocated community, but the reality was one of frustration, 
disillusionment, hardship and failed dreams. Indeed, in addition to the deliberate 
misleading of members of the relocated community with empty promises, the lack of 
meaningful participation and effective grievance redress mechanisms, together with 
poor representation, resulted in a break down of trust towards both the mine and the 
traditional authority, as well as divisions within the community. This echoes many 
other cases of communities affected by proposed or existing mining projects (see 
section 3.1). 
 
Informants in Mafenya felt that they paid a big price and that nothing was coming 
back to them, and that only the mine and the RBA would benefit from the project. 
They nevertheless had a few opinions to share about how the relocation process 
could have conducted to ensure more mutually beneficial outcomes. Informants 
notably stated that the RBA, the Kgosi and the mine would ―need to improve‖; that 
―they were together in this‖. They feel that the community has done everything it 
could: it has organised itself, appealed (individually and through the committee) to 
  
115 
their leaders (administration and kgosanas) to assist in resolving the numerous 
outstanding issues, asked the kgosi himself to intervene; spoke to mine officials on 
numerous occasions, but to no avail. They deplored that they, as members of the 
community were not well represented by the structures of the traditional authority, 
and by the Kgosi in particular, as he would have been able to address the issues 
raised by community members, but when asked to do so he did nothing. They added 
that improving infrastructure and services such as better roads and street lights 
would have made settling down in Mafenya easier. Better access to facilities would 
have also meant the relocated community was not burdened by the cost of transport 
to the graveyard etc. The lack of recreational facilities such as sports grounds means 
that children are playing in dangerous places such as illegal dumping sites or pits 
used for mining purposes. 
 
There is a major discrepancy between the accounts of all informants on the ground 
and Mr. Khunou‘s version of the story, notably regarding the promises that were 
made, the actual conditions of the relocation, and the level of satisfaction among the 
affected community. The negativity towards the resettlement was such that none of 
the informants could state what was good or better in Mafenya, the most positive 
comment was from Ms. Tsiane, who just said she ‗got used to it‘. 
 
7.1.5 Reflexion on the ambivalent position of the Bafokeng traditional authority in 
the relocation process 
Displacement and relocation of communities are inevitably difficult to say the least 
and in the great majority of cases, affected communities do not benefit from the 
development that caused them to move. In this sense, the relocation from 
Lekgoropane to Mafenya is no exception. In addition to this, such projects are 
characterised by unequal power relations that invariably favour the mining company, 
who then imposes the conditions of the relocation which can, and often do lead to the 
impoverishment of affected communities (cf. section 3.2).  
 
One major factor however, could have tipped the balance of power in favour of the 
relocated community. Half of the members of the Development Committee in charge 
of facilitating the process were members of the Royal Bafokeng Administration (the 
administrative arm of the Bafokeng traditional authority). This was in line with the 
Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine 50:50 Joint Venture agreement between the 
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Bafokeng traditional authority and Anglo Platinum. There was therefore reason to 
believe that the people of Lekgoropane would have a different experience; as they 
were facing not only the mine, but also representatives of their traditional leadership 
and administration. These representatives were in a position to influence the terms of 
the relocation, and as a result, the relocated community stood to benefit significantly 
from the unique position of their leadership in the decision-making process. The 
potential therefore existed to have the relocated community‘s concerns and interests 
taken into consideration, and defended by representatives of the traditional authority.  
 
Such dynamics were nevertheless not evident at all during the relocation and one 
can wonder why the traditional authority did not use its position in the Bafokeng 
Rasimone Platinum Mine Joint Venture to obtain fair relocation conditions for the 
community of Lekgoropane? To a certain extent, it is understandable that given the 
ambivalent position of the traditional authority, it was stuck between a rock and a 
hard place. Failure to strike a balance between conflicting responsibilities, and the 
fact that the Bafokeng traditional authority was fully committed to its position in the 
Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine resulted in the imbalance of power being even 
greater, as in the relocation case at hand, affected communities were not only facing 
Anglo Platinum as the project proponent, but they also had their own leadership 
defending its interests in the BRPM Joint Venture.  
 
There is an interesting analogy vis-à-vis the relationship between the Bafokeng 
traditional authority and companies mining on Bafokeng land on one hand, and the 
relationship between traditional authority and the apartheid regime on the other; 
notably regarding how traditional authorities derive and use their power. Ntsebeza 
highlighted the autocratic abuse of power and corruption by traditional authorities 
during apartheid, and pointed out that ―a large number of traditional authorities 
became “stooges” of colonial and apartheid regimes.‖ (Ntsebeza, 1999, p.83) (cf. 
section 2.1.4). In the same way tribal authorities created or coopted by Apartheid 
pursued a self-serving objective of empowerment and enrichment by acting as 
agents of the oppressive regime, the Bafokeng traditional authority has arguably 
found another, perhaps more acceptable way of achieving those objectives. In 
democratic South Africa, the well-educated and modern leadership of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation is resorting to the same self-serving, self-enriching methods used 
by apartheid created tribal authorities to protect their own interests. Even though the 
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public discourse stresses the benefits of this ‗synergy‘ to local communities, people in 
Mafenya tell another story, in which they have borne the social costs of mining 
induced relocation and hardly reap any benefits. The issue hence remains the same: 
does this alliance between the Bafokeng traditional authority and mining companies 
operating on Bafokeng land have to be at the expense of people on the ground?  
 
 
 
This research aimed at providing an account of a case of mining induced 
displacement and relocation, and uncovering the underlying socio-political dynamics 
at play during the process, that also characterise the power relations in the Bafokeng 
Nation. For instance, the relocation has shown how the Bafokeng traditional authority 
exercises its prerogatives as land administrator and how the concerns of affected 
communities can be disregarded even though they collectively own the land. It has 
shown the lack of counter powers to the traditional authority or rather the co-option of 
potential counter powers within the traditional authority. How do those issues of 
unequal power relations translate at a broader level in the Royal Bafokeng Nation? 
 
7.2 POWER DYNAMICS IN THE ROYAL BAFOKENG NATION 
People were presented with a fait accompli when they were told they would have to 
relocate, but also when they discovered the conditions of the relocation. Consultation 
was meaningless, and the relocation was conducted as planned by the Development 
Committee, regardless of the concerns raised and mitigation measures ‗agreed upon‘ 
during the public participation process. The fact that the Development Committee 
went through all the rigmarole of the public participation process but did not 
incorporate any of the essential concerns that the community had, reflects the 
tendency of mining companies to view public participation as a box to tick rather than 
a useful tool to empower local communities. More importantly though, it is 
representative of the leadership style prevalent in the Royal Bafokeng Nation, which 
maintains the appearances of participatory democracy (their website is a perfect 
illustration), but in fact imposes an increasingly authoritarian and centralised form of 
leadership. This is done not only by disregarding the input of members of the broader 
community, but effectively stripping traditional leadership institutions of their counter 
powers, thereby eliminating checks and balances and any potential for a functional 
balance of power, as shown in the next section.  
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7.2.1 Centralisation of power and disempowerment of local communities 
The proposed and now terminated relocation of approximately eighty households 
from Lekgoropane to Mafenya was characterised by latent social conflict throughout 
the process, punctuated by episodic eruptions of public dissension, and is to this day 
the subject of divergent and conflicting views from the various stakeholders involved, 
as was recorded during the fieldwork. In the case examined here, this conflict took 
place in the context of established legislation, formal environmental authorisation 
procedures with provisions for public participation, free media and free speech. 
Despite this recognised framework, there is still a lack of clarity regarding the roles 
and powers of communities in these consultation and decision-making processes, 
which can lead to disenchantment and frustration in local communities if expectations 
are not met, as well as a disintegration of trust. In the relocation case at hand, major 
community concerns were time and again dismissed and are currently still 
outstanding. The consultation of affected residents was for appearance‘s sake and 
did not materialise in meaningful participation. This is symptomatic of other 
consultation processes in the RBN, such as the Kgotha Kgothe, which is basically a 
public relations exercise, with little opportunity to formulate one‘s views on the vision 
and development path that the Royal Bafokeng Nation has adopted. 
 
Indeed, in the same way the community of Lekgoropane had no control over the 
conditions of the relocation and as a result, on how and where they would live their 
lives, people in the Royal Bafokeng Nation have progressively lost control over 
decisions affecting the community as a whole, including over the management of 
community resources. 
 
People on the ground are however reluctant to contest the current status quo and 
directly oppose the traditional authority. Much of the reason for this apparent apathy, 
particularly in poorer, less educated communities, is related to the fear of the 
traditional authority, fear of exile, fear of being discriminated against and not having 
access to resources such as land, and the link of dependency that bounds people to 
it. Indeed, the fear of chiefs is directly linked to their land administration prerogatives 
and the relationship of dependency that exists between community members and the 
traditional authority regarding access to land and resources. This is consistent with 
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Ntsebeza‘s argument that the fear of the Kgosi is deeply bred and is bound up with 
the privileges dispensed by him and his capacity to allocate resources. 
 
Despite having a number of forums to voice their concerns, dissident or simply non 
acquiescent voices are not only ignored, they can be severely repressed, as any form 
of undermining can ultimately be fatal to the survival of the traditional authority, as is 
be explored in the next sections. 
 
7.2.2 Degeneration of effective checks and balances  
Bafokeng history over the past century has been marked by a few significant cases 
showing that leadership decisions that were not based on broad support from the 
community were dealt with decisively.  
 
The incident where Kgosi Lebone, had to re-register the farms (purchased with 
community resources but registered in his name) in the name of the Bafokeng 
(section 5.2.2) shed light on the capacity of sections within the traditional authority 
and the community to check the abuse of power of traditional leaders in cases where 
they adversely impacted on the interests of the community as a whole. While the mill 
boycott (section 5.3.1), which opposed the ‗rebels‘ to the Chief, was a high point in 
authority contestation in the Royal Bafokeng Nation, and illustrated the powers of 
structures within the traditional authority (namely members of the lekgotla) to stand 
up against the excessive powers of the chief. 
 
However, one of the findings that came out of this research, is that the balance of 
powers in the Royal Bafokeng Nation has shifted over the last century and it appears 
that the community representation by the kgosanas (headmen), as well as tradition 
leadership structures such as the lekgotla, are not as influent, and as effective in 
defending community interests as they were in the early nineteenth century. In fact, it 
seems that from checks on the chief, they have become co-opted. To be sure, some 
people affected by the relocation resorted to the traditional channels of 
communication to voice their concerns (through the headmen and lekgotla) until they 
realised they were no longer working*. Key informants have mentioned that the 
                                               
 
*
 Even though resorting to the lekgotla to solve the compensation problem and empty 
promises was fruitless. The fact that Mr. Monei continues to go there to voice his concerns 
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traditional leadership was now like a monolithic bloc, and that kgosanas and 
members of the lekgotla were allegedly co-opted, through ‗gifts‘ and other incentives.  
 
This had led to the erosion of the balance of power and progressive and insidious 
establishment of authoritarian rule in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. This research 
shows that people have progressively lost control over the management and use of 
community resources (notably land) and in parallel, the ability to enforce checks and 
balances on kgosi‘s power (through the lekgotla for example), which has resulted in a 
shift in the balance of power in favour of the traditional authority. As communities 
have been stripped of their powers, and checks and balances within the Bafokeng 
Traditional Leadership structures have been co-opted, the balance of powers has 
progressively ceased to function, resulting in an increasingly centralised and 
autocratic power. The root cause of this change in power relations over the years is 
the necessity to assert control over resources, in order to maintain both political and 
financial power. 
 
7.3 THE SOURCES OF POWER 
The Bafokeng traditional authority derives its power from two main sources: first, and 
most critical source of power is the control over communal land resources, and 
second is the control over mining revenues and other community resources.  
 
The control over land (notably land management and administration prerogatives) is 
a source of power and legitimacy for the traditional authority to the extent that people 
depend on the traditional authority for land, and that these prerogatives are bestowed 
upon the traditional authority by virtue of both tradition and recent legislation. This 
power and legitimacy allows the traditional authority to control mining revenues and 
other community resources, which in turn reinforces its power, insofar as people 
depend on the traditional authority to access these resources, services as well as 
patronage; not to mention that control of the sheer financial wealth in itself is a source 
of power. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 
seems to be a sign that the lekgotla continues to be considered, at least for Mr. Monei, as a 
forum where one‘s voice can be heard and can matter. 
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These causality/dependency links are represented in a very simplistic and schematic 
way in the figure below, and are analysed in more detail in the next sections: 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Sources of power in the Royal Bafokeng Nation  
 
7.3.1 Control over community resources 
Control of mining revenues is what really is at stake as they are the primary source of 
the financial wealth of the Bafokeng. The traditional authority is the administrator of 
mining revenues, which are by far the largest source of funds in the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation. Mining revenues are administered by the Bafokeng traditional authority, 
which uses them to extend patronage and deliver services people depend on for their 
day to day lives (cf. section 5). 
 
Allocation and redistribution of these funds is contentious to say the least; the 
Masterplan, a medium term policy for development planning, is the vision driving 
infrastructural development in the RBN, from roads to schools. This plan was not 
developed in consultation with communities in the RBN, which is all the more cause 
for concern since it was mainly developed by consultants ill-acquainted with local 
contexts. 
 
The Bafokeng traditional authority would not control such massive financial resources 
if it was not for the fact that they had control over land, its management and 
administration, as is shown in the following section. 
 
Power (and 
legitimacy)
Control over 
financial wealthPower
Control 
over land
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7.3.2 Control over land 
Control of land is critical in understanding how the Bafokeng traditional authority (and 
other traditional authorities in South Africa for that matter), derives its power. It also 
explains to a large extent the evolution towards an increasingly autocratic leadership 
style (notably by repressing opposition and challenging concurrent land claims). In 
this respect, Ntsebeza‘s work has been extensively used as it provides a framework 
to understand the powers that traditional authorities derive from their land allocation 
prerogatives. And how traditional authorities have at times resorted to autocratic 
modes of government, as opposed to the traditional forms of governance based on 
participative democracy. Indeed, control of land is the primary source of political, but 
also financial power for the Bafokeng traditional authority, and is therefore of critical 
importance.  
 
The eagerness of the Bafokeng traditional authority to establish communal ownership 
of and control over land is not to be underestimated. Firstly, if legitimacy and 
popularity is declining, all there will be left to justify the rule of the Kgosi over the 
people in the Royal Bafokeng Nation will be the more traditional forms of authority, 
derived from the control over resources, and over the allocation of land in particular.  
 
Secondly, as outlined above, communal ownership of the mineral rich land by the 
Bafokeng is the fundamental premise for not only the payment of royalties by the 
mines to the Royal Bafokeng Trust, but also the ownership of shares and the 
formation of Joint Ventures with mining companies. Hence, if communal ownership of 
land is contested, which it is (cf. section 5.2.2), and sections of ‗Bafokeng‘ land 
ultimately become private, the whole economic structure on which the traditional 
authority rests on is bound to collapse, or at least undergo serious damage. This in 
turn ties back with the first argument since if the Bafokeng traditional leadership has 
less resources, its redistributive power will be considerably undermined, and so will 
its comparative advantage vis-à-vis local (democratic) government. This might be just 
enough to tip the balance of power and trigger a massive shift of (already shaky) 
allegiances towards the elected members of local government in the Rustenburg 
municipality (which does not mean this would not be equally disenchanting). 
 
The ramifications of the land question in the Royal Bafokeng Nation are far-reaching 
and touch every segment of Bafokeng society, the implications of equivocal 
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ownership of land are considerable, and the way this issue is resolved will have 
substantial social, political and economical consequences. The traditional authority is 
able to sustain lengthy judicial process and thereby discourage land claims. 
Nonetheless, concurrent land claims present the risk of striking right at the 
foundations of this financial wealth, thus severely undermining the very basis on 
which the Bafokeng traditional authority derives its power.  
 
7.4 RETAINING POWER IN A PRECARIOUS ENVIRONMENT 
There are a number of threats menacing the power of the Bafokeng traditional 
authority. The system described above (Figure 7.1), in which the Bafokeng traditional 
authority has control over people and resources, is only tenable as long as members 
of the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ feel they have a say in decisions affecting the community and 
that resources are used appropriately and for the benefit of the community as a 
whole, (based on the fact that the land was bought by, and hence belongs to the 
community as a whole). However, signs of ailing support and discontent with the way 
the traditional authority is appropriating itself mining revenues and increasingly 
neglecting views from the people are visible and have been building up over time.  
 
Glitches in the system mean that it does not run smoothly, and as a result, the 
Bafokeng traditional authority has had to apply force to maintain the status quo. To 
be sure, this did not translate in physical force, rather, it entails an increasingly 
centralised and autocratic form of power, which effectively implied the 
disempowerment of ordinary community members as well as rendering traditional 
checks and balances inoperative. This strategy however, can only lead to further 
instability in the system, as people become increasingly unhappy with the lack of 
inclusivity (i.e. consultation), start questioning how community resources are used, 
and reclaiming control over them (including control over land), thus, threatening the 
very basis on which the Bafokeng traditional authority‘s power rests, and increasing 
autocracy and centralisation accordingly. 
 
The powers of traditional authorities in general are being questioned as democracy 
has been extended to all South Africans in theory. If the power exercised by 
traditional authorities is no longer justified by custom and constituencies themselves 
consider the traditional authority illegitimate, traditional authorities will lose their 
power, and with it, their land administration prerogatives, which will be given to a 
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democratically elected entity. As far as the Royal Bafokeng Nation is concerned, 
legitimacy and tradition alone cannot sustain the Bafokeng traditional authority in the 
long run, as there are already signs that legitimacy is dwindling. Therefore, a loss of 
power (due to declining control over the sources of power) in effect means the end of 
the traditional authority. Thus, the Bafokeng traditional authority has had to resort to 
more authoritarian rule in order to maintain power, as the bases on which its power 
rests have become increasingly shaky. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Chain reaction resulting in a decline of power  
 
From this perspective, one can understand the amount of effort that the latter makes 
to retain its power. If the Bafokeng traditional authority can maintain its control over 
the two major sources of power, it can maintain its position as the leadership of the 
Royal Bafokeng Nation, even if it is not backed by popular support. With this in mind, 
one understands the strategies of intimidation, co-option and corruption to artificially 
maintain support and effectively silence opposition. The cost of this strategy so far 
has been stripping the lekgotla and councils of their (counter) powers and 
disempowering people on the ground through dependency and intimidation, resulting 
in increased incidences of authoritarian and centralised power overriding traditional 
forms of participatory democracy. 
 
Control over 
land
Power (and 
legitimacy)
Control over 
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Power
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The Bafokeng traditional authority has resorted to increasingly autocratic and 
centralised forms of governance through the disempowerment of Bafokeng 
constituencies and the decline of effective checks and balances within the institution 
of Traditional Leadership, in an attempt to retain control over land and mining 
revenues, which are the two major sources of power in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. 
Those power dynamics were perceptible at the level of the relocation process, and it 
is argued, are representative of the trend characterising the current leadership style 
in the Royal Bafokeng Nation  
 
Beyond the relocation case examined, this thesis has argued that the wealth 
engendered by mining revenues, and the agreements that the Bafokeng traditional 
authority and mining companies entered in on the one hand; and the fragility of such 
wealth and contractual arrangements due to growing dissatisfaction within 
communities as well as competing land claims by individuals within the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation on the other (threatening the very basis on which this wealth is 
built), have contributed to shift the style of leadership in the Royal Bafokeng Nation 
from one emphasising participatory democracy and checks and balances, thereby 
tending to a relatively stable balance of powers; to a more authoritarian and 
centralised one, stripping institutions such as traditional councils and lekgotla of their 
(counter) powers, and co-opting representatives of communities on the ground such 
as the kgosanas. 
 
7.5 EMPOWERING THE POWERLESS 
As traditional checks and balances became inoperative, and the powers of traditional 
leadership institutions such as the lekgotla and the headmen started eroding 
progressively through cooptation and corruption, the broader Bafokeng society 
started to regain its responsibilities as the watchdog of the traditional authority, and 
some sections of the Bafokeng began to take up those issues.  
 
Indeed, abuse of power, absence of meaningful consultation, intimidation, 
appropriation of land and mining revenues are fuelling much discontent among some 
sections of the Bafokeng. Although no hard evidence of this was collected during this 
research, these are trends that emerged during the fieldwork, mostly in informal 
conversations with people on the ground, through statements that were made 
verbally and explicitly, but also through non-verbal reactions and implicit remarks. 
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As this thesis has shown, there are a number of reasons for the growing contestation 
of the traditional authority in the Royal Bafokeng Nation. Grievances do not only 
relate to the fact want to receive tangible benefits from mining, which is really the tip 
of the iceberg. More fundamentally, discontent stems from the increasingly 
centralised and authoritarian style of leadership imposed by the Bafokeng traditional 
authority, supported by its administrative and financial arms, upon people on the 
ground. While people generally respect decisions made by the traditional authority, it 
is the lack of inclusivity that has exasperated many members of the community, who 
feel they no longer have the opportunity to provide input and have a say in the way 
community resources are allocated.  
 
The status quo in terms of power in the Royal Bafokeng Nation is partly maintained 
because people feel intimidated to speak out and dissident voices are repressed. But 
sections of the Bafokeng are starting to organise themselves, just like group 
organisation was the response of the powerless to the powerful in the relocation 
process. The ‗Bafokeng Land Buyers Association‘, representing a group of 
individuals reclaiming land, is one example of this. As discontent grows and more 
and more people feel left out, while at the same time, a small elite is splashing on 
flamboyant stadiums, releasing ten digits financial statements and foreign made 
masterplans, this will become untenable. The sheer numbers might just be enough to 
tip the balance of power, in true Marxist revolution style.  
 
Perhaps a more plausible scenario would be one where the power of the traditional 
authority could be undermined by the loss of control over certain sections of land 
(should the land claims underway lead to such outcomes). Finally, control over land 
will progressively become less critical when platinum reserves become depleted, and 
the traditional authority might then concentrate on its asset management functions. 
These are just a few conjectures; the Bafokeng traditional authority probably has 
more elaborate plans for the future and, more importantly, there are undeniably ideas 
emerging from the ground promoting another vision for the Bafokeng, one that 
emphasises inclusivity and regaining control over community resources. 
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8. CONCLUSION - THE STORY BEHIND THE STORY 
8.1 GLOSSY PAMPHLETS VS. DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS 
―The Bafokeng royal family's disbursement of its riches is increasingly 
seen as an object lesson for South Africa in how to transfer wealth to 
the poor.‖ (Financial Times, 28 June 2008) 
 
“The Royal Bafokeng Nation […] a shining example of true 
community-based economic empowerment” (Mining Weekly, 6 July 
2007) 
 
―This is a people-driven, community-driven operation. We are using 
the traditional model where everyone has a right to the community's 
wealth to ensure we grow our people" (Business Report, 1 May 2005) 
 
I was warned at the very beginning of my research by a staff member of the Royal 
Bafokeng Administration that what I would find would not reflect what one can read in 
the newspapers, which is in essence a very elaborate and carefully planned exercise 
of papering over the cracks, reminiscent of Pangloss‘ mantra: “all is for the best in the 
best of all possible worlds”. She left it there, reluctant to elaborate, and leaving me to 
imagine what kind of Pandora‘s box I was about to open.  
 
It was not long until the fault lines started to reveal themselves, and this was before 
even speaking to any members of the relocated community. There is a lot more to 
the Bafokeng than what information can be found in the public domain. Certainly, the 
fact that the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ own assets valued at several billions of Rands is a 
distinctive feature of the community; as is the fact that hundreds of people are 
employed to manage this wealth like any other investors would, and to plan and 
implement development projects very much the way local government would. Those 
are all elements that make the Bafokeng stand out as a rural community governed by 
a traditional leader, and it is only fair that journalists focus on what makes the 
Bafokeng unique in South Africa. 
 
Behind the story reported by journalists lies another, less polished reality, which 
exposes the gap between the version of the story that is marketed to the public, and 
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the untold reality on the ground. Indeed, anyone who has spent a little bit of time in 
the villages of the Royal Bafokeng Nation, and spoken to people on the ground 
knows there is another story to tell: one that heavily questions the so-called 
‗community-empowerment‘ and the true benefits of mining to communities. There is 
so little space for critical minds in the Royal Bafokeng Nation that any opinion 
vaguely out of line with the accepted thought is kept almost like a secret. 
Nevertheless, the skeletons in the closet are beginning to reveal themselves, for 
those who know where to find them. Organisations such as Jubilee South Africa in 
particular are following developments in the Royal Bafokeng Nation and have issued 
several press releases about conflicts involving communities protesting against 
mining operations (see Appendix F for recent examples). 
 
8.2 THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY: REAPING THE BENEFITS WITHOUT BEARING 
THE COSTS 
At present, there are a number of stakeholders who benefit from the status quo in the 
Royal Bafokeng Nation. The traditional authority, for the reasons stated above, but 
also the mining companies, which have much of their stakeholder engagement 
facilitated through the involvement of the Bafokeng traditional authority, not to 
mention easier access to one of the richest platinum deposits in the world, as the 
Bafokeng traditional authority is the only interlocutor for all land related matters, these 
factors allow mining companies to save significantly on time and money, and access 
considerably valuable resources. 
 
Furthermore, there are various entities within the Bafokeng traditional leadership 
structures that gain from maintaining the status quo: the Bafokeng civil service 
depends on this system, as well as all the corporate entities, such as Royal Bafokeng 
Sports and Royal Bafokeng Holdings. This is much bigger than the chief‘s personal 
power and, it would be erroneous to consider the chief, as the sole promoter of the 
status quo. 
 
In this context, any changes to the status quo in terms of power relations in the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation could lead to massive consequences for the stakeholders currently 
benefiting from it. With stakes being so high, and too many people standing to lose 
from a change in the current arrangements, preservation of the status quo is critical 
in maintaining power and wealth. However, reaping the benefits of the status quo 
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comes at a cost which is borne by local communities, which in turn is much of the 
reason why the system is increasingly unstable. 
 
The Bafokeng traditional authority, more than the mining companies, is particularly 
vulnerable, as it stands to lose everything. The Bafokeng traditional authority was 
seen as furthering the interests of the mine during the relocation process, but given 
the context described above, the interests of the mine are the interests of the 
traditional leadership, insofar as they both rely on the status quo being maintained. 
Hence, more than furthering its corporate interests, the Bafokeng traditional authority 
is actually striving to ensure its own survival. 
 
 
 130 
9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Interviews 
 
The following people‘s interviews were used: 
 
Mr. Edward Boikanyo (18 November 2009) 
Mr. Eric Kgaditswe (18 November 2009) 
Mr. Isaac Monei (18 November 2009) 
Ms. Teresa Tsiane* (17 November 2009) 
Mrs. Pitso* (17 November 2009) 
Mr. Modise* (17 November 2009) 
Mrs. Modise* (17 November 2009) 
Mr. George Khunou (26 November 2009) 
 
Published 
 
Bennett, T.W. (1995), Human Rights and African Customary Law under the South 
African Constitution. Cape Town: Juta. 
 
Bergh, J.S. (2005), ―‗We must never forget where we come from‘: The Bafokeng and 
their land in the 19th Century Transvaal‖, History in Africa, 32, pp.95-115 
 
Bozzoli, B., with Mmantho Nkotsoe. (1991) Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life 
Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983, Johannesburg, Ravan 
 
Campbell, G.A. and Minnitt, R.C.A. (2001) Economic Trends in the Platinum-Group 
Metals Market. Minerals and Energy, vol. 16, no. 4, 2001. pp. 3–12. 
 
Cheney H., Lovel R., and Solomon F. (2002). ―People, Power, Participation: A 
Study of Mining - Community Relationships‖, MMSD Research paper. 
 
Coertze, R.D. (1987). Bafokeng Family Law and Law of Succession, SABRA, South 
Africa. 
 
Copans G., ―New empowerment company launched in North West‖, Mining Weekly, 
30th November 2007 
 
Cousins, B. (1996). ―Livestock Production and Common Property Struggles in South 
Africa‘s Agrarian Reform‖, Journal of Peasant Studies 23(2/3). 
 
                                               
 
*
 Not their real names. 
  
131 
Cross, C.R. and Haines R.J., (1988). Towards Freehold? Options for Land and 
Development in South Africa‟s Black Rural Areas, Juta. 
 
South Africa (Department of Land Affairs). (1997). White Paper on South African 
Land Policy. Pretoria: Department of Land Affairs. 
 
South Africa (2003) White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance. Pretoria  
 
De Vos A.S. (2001) Research at Grass Roots, A Primer for the Caring Professions, 
Van Shaik Publishers 
 
Gibson, R., (2006) ―Sustainability assessment and conflict resolution: Reaching 
agreement to proceed with the Voisey‘s Bay nickel mine‖, Journal of cleaner 
production, Vol 14 (3), 2006, pp.334 -348 
 
Gordon, B., M. Bertram, and T.E. Graedel, (2006) ―Metal stocks and sustainability. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America‖, 
103, no. 5, pp.1209-1214. 
 
Harvey, B and S Nish. (2005). ―Rio Tinto and indigeneous community agreement 
making in Australia‖ Energy and Natural Resources Law 23, no. 4  
 
Ife, J. (1995) Community development: creating community alternatives – vision 
analysis and practice. Melbourne: Longman. 
 
Keulder, C. (1998). Traditional Leaders and Local Government in Africa: Lessons for 
South Africa, Human Sciences research Council, Pretoria. 
 
Labonte, R. (1997). ―Community, Community Development, and the Forming of 
Authentic Partnerships: Some Critical Reflections‖, in Community Organizing and 
Community Building for Health. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Lahiff, E. (2000). ―Land Tenure in South Africa‘s Communal Areas: A Case Study of 
the Arabie-Olifants Scheme‖, African Studies, 59, 1, pp.45-69 
 
Mamdani M. (1996) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism, Princeton, Princeton University Press 
 
Manson, A. and Mbenga, B. (2003) ''The Richest Tribe in Africa': Platinum-Mining 
and the Bafokeng in South Africa's North West Province, 1965-1999', Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 29:1, 25-47 
 
Nriagu, JO (1990) ―Global Metal Pollution: Poisoning the Biosphere‖. Environment 
ENVTAR, Vol. 32, No. 7, p 7-11,28-33, 
  
132 
 
Nthau, N.L. (2002). The Possible Role of Traditional Leadership in Development 
Planning in South Africa – Case Study of the Bafokeng community in North West 
Province, MSc Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. 
 
Ntsebeza L. (1999) ―Democratisation and Traditional Authorities in the New South 
Africa‖, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and Middle East, Vol. XIX No.1, 
pp.83-93 
 
Ntsebeza L. (2004) ―Democratic Decentralisation and Traditional Authority: Dilemmas 
of Land Administration in Rural South Africa‖, European Journal of Development 
Research, Vol.16, No.1, pp.71-89 
 
Ntsebeza L. (2005) Democracy Compromised – Chiefs and the politics of the land in 
South Africa, Brill Leiden Boston, Netherlands 
 
Ntsebeza L. and Hall R. (2007). The Land Question in South Africa – The Challenge 
of Transformation and Redistribution, HSRC Press 
 
Oomen B. (2005). Chiefs in South Africa – Law, Power and Culture in the Post-
Apartheid Era, UKZN Press 
 
Peil, M. (1995) Social Science Research Methods, A Handbook for Africa, second 
revised edition, East African Educational Publishers Ltd. 
 
Peck P, Sinding K. (2003) ―Environmental and social disclosure and data richness in 
the mining industry.‖ Business Strategy and the Environment;12(3):131-46 
Pidwirny,M Fundamentals 
 
Robèrt K.-H., Schmidt-Bleek B., Aloisi de Larderel J., Basile G., Jansen J.L., 
Kuehr R., Price Thomas P., Suzuki M., Hawken P., Wackernagel M., (2002) 
―Strategic sustainable development - selection, design and synergies of applied 
tools ?‖, Journal of Cleaner Production 10 197–214 
 
RSA, Communal Land Rights Act (Act No. 11 of 2004), Government Printer, Pretoria 
 
RSA, Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (Act No. 41 of 2003), 
Government Printer, Pretoria 
 
Simpson, G.N. (1986). Peasants and Politics in the Western Transvaal, 1920-1940.  
MA Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. 
 
Soraya Spadavecchia O., ―300 000 said to benefit from community-based 
empowerment‖, Mining Weekly, 6th July 2007 
  
133 
 
Warren, M. E. (1999). Democracy and Trust, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
Reports and Papers 
Bench Marks Foundation, Review of the Corporate Social Responsibility 
Programmes of the Platinum (Limpopo), Gold and Uranium Mining (North West, 
Gauteng), and Coal (Mpumalanga) Sectors in South Africa, 2008, 154 p. 
 
Bench Marks Foundation, The Policy Gap, a review of the corporate social 
responsibility programmes of the platinum mining industry in the North West 
Province, 2007, 90p. 
 
Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Sustainability and Transformation Report 2007, 
30p.  
 
Conradie, A.S. Platinum Group Metals. South Africa‟s Mineral Industry 2000/2001. 
Department of Minerals and Energy. Pretoria, 2002. 
 
Department of Minerals and Energy, A Strategic Framework for Implementing 
Sustainable Development in the South African Minerals Sector: Towards Developing 
Sustainable Development Policy and Meeting Reporting Commitments - Discussion 
document, 2007 
 
Downing T.E. (2002) Avoiding New Poverty: Mining-Induced Displacement and 
Resettlement, MMSD 
 
Hoadley M., D. Limpitlaw, A. Weaver (2002), The Report of the regional MMSD 
Process MMSD Southern Africa, 77pp. 
 
Houston GF & FP Somadoda (1996), Constitutional Development and the Issue of 
Traditional Leadership in Rural Local Government in South Africa, Paper presented 
at the International Conference on the new South African Constitution, Umtata, 25-26 
April 1996 
 
International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) (2006) The Challenge of Mineral 
Wealth: using resource endowments to foster sustainable development - Analytical 
Framework 
 
International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM). (2006) The Challenge of Mineral 
Wealth: using resource endowments to foster sustainable development - Resource 
Endowment Toolkit, Assessing the socio-economic impact of mining 
 
  
134 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), (2007), Taxing Challenges: The 
Challenge of Mineral Wealth: using resource endowments to foster sustainable 
development http://www.icmm.com/document/196 (Date accessed January 15, 2008) 
 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM). (2003). Sustainable development 
framework. International Council on Mining and Metals.  
 
Minerals Council of Australia. (2005). Enduring Value – The Australian minerals 
industry framework for sustainable development 
 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD), (2002) Breaking New 
Ground, the report of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project, 
Earthscan publications Ltd. London, 410p. 
 
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development in Southern Africa (MMSDSA), 
(2002) The Report of the Regional MMSD Process, 77p. 
 
Mugodi, T.Z. and Fleming, D.R. (2003). A study of ICT diffusion into South Africa‟s 
platinum mining sector. Application of Computers and Operations Research in the 
Minerals Industries, South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy. Source: 
http://www.saimm.co.za/events/0305apcom/downloads/505-510%20Mugodi.pdf, 
accessed 27/08/08 
 
Sonneberg, D. & F. Münster (2001) ―Mining and Society – Involuntary Resettlement‖, 
MMSD Southern Africa Report on Research Topic 3, ed P. Kapelus, AICC, August, 
85p. 
 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) (2008), Mining-related 
observations and recommendations: Anglo Platinum, affected communities and other 
stakeholders, in and around the PPL Mine, Limpopo 
 
Government publications 
Statistics South Africa, Provincial Profile 2004: North West, Statistics South Africa, 
2006, 98p. [Report No. 00-91-06 (2004)] 
 
Unpublished and web resources 
 
www.bafokeng.com 
 
www.bafokengholdings.com  
 
www.bullion.org.za (Chamber of Mines of South Africa) 
 
www.implats.co.za 
  
135 
 
www.minerals.org.au 
 
www.forumforthefuture.org.uk 
 
http://www.miningmx.com/empowerment/728687.htm, ―SA's platinum nation‖, 
Sikonathi Mantshantsha, Posted: Thu, 29 Mar 2007  
 
http://www.miningreview.com/archive/021/08_1.htm, ―Anglo Platinum spearheads 
black economic empowerment in South Africa‖ 
 
Anglo American Sustainable Development Report 2007  
http://www.angloamerican.co.uk/static/uploads/SD%20REPORT%202007%20(SMAL
LER).pdf (Date accessed 28 January 2008) 
 
BHP-Billiton 2007 Case Study  
http://sustainability.bhpbilliton.com/2006/safety/caseStudies/safetyInTheSupplyChain
/catAlliance.asp (Date Accessed 1 February 2008) 
 
Cameron, H. and T. Goldsmith. 2007. Mine - Riding the Wave 2007. Johannesburg: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/ad4defb47a20ed0a852572f90
07200c7 (Date accessed: January 11, 2008). 
 
Environmental Law Institute 2004 Prior Informed Consent and Mining: Promoting the 
Sustainable Development of Local Communities  
http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/d14-01.pdf (Date accessed 15 March 2008) 
 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. 2002. Seven questions to 
sustainability. How to assess the contribution of mining and minerals activities. no. 
http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id=456. (Date accessed: January 15, 
2008). 
 
Miranda, M, D Chambers, and C Coumans. 2005. Framework for responsible mining: 
A guide to evolving standards.  
http://www.frameworkforresponsiblemining.org/docs.html. (Date accessed March 2, 
2008). 
 
Mtimkulu P. (2007), Traditional Leaders and the Constitution,  
http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=11615 (date 
accessed: 2009/08/06) 
 
Mudd G. (2007). The Sustainability of Mining in Australia : Key Production Trends 
and Their Environmental Implications for the Future  
  
136 
http://www.mpi.org.au/attachment/d016df19778a7c563cd1c99afe29c43a/f2065acefd
9648fc79d94181e9032269/1_SustMining-Aust-aReport-Master.pdf (Date accessed 
2007/03/19) 
 
 
Recommended further readings on Traditional Authority 
 
Precolonial and colonial eras 
Glaser, D. (2001), Politics and Society in South Africa – A critical introduction, 
London, Sage, pp.71-75 
 
Guy, J (1990), ‗Gender Oppression in Southern Africa‘s Precapitalist Societies‘, in 
Walker, C. (ed), Women and Gender in Southern Africa to 1945, Cape Town, Philip 
The Apartheid Era 
Comaroff, J. (1974), ‗Chiefship in a South African Homeland: A case Study of the 
Tshidi Chiefdom of Bophuthatswana‘, Journal of Southern African Studies, 1, 1, pp. 
36-51 
 
Mare, G. And Hamilton, G. (1987), An Appetite for power: Buthelezi‟s Inkatha and the 
Politics of Loyal Resistance, Johannesburg, Ravan Press 
 
Post-1994 
Koelbe, T and Lipuma, E (2005), ‗Traditional Leaders and Democracy‘ in Robins, S. 
(ed), Limits to Liberation after Apartheid: Citizenship,Governance and Culture, 
Oxford, James Currey 
 
Lehman, H (2007), ‗Deepening Democracy? Demarcation, traditional authorities and 
municipal elections in South Africa‘, The Social Science Journal, 44, 2, 301-17 
 
Mulaudzi, M (2004), ‗Chieftainship and its relationship to democracy past and 
present‘, in A Olifant, P Delius, and L Melzer (eds), Democracy X: Marking the 
present/Re-presenting the past, Pretoria, University of South Africa  
 
Van Kessel, I and Oomen, B (1997), ‗ One chief, one vote: the revival of traditional 
authorities in post-apartheid South Africa‘, African Affairs, 96 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
TIMELINE  
OF BAFOKENG LEADERS  
FROM 19
TH
 CENTURY TO 
DATE 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
IFC PS 5 AND  
WORLD BANK OP 4.12 ON 
INVOLUNTARY 
RESETTLEMENT 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
AUTHORISATION TO 
CONDUCT FIELDWORK AND 
CONSENT LETTER FOR 
PARTICIPANTS  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
DEEDS REGISTRY 
DOCUMENTS FOR FARMS 
BOSHKOPPIE 104JQ AND 
STYLDRIFT 90JQ 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
‗BAFOKENG LAND BUYERS 
ASSOCIATION‘ PRESS 
RELEASE ON PENDING LAND 
CLAIM 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Bafokeng Land Buyers Association  
 
Tuesday, December 8, 2009 
Tshasa  
Thekwana and Photsaneng Land Claims 
By Gash Nape 
In 1906, our forefathers, the buyers of the farm in which we reside here in Thekwana(Turfontein 
302JQ) today, lodged a land claim with the then Transvaal High Court. They were later joined by the 
claimants from our neighbouring Photsaneng on the farm Klipfontein 300JQ. 
The Court decided to hear the two claims together, as their merits were similar. 
In the end, the Court held that a section of a tribe could not hold title on land separate from the tribe.  
It is almost 103years since our forefarthers fought for their right to have the land they bought back in 
the 1870s registered in their names. On Thursday the 10th December 2009, the Mafikeng High Court 
will hear again the same matter. 
The Royal Bafokeng Nation has requested the Court to order the Minister to register our farms, which 
are still held by the Minister, in the name of the ‘Royal Bafokeng Nation‘. We and other sections of the 
tribe within the Bafokeng are opposing that the farms be registered in the names of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation but instead, they should be registered in the name of the original buyers. The very 
same argument that our forefathers argued in 1906.  
Last year, Klipfontein 300JQ was gazetted after the Land Claims Commission found the Photsaneng 
claim to be valid. We at Thekwana were promised by the Commission last year that our claim will also 
be gazetted as it is similar to that of Photsaneng. In fact the Minister opposed an Application by the 
Bafokeng last year in High Court when the Bafokeng wanted to transfer the farms. The Minister is a 
different person this year . We hope that since the decision of the Court in 1908 was based on racially 
discriminatory laws of that time, which made it impossible for our forefathers to have our lands 
registered in our names, it is possible today in our democratic, constitutional state that such 
transference and registration as we wish take place. 
We will oppose and contest the Bafokeng application until we have the land of our forefathers, our 
land, back. We will not be apologetic for that. 
Baphiring in Luka to hold a public demostration 
Baphiring in Luka village will embark on a public demonstration, picketing at the entrance of Luka 
Village, at seven in the morning or five in the evening, Wednesday 09th December 2009—writes 
Lucas Mekgwe. 
Baphiring are one of the three villages within the Bafokeng ‗tribe‘ who formerly lodged a land claim 
back in 1998. Baphiring have appointed a firm of lawyers, Gillfillan du Plessis to represent them in 
opposing transference and registration of their farms into the Royal Bafokeng Nation. Baphiring feels 
insulted by the manner in which Government has treated them on this matter, with different regimes in 
  
 
the ANC-led Government always preferring to work with the rich and mighty Bafokeng than with the 
meek and poor rural community who wants to assert and entrench their constitutional right to land. 
Chaneng Community Up in Arms 
Bachana of the rural Chaneng Village, a stone throw away from the international resort, Sun City, are 
furious about what they describe as ‗broad day land robbery‘ – writes Chaneng correspondent. 
Written evidence is available that shows that the farm Styldrift 90JQ, on which the Chaneng 
Community resides, was privately bought by five ‗natives‘ separate from the larger Bafokeng ‗tribe‘.  
The Community is infuriated by the manner in which mining rights on their land have been 
expropriated. Anglo Platinum has entered in mining deals with the Bafokeng tribal authority without 
due regard to the land buyers. The latest insult is the attempt by the Bafokeng tribal authority to have 
the High Court Order to the effect that the farm Styldrift 90JQ be registered in the name of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation instead of the original buyers. The Community asserts that they have always been 
ready and capable of administering their own title on land. The land claimants are working closely with 
Bafokeng Land Owners Association, which is a body of land claiming communities within the 
Bafokeng, The Association has recently exposed, through public submissions on the TLGF Bill, the 
historic coverup by the Bafokeng on private land purchases by indigenous communities forming the 
Bafokeng ‗tribe‘. The Community vows to expose injustices they suffer under Bafokeng and Anglo. 
Mogono fights the Bafokeng for their land 
Mogono Community has always been fighting battles in protection of their lands, Haartbeestspruit 88 
JQ (Melloe) and Klein Doornspruit 108JQ (Mogono). 
Between the years 1940 to 1950, the community destroyed invader settlements on their farm Melloe. 
The settlers are believed to have been the followers of a certain Geni. The invading settlers requested 
protection and assistance from the Bafokeng Tribal Authority, which they were afforded. In the end 
both the tribal authority and Geni lost, and the settlers relocated to settle on the nearby farm 
Rietspruit. In a recent fight, a certain Martin Diale wanted to plough on Melloe without permission by 
the Mogono Community. He was summoned to the Community Council (Lekgotla) and was ordered to 
vacate the farm with immediate effect. He opened a case against the Community and lost. 
On Thursday the 10th December 2009, the Community will engage again, this time against the 
Bafokeng Tribal Authority aka Royal Bafokeng Nation at the Mafikeng High Court against transfer of 
their farms into Bafokeng‘s RBN. 
Marakana Community says enough is enough! 
Some members of the Marakana community who have been in contact with the Bafokeng Private 
Land Owners Association have joined forces to stop the Mafikeng High Court‘s transference of their 
farm Tweedepoort 283JQ to the Royal Bafokeng Nation. 
The members rely on the affidavit written long ago in 1904 by Missionary PH Wenhold that the farm 
was bought for the community. At the time of purchase the community was under the leadership of 
Mahuma, Mogobodia and Modisakeng.  
The community members claim that they have been neglected by the Bafokeng for many years, with 
social developments in Bafokeng mainly earmarked for Phokeng and Luka villages. Members wants 
the court to rule once and for good on their land title. 
  
 
Why are Bafokeng land buyers angry? 
On the 22 October 2009, the High Court of Mafikeng, ordered in Case no. 999/08 that: 
1. A rule nisi is issued calling upon any interested person (other than the Minister and the Registrar of 
Deeds who do not oppose the Application) to appear in court on the 10th December 2009 at 10h00 to 
show cause why a final order should not be granted in the following terms:  
1.1 It is declared that the properties set out in Annexure A to the Notice of Motion are registered in the 
name of the Royal Bafokeng Nation, who is accordingly a registered owner thereof. 
What this means is that any person who is against the registration of the farms into the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation‘s name should appear before the judge on the 10th December 2009 at 10am and to 
request the Judge to set aside the Application by the Bafokeng Tribal Authority as represented by 
Lerou Molotlegi,  
The implication is that should there be no one appearing to contest the transference, the Court will 
order that all the listed farms be transferred and registered under the Royal Bafokeng Nation.  
One of the problems that have been raised with such transference is that the Royal Bafokeng Nation‘s 
administration itself may not be a democratic institution and it is not representative of all the bona fide 
members of the ‘tribe‘, as a result, everything happening within the Bafokeng will be controlled by 
anyone of Semena or Magosi or Lerou.  
A major problem is that the three could themselves be controlled by certain powerful people or 
companies who are not members of the ‗tribe‘ and who will either steal, misuse Bafokeng property or 
use the Bafokeng for a certain political agenda, detrimental to the South African constitutional state.  
The present outcry is that the Bafokeng is being used by the mining companies who are looting the 
platinum wealth beneath their lands, this with the support of unscrupulous government officials and 
politicians. 
Travel Arrangements to Mafikeng 
Four buses have been arranged to ferry people to the High Court on Thursday the 10th December 
2009. 
The buses will depart from Game at 6am. Any person wishing to go to Mafikeng to see and hear this 
important historic Court appearance for him/her-self, should sms or contact Mr. Nape on 0731988634. 
A light meal will be served and people must bring water bottles for themselves. Picketing outside the 
Court will start at around 8:30am. By 9:45am people will be expected to be seated inside the Court. 
The Court proceedings will commence at exactly 10am. 
A number of t-shirts will be given to the demonstrators for ease of identification. The media will be 
present and people will be expected to be behave in a peaceful and responsible manner. 
Those who will be traveling in their own cars, and wishing to join the others at Mafikeng, are 
requested to contact Michael Nape for support.  
The Court proceedings themselves are not expected to take more than two hours. Departure from 
Mafikeng will be at 1pm.  
  
 
 
In the Next Edition 
Tshasa is a publication of Bafokeng Land Buyers Association (―the Association‖). This newsletter is 
expected to carry news from all the communities forming the Bafokeng. It is the voice of the voiceless 
people of Bafokeng. 
The newsletter has a sister publication which can be found online at www.bafokeng-
communities.blogspot.com.  
Anyone can send a story either directly on the blog or by email to 
bafokengcommunities@gmail.com. 
Arrangemets are currently being made to avail the newsletters at strategic points where supporters 
and members of the public will be expected to buy a copy for R1. The money will be used to cover 
printing and distribution costs. 
People are encouraged to send in stories happening in their areas. It is belived that every village has 
a story to tell. Some say there is a cover-up to expose. Some of the cover-ups have been exposed 
through blogs such as the Rustenburg Monitor. 
A death, a marriage, a birthday party, a general meeting, an announcement, mining impact, pollution, 
job advertisement, anything, you can have it published here. 
The newsletter will accept donations to print at least 4000 copies to cover all the areas per month on 
an A3 paper. The total minimum cost is a mere R1 500.00. 
You can pledge by directly settling the printers‘ invoice for the print, a copy of which will be sent to you 
before publication! 
How chief August Mokgatlhe registered communities’ title deeds in 1906 
At the time the title deeds were registered in 1906, many chiefs (then called kaffir kapteins), were 
being used by the then colonial regimes for expediency. If whites wanted slave labour, they would 
simply consult with the kaffir kaptein. When government wanted to collect taxes, they would go to the 
kaffir kaptein. When the military wanted additional manpower for their frontline combats in a battle, 
they would use kaffirs supplied by the kaffir kapteins. 
When Mokgatlhe Mokgatlhe (‗Mokgatlhe‘) facilitated the purchase of land for natives around 
Rustenburg between the years 1871 and 1895, he did not display any malicious intentions to rip-off 
the land buyers. It was Mokgatlhe‘s grandson, August Mokgatlhe who started the furore. It was during 
his reign in the years between 1897 and 1906 that he plotted to register all the farms, bought privately 
by sections of the ‗tribe‘, in his name. 
The bulk registration of the community‘s farms in 1906, in trust for August Mokgatlhe, were on the one 
end out of expediency for the then colonial government to work with one obedient ‗kaffir kaptein‘ 
August Mokgatlhe, instead of the many leaders (‗petty chiefs‘) in the area. On the other end, the 
family of Missionary JHC Penzhorn (‗Penzhorn‘) went through an ordeal after the Missionary passed 
on. Faced with huge challenges on estate duties and poll taxes, the executrix, Penzhorns‘ wife, 
Henrietta, made a simple choice to handover all the title deeds, most probably with the accompanying 
buyers‘ lists to August Mokgatlhe. It is alleged that Mokgatlhe promised to pay off all debts on the 
  
 
farms on condition that Henrietta signed a declaration to the effect that the farms were bought by 
Penzhorn FOR Mokgatlhe instead of for the various sections of the ‗tribe‘. At the same time, the 
Missionary P.H. Wenhold refused to be coerced in making such a false, expedient declaration. 
Who is this Bafokeng Land Buyers Association? 
The Bafokeng Land Buyers Association (―the Association‖) is representative body of the descendants 
of the original buyers of private farms that forms over fifty percent of the current geographic area of 
the Bafokeng Tribal Lands, located around the town of Rustenburg, North West Province. 
The Association asserts that the racist colonial laws of the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries did not allow 
black people or groups of black people to buy and register farms in their individual capacities. 
Title to their farms is currently held by the Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform in trust for 
Leruo Molotlegi and the Bafokeng Tribe. 
The Association seeks to assist all persons in asserting their land and economic rights within the 
Bafokeng in particular and Rustenburg in general. 
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From: George Dor georgedor@gmail.com 
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:37:24 +0200 
To: george george@mail.ngo.za 
Subject: North West protest Anglo and Royal Bafokeng 
 
Please receive the release below from youth in communities around Rustenburg in 
the North West Province. Yet more dissatisfaction with Anglo Platinum and the Royal 
Bafokeng corporation. 
George Dor, Jubilee South Africa 
 
Today, 11 February 2010, the youth organisations and the communities of Mafenya, 
Chaneng, Robega and Rasimone leaders are without any business conditions 
pushing the R 10.5 billion Styldrift Project (Anglo Platinum and Bafokeng Joint 
Venture) Managers to shut down the operation within 24 hours. 
The BRPM JV which began bulk earth works without an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) has been clouded by a lack of respect to the afore-mentioned 
communities, even to the land owners and farmers. 
The unethical mine bosses and canny BRPM JV Executive are hopeful for 
prospecting license to be granted which will be reduced to non-issue when the 
Robega Community leaders meet this mid-week. 
The forceful closure of the 380 000 Pt oz per annum project of greedy capitalist has 
proven a GAP in the ANC-led government policies of Community Consultation.  
The consultation in question was in a form of informing the elderly traditional 
makgotla who are illiterate and lack understanding in many of constitutional and 
environmental rights. Amongst communities complaint leading to the unconditional 
Closure is:  
Violation of communities rights to a reasonable and just compensation as outlined 
in section 25 (3) of the bill of rights. 
No social and labour plan 
Unknown/ inaccessible Environmental Management Programme Report 
Farming and grazing land is destroyed without prior engagement and just 
compensation. 
Lack of benefits to local business and removal of an outspoken RBED official. 
Improper labor hiring 
The radical stance comes as a result of the said communities attempts to receive an 
ear to listen from the mine bosses but failed to conduct a community engagement 
process, which is viewed by platinum scramble leaders as partially informing the 
directly impacted communities.  
The question, is how long should the poor suffer? 
 
Joseph Magobe 
Chairperson and Protest Convener 
Chaneng Youth Organisation 
  
 
From: Anne Mayher akmayher@gmail.com 
Date: Sat, 23 May 2009 15:41:25 +0200 
To: akmayher@gmail.com 
Subject: Alert: Landowners Demand Impala Platinum/Bafokeng Prospectors Leave 
Their Land 
 
Jubilee South Africa, National Office 
Press Alert 
 
LANDOWNERS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE BAFOKENG AND IMPALA PLATINUM 
Rooidekraal, Near Sun City, North West Province, South Africa 
 23 May 2009, Saturday 15:00 
 
Landowners are marching to a prospecting site of Impala Platinum today, to give 
them notice to leave their land with immediate effect. They have not been consulted 
and they do not want any mining to take place. Despite this, a joint venture of Impala 
Platinum and the Royal Bafokeng have started prospecting on their land. The 
communities are planning rolling mass actions from today. 
As stated by the landowners, "Our grandfathers bought the two pieces of land in Brits 
with the following registration number 823-92-197JQ referring to land at Ward Hex 
River (some refer to it as Twee Rivier) and Ysterfontein 45 beginning in 1907, and 
finishing paying for these portions of lands in 1912." In 1923-1924 they were 
forcefully removed from these lands and resettled at Roodekraal Spruit. 
 
History of Land Claims 
 With the new dispensation in 1994 people were encouraged to claim for the land 
were they were forcefully removed. On 11 June 1997 we lodged our first restitution 
land claim and this was followed by the second claim on 28 September 1998. We 
lodged as a individual claims and communal claims with title deeds and shares 
including minerals lying underground. Our claim was Gazetted in 1999. After the 
Gazetting was done and we were assisted by two people who confused us, as the 
Roodekraal Spruit community. They started to mention the different entities that 
communities can claim land under, including a Trust, Communal Property 
Association and a Closed Corporation. They told us we should choose the CPA 
without even training us on the different entities mentioned above. 
 
With regard to Roodekraal Spruit where our forefathers were resettled, the 
government only allocated them 7469 Morgen 360 square without including the 
Ysterfontein hectare even though they were also forced out of Ysterfontein. 
 
 The agreement was for every 1 Morgen taken they would get 2.5 morgen back at the 
new place where they were relocated, but they only received 1.5 Morgen for every 1 
Morgen. They also promised three boreholes, but to no avail. In all the negotiations 
there were no Bafokeng tribe authorities or members, and that is why we are today 
  
 
surprised to hear that they have portion of our land. Most importantly we are against 
the Royal Bafokeng for also dispossessing us of our land. 
 
We now find ourself having to go to the land claims court and even embark on rolling 
mass action to protect and defend our land. 
It is against this backdrop that we are planing to hold a meeting on Saturday to inform 
all community members and to plan the way forward. We are inviting all media 
houses and Social Movements like Jubilee South Africa to also help us like they are 
helping those who are like us in Mokopane and Xolobeni - and many others that they 
are assisting. 
 
Issued by Mr. Jaconiah Mafoko (079 854 8917) and Mr. Sello Ditsela (072 222 0955) 
of Roodekraal Spruit 
For more information please also feel free to contact Jubilee South Africa's Brand 
Nthako at 082 628 1362. 
